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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH
CODE ANN.

§§ 78-2-2(3)0) and 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's motion to strike

Appellee's amended memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment?
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in interpreting a rule in
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration is a question of law reviewed under a correction
of error standard, with no deference accorded to the trial court's determination. N.A.R.,
Inc. v. Fan, 2000 UT App 62, 1 5, 997 P.2d 343, 344.
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a
motion to strike Appellee's amended memorandum in support of motion for summary
judgment. (R. 1207-12; R. 1512-20.) The trial court provided no written or verbal
rationale for its denial of the motion to strike. (R. 1532-34.)
2.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's motion to strike fact

exhibits contained in Appellee's amended memorandum in support of motion for summary
judgment?
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in admitting out-of-court
statements under the Utah Rules of Evidence "depends on "whether the trial court's
analysis involved a factual or legal determination or some combination thereof.'" State v.
1
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Parker, 2000 UT 51,113, 4P.3d778, 781. The trial court provided no written or verbal
rationale for its denial of the motion to strike. (R. 1532-34.) The trial court's decision
to admit the evidence over Gene Francisconi's objection to its lack of authentication, lack
of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, conclusory assertions and hearsay should be
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Klinger v. Kightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah App.
1995).

^
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a

motion to strike the exhibits. (R. 1170-72; R. 1173-1206; R. 1521-31.)
3.

P

Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined there was no genuine issue

as to any material fact regarding Appellant's employment contract claims?
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in concluding as a matter of law
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning summary judgment is a
question of law reviewed under a correction of error standard, with no deference accorded
to the trial court's determination. Robinson v. TripcoInvestment, Inc., 2000 UT App 200,
if 9, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 26.
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a
memorandum in opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the
employment contract claims. (R. 1239-44.) The rationale for the trial court's grant of the
motion for summary judgment is the issue presented for review. (R. 1536-37.)

2
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4.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined there was no genuine issue

as to any material fact regarding Appellant's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim?
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in concluding as a matter
of law that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning summary judgment
is a question of law reviewed under a correction of error standard, with no deference
accorded to the trial court's determination. Id.
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a
memorandum in opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim. (R. 1245-47.) The rationale for the trial court's
grant of the motion for summary judgment is the issue presented for review. (R. 1538.)
5.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined there was no genuine issue

as to any material fact regarding Appellant's defamation claim?
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in concluding as a matter
of law that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning summary judgment
is a question of law reviewed under a correction of error standard, with no deference
accorded to the trial court's determination. Robinson, supra.
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a
memorandum in opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the defamation

3
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claim. (R. 1244.) The rationale for the trial court's grant of the motion for summary
judgment is the issue presented for review. (R. 1537-38.)
6.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined there was no genuine issue

as to any material fact regarding Appellant's fraud claim?
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in concluding as a matter
of law that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning summary judgment
is a question of law reviewed under a correction of error standard, with no deference
accorded to the trial court's determination. Robinson, supra.

*#>

Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a
memorandum in opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the fraud
claim. (R. 1247-48.) The rationale for the trial court's grant of the motion for summary
judgment is the issue presented for review. (R. 1538-39.)
7.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's motion to amend his

complaint to include a claim of retaliation?
This issue is withdrawn on appeal due to Mr. Francisconi's determination that the
claim of retaliation is included in the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is a wrongful termination action and tort action arising out of the way in which

the termination was carried out. Appellant Eugene Francisconi ("Mr. Francisconi") was
4
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terminated by Appellee Union Pacific Railroad Co. ("UP") on April 26, 1996. On that
day, UP officials had accused Mr. Francisconi of irregularities in connection with certain
reimbursements for expenses. Two implied agreements providing for employment other
than at-will arise out of a meeting on that day, and two implied agreements were in place
before that.

UP breached its employment contracts with Mr. Francisconi when it

terminated him for alleged expense account irregularities. In addition to claims for breach
of an employment contract, Mr. Francisconi has brought claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, defamation and fraud arising out of the termination.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below.
After entry of an order denying Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike a majority of the

exhibits submitted in support of UP's motion for summary judgment (R. 1532), and
denying Mr. Francisconi1 s motion to strike UPfs amended memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment (id.), the trial court granted UP's motion for summary
judgment (R. 1536-40).
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Mr. Francisconi worked on the railroad for more than 25 years before he was

terminated. He began his career with the railroad directly out of high school. He started
as a laborer and worked his way up to a managerial position in six years. He received
regular merit awards and recognition for superior achievement. He was evaluated annually,
and always received the highest rating available to his managerial class. (R. 1216.)
5
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2.

In his position as safety manager based in Salt Lake City from 1990 through

his termination in 1996, Mr. Francisconi was required to spend approximately 50 percent
of his time traveling throughout the company's "western region," which included nine
western states from Cheyenne, Wyoming to the West Coast, and to conferences
nationwide. (R. 1252-53.) He was responsible for maintenance operations, which
included locomotive and car safety. The majority of his work-related time was "spent
traveling to the various locations in the region but [once there] my duties would entail
safety inspections, safety meetings, safety training." (R. 1252.)
3.

%-.-

The company's operations in Pocatello, Idaho, were a part of the western

region, and therefore a part of Mr. Francisconi's geographical area of responsibility.
During the relevant period (1994-96), Pocatello had the largest terminal in Mr.
Francisconi's area of responsibility, and employed about 1,200 personnel. (R. 1217.)
4.

By 1996, Mr. Francisconi had extensive experience with the company's

expense reimbursement policies, and the expense reports in question constitute a fraction
of the total number of expense reports submitted during the audit period of 1994 through
1996. (R. 1217.) Prior to April 26, 1996, Mr. Francisconi had never had an expense
report rejected or otherwise questioned in any way. (Id.)
5.

From 1976, UP caused a Personal Expense Manual and periodic updates

thereto to be delivered to Mr. Francisconi at his workplace. He thereafter read and

6
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retained the expense policy, and was familiar with its contents, including the "in lieu o f
lodging section. (R. 1217-18.)
6.

In 1987, after he became separated (and later divorced) from his then-wife,

Mr. Francisconi had an intimate relationship with Barbara Tower, another employee of the
company. At the same time, however, Mr. Francisconi was abruptly transferred to
corporate headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, to work for Arthur Shoener, a UP executive,
as a safety representative. (R. 1270.)
7.

^

In 1988, while in Omaha, Mr. Shoener told Mr. Francisconi on several

occasions that he too had had an intimate relationship with Ms. Tower. (R. 1218.) The
Omaha position was temporary, and Mr. Francisconi was reassigned back to Salt Lake
City nine months later, after Ms. Tower had left Salt Lake City and employment by UP.
(R. 1270-71.)
8.

Ms. Tower confirmed that she had an intimate relationship with Mr. Shoener

for several years in the 1980s (R. 1358-59) as well as 1993 through 1997. (R. 1362-63.)
9.

Mr. Shoener last spoke to Mr. Francisconi about Ms. Tower in 1995 or

1996, while they were both in Pocatello on business. (R. 1271; R. 1218.)
10.

Mr. Shoener, Vice President of Operations for UP, made the decision on

behalf of UP to terminate Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1352.)
11.

In 1994, UP caused a pamphlet entitled "Union Pacific General Rules for

Administering Discipline Effectively" ("UPGRADE Policy") (Appx. J) to be delivered to
7
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Mr. Francisconi at his workplace.

Mr. Francisconi read and retained the original

pamphlet that was delivered to him. At no time after receiving the pamphlet did Mr.
Francisconi receive any training or communication from any source that even implied the
UPGRADE Policy does not apply to managers. (R. 1218.)
12.

No company employee ever reported to Mr. Francisconi in his position as

a safety manager. (R. 1218.)
13.

^ ?r

Thomas Campbell, an Assistant Vice President of the company and Mr.

Shoener's assistant (R. 1219), instructed Gary Johnson, Mr. Francisconi's supervisor (R.
1215), to direct Mr. Francisconi to attend a meeting in Omaha on April 26, 1996. (R.
1324.) Mr. Johnson refused to disclose the purpose of the meeting. (R. 1254, 1256.)
14.

On April 26, 1996, Mr. Francisconi attended a meeting at the Red Lion

Hotel in Omaha, Nebraska. Once at the meeting, Mr. Francisconi was confronted by six
UP officers and agents, including several auditors, direct supervisors and a railroad
policeman, Gary Lottman. (R. 1254.) The meeting lasted four hours. (R. 1257.)
15.

During this time, Mr. Francisconi was shown copies of his expense

statements and accused of violating the "in lieu o f policy by, among other things,
purchasing improper items and claiming purchase of items as gifts for others when he or
his wife personally benefitted from the items. He was also accused of being a thief, a liar,
committing fraud, and abusing his position. (R. 1218.)

8
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16.

At the meeting, Mr. Francisconi was told that the company was considering

having him criminally prosecuted, and that the residences of his father and other relatives
could be searched for stolen items. (R. 1219.)
17.

Toward the end of the meeting, Mr. Lottman said to Mr. Francisconi: "What

do you think you need to do to keep your job?" (R. 1264.) Mr. Francisconi responded:
"Well, you tell me what I need to do. I'm willing to make restitution if you think I've
done something wrong. Tell me what you want me to do. And at that point in time, I
would have made restitution of any amount they said I needed to keep my job even though
I felt I was not at fault and even though I felt that I followed the ["in lieu o f ] policy."
(Id.) Mr. Lottman replied: "Well, the first thing you can do to save your job is to fill out
a statement." (Id.) Mr. Lottman admits he suggested to Mr. Francisconi that he provide
a statement. (R. 1344.) Mr. Lottman then dictated to Mr. Francisconi the contents of the
statement, and Mr. Francisconi wrote it out and signed it. (R. 1264.)
18.

Mr. Francisconi disavows the contents of the statement he signed. (R. 1215.)

He was not informed about the reason for the meeting in Omaha on April 26, 1996. He
walked into the hotel conference room set aside for the meeting, and was thereafter
interrogated, non-stop, for the next four hours by six persons, including Mr. Lottman.
Mr. Francisconi felt the meeting "was very grueling. Gary Lottman sat straight across
from me. Stared at me the entire time. Very intimidating meeting." (R. 1257.) During

9
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the meeting, Mr. Lottman accused Mr. Francisconi of being a liar and a thief, and
threatened him with criminal prosecution. (R. 1264; R. 1346.)
19.

Mr. Francisconi signed the statement because it was his "understanding that

by giving them this statement I was saving my job." (R. 1263.) In doing so, he was
relying on the statements made to him by other employees who had been audited, such as
James Gallamore, and who Mr. Francisconi thought had much more serious expense
account irregularities. They had told him prior to the meeting that they had been permitted
to keep their jobs after signing statements and making restitution. (R. 1263; R. 1216.)
20.

Only after Mr. Francisconi had signed the statement was he then informed

that doing so would not save his job as he had been promised. Neil Vargason, who was
the senior UP official present, told Mr. Francisconi that he faced dismissal, and offered
him two choices: invoke Level 5 UPGRADE or sign a resignation that UP officials had
brought with them to the meeting. Mr. Francisconi refused to resign, and accepted UP's
offer to place him in Level 5 UPGRADE. (R. 1265.)
21.

At the time of the meeting, Mr. Francisconi understood Level 5 UPGRADE

to mean that he would have the right to a hearing on the merits of his dismissal, and the
right to have committee review any adverse decision resulting from the hearing.(R. 1219.)
22.

Mr. Vargason admits that he may have mentioned Level 5 UPGRADE to Mr.

Francisconi at the meeting. (R. 1366.) Mr. Lottman admits that Level 5 UPGRADE was
mentioned. (R. 1345.)
10
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23.

Mr. Francisconi is not the only manager who believes that he qualifies for

the UPGRADE Policy. Alan Hill, who replaced Mr. Francisconi, testified that it is his
understanding that all company employees, including managers, qualify for UPGRADE.
(R. 1369-70.) He has never been told UPGRADE does not apply to him. (R. 1370.)
Robert Rupp, who was an assistant manager in Pocatello, also testified that he understood
all levels of UPGRADE to apply to all employees. (R. 1336-37.)
24.

After the meeting on April 26, 1996, Mr. Francisconi was not allowed to

return to company headquarters, where he had left his briefcase, without a continuous
escort. Upon his return to Salt Lake City that same evening, he was met by two railroad
policeman the moment he exited the airplane. He was told he must immediately relinquish
his company vehicle and the keys to his office. Without transportation, he made it home
only after obtaining a ridefroma co-worker who had been on the same flight. The railroad
policemen further told Mr. Francisconi he was no longer authorized to enter company
property. He was told that he would be contacted by law enforcement. (R. 1219.)
25.

Soon after arriving home and through May 17th, Mr. Francisconi

experienced extreme anxiety resultingfromhis dismissal. He broke out in hives for several
days and could not sleep. (R. 1219.)
26.

Between April 30 and May 17, Thomas Campbell telephoned Mr.

Francisconi at his home on three separate occasions. (R. 1267; R. 1374.) During each
of these conversations, Mr. Campbell demanded that Mr. Francisconi sign a resignation
11
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and release of liability agreement. He was told that he had until May 17,1996, to sign and
return the release. Among other provisions, the release would have required Mr.
Francisconi to waive any right to sue UP for wrongful termination. (R. 1219-20.)
27.

If Mr. Francisconi did not sign the release, Mr. Campbell threatened, he

would have no insurance from April 30, 1996, not receive COBRA medical coverage, be
prosecuted for criminal fraud, receive no accrued vacation pay, receive no pay for the
month of May, and would not be recommended to any prospective employer. (R. 1266-67.)
28.

Mr. Campbell knew before the April 26th meeting that Mr. Francisconi's

wife, SharFrancisconi, suffered from medical problems. (R. 1373.) Mr. Francisconi also
told Mr. Campbell during their conversations in May that his wife had had gall bladder
surgery on May 3,1996, and would again be undergoing nonelective surgery in June 1996
to remove a growth on her spine that was causing paralysis. (R. 1220.)
29.

At his wife's urging, Mr. Francisconi refused to sign any resignation

document, and notified Mr. Campbell of this fact on May 17th. (R. 1267.) Mr.
Francisconi informed Mr. Campbell he would be pursuing legal action to remedy his
wrongful termination. (R. 1220.)
30.

^

f

The health care benefits department of UP was directed by Rene Lillard, the

human resources director of the railroad operations department, which was headed by Mr.
Shoener, not to offer COBRA coverage to Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1355.) UP did not
initially offer COBRA coverage to Mr. Francisconi. (Id.)
12
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31.

Shar Francisconi was previously scheduled to undergo nonelective surgery

on June 5,1996. On June 3rd, Mr. Francisconi and his wife were contacted by the hospital
and informed that the surgery was canceled due to no insurance coverage through UP. The
surgery was rescheduled for July 8th. (R. 1220.)
32.

On June 20, 1996, Mr. Francisconi received a COBRA Election Form from

UP. The next day, Mr. Francisconi returned the paperwork to UP electing COBRA
coverage for his wife. (R. 1220.)
33.

On July 3, 1996, Mr. Francisconi and his wife received notice from the

hospital that the July 8th surgery would be canceled if coverage was not arranged by the
close of business that day. Shar Francisconi telephoned Larry L. Reiff, UP's benefits
administrator, to determine why COBRA was still not available. Mr. Reiff was not in his
office, and Shar Francisconi left a voice mail message. Mr. Reiff did not return her call.
Later that day, Shar Francisconi faxed Mr. Reiff a letter demanding that coverage be
provided. Mr. Francisconi and Shar Francisconi were informed later that day that COBRA
coverage was now in place and the surgery would go forward. (R. 1220.)
34.

Ms. Tower testified that she was told by Tom Haig, an employee of UP, that

Mr. Francisconi was terminated because he "was cheating on his expense accounts." (R.
1360.)

yt;

' -*••• "
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expense reports were first submitted. (R. 1571, at 3 n.3.) But when Mr. Francisconi
refused to resign, Mr. Johnson reversed himself and suddenly decided the stays were not
for a business purpose. {Id.)
46.

During the stays in Pocatello, Mr. Francisconi worked full days conducting

training and other related activities, including on weekends. (R. 1268-69; R. 1214; R.
1335.)
47.

UP alleged in the trial court that Mr. Francisconi was required to describe

in the expense reports each recipient of an "in lieu o f lodging expense. (R. 1025.) The
"in lieu o f policy does not require an employee to identify the ultimate recipient. (R.
1300.) A typical standard form used by Mr. Francisconi to seek reimbursement of
expenses, a copy of which is attached as Appendix I hereto, contains no directive to
include such information. (R. 1339-41.)
\. [• 48.

UP further alleged in the trial court that Mr. Francisconi had given items

later reimbursed as "in lieu o f expenses directly to third parties, such as relatives. (R.
1382.) But the "in lieu o f policy does not prohibit the host from giving an "in lieu o f
item to a third person. (R. 1300.)
49.

?

,

:

UP alleged in the trial court that certain items could not be given to the host

and then reimbursed. (R. 1392-93.) The "in lieu o f policy places no limitation on the
type of item that may be given to a host. (R. 1300.)
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50.

UP prepared reports describing the alleged misconduct of the employees who

were audited, many of which reports are contained in Appendix E. Summarizing the
reports of two of the three employees other than Mr. Francisconi who were terminated as
a result of the audit:
J.L. Frazier, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations. Reported fictitious
personal mileage that he claimed at $5,000; inappropriate meals and
entertainment charges totaling $3,200; altered and fabricated receipts.
Substantial evidence that he intended to defraud the company. (R. 1571,
Appx. E, at 3-4.) For instance, responding to a derailment in Laramie,
Wyoming, Mr. Frazier flew there on the corporate jet, but claimed personal
mileage traveling there. Changed a $40 receipt to $250 in connection with
entertainment of people involved in cleanup. Collected ticket stubs at
restaurants and used those as support for fictitious items. Obtained claim
checks that were in sequential order and used them periodically to obtain
reimbursement for fictitious items. Restitution: $15,500. (Id.)
G.L. Benham, Systems Consultant. On 20 occasions, reimbursed for unused
flight coupon but flew on the corporate jet. Reported 46 credit card
purchases in Mexico City, Mexico, even though amounts billed by American
Express disclosed the exchange rate used by Mr. Benham was less than the
rate used by American Express. Claimed between $30 and $45 for one-way
taxi fare from the Railroad's marketing and sales office to the Mexico City
airport although the current one-way fare is approximately $15. Submitted
duplicate requests for reimbursement on four occasions ($317). Expensed
a three-day trip to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, but was in Omaha the whole
time. Restitution: $11,928. (7d.,at4.)
51.

Other employees were permitted to keep their jobs despite their serious

violations of the expense policy. For instance, within Mr. Shoener's line of authority:
J.D. Gallamore, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations. Reimbursed
$1,984 for airline tickets. Paid for the tickets with his corporate credit card
and then was reimbursed twice, when he sought reimbursement for the
charge to his credit card and when he returned the coupon for
19
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reimbursement. Reported an airline ticket ($534) that was charged directly
to the company, even though the ticket coupon had been stamped "nonreimbursable" by the travel agent. Reimbursed $9,100 for 13 trips to St.
Louis (his home town), where he expensed weekend, holiday and vacation
days. The purpose of the business trips was not adequately explained.
Purchased 160 Omaha Steaks gift certificates with a value of $9,500. The
Company was told that the steaks and gift certificates were purchased for the
Company's Spot Awards Program; however, the steaks were distributed just
prior to the year-end holiday season and were issued to Mr. Gallamore's
cousin, his neighbor, unidentified persons, senior-level managers, and other
inappropriate persons. Reimbursed $6,540 for payments to Thomas
Campbell for staying at his house in lieu of commercial lodging. For part
of that time, Mr. Gallamore paid Mr. Campbell $55 per day. Reimbursed
on 43 occasions ($1,666) for entertainment of locally-based employees.
These 43 instances represented 37 percent of the workdays Mr. Gallamore
spent in the Omaha office during the 11-month period in question. Unable
to account for much of the expense report exceptions. Restitution: $5,202.
(Id., at 4-5.) "He [Mr. Gallamore] was suspended by Mr. Shoener and Mr.
Shoener told him to go home and don't come back to the office for a week
and think about why you want to stay employed with UP, and that was the
reprimand. Mr. Gallamore sacrificed his merit pay for 1997. He did not
receive a merit pay increase for 1997, and his bonus for the 1996
performance year, which would have been approximately $10,000, was not
given to him." (Zrf.,at5.)
52.

In a Minute Entry dated January 27, 2000 (Appx. A), the trial court denied

Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike UP's amended memorandum in support of motion for
summary judgment and denied a request to strike eight exhibits offered in support of that
memorandum. (R. 1532-34.)
53.

On March 7, 2000, the Hon. Stephen Henriod heard oral argument on UP's

motion for summary judgment (R. 1535.) On March 21, 2000, the trial court entered a
Memorandum Decision, granting summary judgment in favor of UP on Mr. Francisconi's
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five claims for relief. (R. 1536-40, Appx. C hereto.) On April 11, 2000, the trial court
entered judgment against Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1550-53, Appx. B.) On May 8, 2000, Mr.
Francisconi filed a Notice of Appeal from the entry of judgment in favor of UP. (R. 156162, Appx. D.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court over-stepped its authority in granting summary judgment in favor of
UP by acting as the fact finder rather than the gatekeeper who ensures that a genuine issue
of material fact exists. By requiring Mr. Francisconi to "persuade" it of the merits of his
claims, the trial court superimposed an improper standard on its determination of the
motion for summary judgment, and committed reversible error.
Sufficient evidence was submitted to the trial court to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to the existence of one or more implied-in-fact employment contracts with
terms other than at-will. Specifically, the "in lieu o f policy created an agreement that
Mr. Francisconi would not be terminated for using the policy in an appropriate manner.
Mr. Francisconi's use of the "in lieu of" policy is highly disputed.

Further, the

UPGRADE Policy that was delivered to Mr. Francisconi created an implied agreement that
he would not be terminated without the right to invoke Level 5 grievance procedures.
Irrespective of whether UP allowed managers to grieve dismissal, a reasonable person in
Mr. Francisconi's position would have believed that UP communicated through its conduct
and words its agreement to follow certain procedures before dismissal.
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UP also agreed to a relationship that was other than at-will when it promised, at the
meeting in Omaha, to allow Mr. Francisconi to keep his job if he would sign the statement
concerning the alleged audit irregularities. Mr. Francisconi's testimony, as well as the
admissions of Gary Lottman and Neil Vargason of UP, raise a genuine issue as to whether
UP agreed to not terminate Mr. Francisconi for his alleged abuse of the expense policy in
exchange for the statement and continued employment. Finally, the meeting also resulted
in a promise by UP that Mr. Francisconi could invoke Level 5 UPGRADE as an
alternative to signing a resignation document that was provided.

*,

With respect to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the trial
court substituted its judgment for that of the jury. It improperly resolved highly disputed
facts, and disregarded other facts, which together created a genuine factual dispute.
Similarly, Mr. Francisconi offered sufficient facts to raise a genuine issue as to whether
UP defamed him when it described him as a liar, a thief, and told third persons he was
terminated because he had been "cheating on his expense accounts." Finally, the fraud
claim was improperly determined by the trial court, even though sufficient facts were
offered to raise a genuine issue as to whether UP defrauded Mr. Francisconi when it
promised him it would not terminate him for the alleged audit irregularities if he would
sign the statement.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING GENE
FRANCISCONTS MOTION TO STRIKE UNION
PACIFIC'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD
BE REVERSED
In its minute entry dated January 27, 2000 (Appx. A), the trial court provided no
grounds for its decision to deny Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike UP's amended
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment. (R. 1532-34.) The basis for
the motion was UP's failure to submit a conforming memorandum in support of its motion
for summary judgment within the period ordered for the filing of dispositive motions.
Rule 4-501(1)(A) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires every motion
("except uncontested or ex-parte matters") to be accompanied by a memorandum of points
and authorities as well as any materials relied upon in support of the motion. The rule also
provides that a memorandum supporting a motion "shall not exceed ten pages in length
exclusive of the 'statement of material facts' as provided in paragraph (2), except as
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application." For a motion to be effective, a
party must (1) submit a memorandum of points and authorities, (2) submit an ex-parte
application for waiver of the ten-page limitation, and (3) obtain an order from the trial
court granting such waiver. Id.
On September 28, 1999, the trial court entered an amended scheduling order,
establishing October 29, 1999, as the discovery cutoff date, and November 30, 1999, as
the dispositive motion cutoff date. (R. 660-01.) On November 17, 1999, UP filed a
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motion to enlarge the dispositive motion cutoff date. (R. 803-06) The trial court denied
the motion to enlarge. (R. 818.)
On the last day ordered for the filing of dispositive motions, UP filed a motion for
summary judgment. (R. 819-21.) Its memorandum in support of motion for summary
judgment was 31 pages in length exclusive of the statement of material facts. (R. 822-52.)
UP also filed an ex-parte application for leave to file an over-length memorandum. (R.
979-82.) On November 30,1999, the day it was filed, the trial court denied UP's ex-parte
application. (R. 977-78.)
When the trial court denied the application for waiver of the defect in UP's nonconforming memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment, the memorandum
was thereby voided. Consequently, within the period ordered for the filing of dispositive
motions, UP had submitted only a motion without a supporting memorandum of points and
authorities. In the absence of a memorandum of points and authorities, the motion for
summary judgment was also defective. See R. 4-501(a)(A) Utah Code of Judicial Admin.
It may fairly be said that a party that submits an over length memorandum on the
dispositive motion cutoff date does so subject to the risk that the trial court may deny the
ex-parte application, and consequently that the memorandum may be thereby voided.
What is more, because the denial of UP's ex-parte application was entered on the same day
the application was filed, if UP had acted with the deliberateness that the situation
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demanded, it could have submitted a timely amended memorandum complying with the
page limitations set forth in Rule 4-501 (1)(A).
UP obviously interpreted the trial court's denial of its ex-parte application as a
voiding of its original memorandum. On December 17,1999, UP purported to file a paper
it entitled "Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment." (R.
1023-1163.) Because this "amended memorandum" was filed well after the date ordered
for the filing of dispositive motions, it should have been disregarded by the trial court as
untimely.
The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to strike the amended
memorandum. (R. 1532-1534.) Ruling without comment, the trial court gave no grounds
for its disregard of its own scheduling order.

(Id.) The ruling therefore has no

presumption of correctness. Ron Shepherd Insur., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 n.
7 (Utah 1994). But whatever the basis for the ruling, it was improper. UP never
requested a change in the scheduling order. Mr. Francisconi had the right to rely upon the
order as a rule of procedure adopted in this action. Scheduling orders "should not be
lightly disregarded." Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING GENE
FRANCISCONTS MOTION TO STRIKE FACT
EXHIBITS OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF UNION
PACIFIC'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD
BE REVERSED
With no rationale provided by the trial court for its decision denying Mr.
Francisconi's motion to strike eight of the fact exhibits attached to UP's amended
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment, the basis for the ruling is
unknown. As noted above, the ruling therefore has no presumption of correctness. Ron
Shepherd Insur., 882 P.2d at 654 n. 7. In view of the page limitations attending the
preparation of this brief, it is impossible to repeat in detail all of the grounds for striking
the exhibits that were raised in the trial court. Consequently, the supporting and reply
memoranda submitted in the trial court in connection with the motion to strike the exhibits
are attached as Appendices F and G hereto. The following is a brief summary of the
grounds for striking each exhibit.
"Application for Employment". This document was never authenticated. The
proponent of writings or other documentary evidence must first authenticate the evidence
by "showing that it is what the proponent claims it to be." State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d
898, 900-01 (Utah App. 1996). C/., Utah R. Evid. 901(a). In his deposition, Mr.
Francisconi testified he had no recollection of the document, which is dated August 10,
1970. (R. 1198.) UP offered no other evidence showing personal knowledge that the
"Application for Employment" is what UP claim it to be, namely, Mr. Francisconi's
employment application. Further, the document that was attached to UP's motion for
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summary judgment was not the same three page document offered at Mr. Francisconi's
deposition. (R. 1177-78.)
The "Application for Employment" is also hearsay. "Hearsay is v a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.'" Klinger, 889 P.2d at 1376 (quoting Utah R. Evid.
801(c)). Recognizing this, UP, in its response to the motion to strike, offered the affidavit
of Michael Bernard to qualify the document as a business record under Utah Rule of
Evidence 803(6).
For evidence to be admissible as a business record, a proper foundation must
be laid to establish the necessary indicia of reliability. That foundation
should generally include the following: (1) the record must be made in the
regular course of the business or entity which keeps the records; (2) the
record must have been made at the time of, or in close proximity to, the
occurrence of the act, condition or event recorded; (3) the evidence must
support a conclusion that after recordation the document was kept under
circumstances that would preserve its integrity; and (4) the sources of the
information from which the entry was made and the circumstances of the
preparation of the document were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.
[Trolley Square Ass's v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting
State v. Bertul 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983)).]
"The foundation must be laid using sthe testimony of the custodian [of business records]
or other qualified witness.' Klinger, 889 P.2d at 1377 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 803(6)). A
"qualified witness" has personal knowledge of the authenticity of the document. Id.
Mr. Bernard is the Director of Auditing of UP (R. 1470), and in 1996 held the
position of Manager - Auditing (R. 14712). In his affidavit, Mr. Bernard offered the
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following facts to establish himself as a "qualified witness," and to otherwise lay the
foundation required under Rule 803(6):
Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a copy of the Application for Employment of
Eugene Austin Francisconi dated August 10, 1970. Contained within the
Application for Employment is a statement of the Terms and Conditions of
Employment. The Application for Employment, including the Terms and
Conditions of Employment is part of the company's official records and is
maintained in the normal course of business within Mr. Francisconi's
personnel file. [R. 1471-72.]

&t;
v?;

Thus, Mr. Bernard, the Director of Auditing, does not establish any basis for his
alleged personal knowledge of the personnel record keeping practices of UP in 1970,
when the document was purportedly made, or at any other time. Indeed, he fails to allege,
to say nothing of establish, that the "Application for Employment" was prepared by a
person with knowledge or transmitted to a custodian of the record by a person with
knowledge; fails to identify the record keeping practices of the company pursuant to which
the record was supposedly maintained over the past 30 years as part of a regularly
conducted business activity, fails to identify the location of the alleged personnel file, and
so forth. As such, in addition to lack of authentication, the "Application for Employment"
was inadmissible hearsay.
Affidavit of John Ivester with attached "In Lieu of Lodging Schedule." Mr. Ivester
allegedly performed the actual audit of Mr. Francisconi's expense statements, and UP
offered his affidavit with attached schedule to establish that Mr. Francisconi had abused
the expense policy. (R. 1058-64.) Approximately one-third of UP's statement of facts in
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support of its motion for summary judgment were derived from Mr. Ivester's affidavit with
attached schedule. (R. 1024-27, at 115-7, 9-15,25-27, and 29.) He alleged, among other
things, that Mr. Francisconi had attempted "to conceal the nature of the purchased
merchandise," and referred to expense statements, receipts, unnamed "store personnel,"
unidentified "information to the auditor," unattached American Express statements, and
the like as the basis for the information contained in the schedule, and for his conclusions.
(R. 1058-64.)
But Mr. Ivester never established that the information he relied upon was subject
to a hearsay exception. The expense statements, receipts and "store personnel" were all
hearsay. Indeed, all of the information he relies upon is hearsay. He has no personal
knowledge to support any allegation in his affidavit or the attached schedule.
UP made no attempt to qualify Mr. Ivester as a records custodian or qualified
witness, and no foundation was laid to qualify the expense statements and receipts as
business records. Even if he had established this foundation, Mr. Ivester's summary and
conclusions drawn therefrom were still inadmissible because they were not prepared as part
of a regularly conducted business activity. Trolley, 886 P.2d at 67 (ruling summaries of
monthly statements were inadmissible because they were prepared in anticipation of
litigation, and not in the regular course of business) (quoting Shurtleffv. Jay Tuft & Co.,
622 P.2d 1168, 1174 (Utah 1980)).
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"Interview Summary" prepared bv Janice Arthur. UP alleged that Ms. Arthur
"took detailed notes of the interview" in Omaha, and "then prepared a written summary
of the questions asked and given by Mr. Francisconi." (R. 1026.) But in her deposition,
Ms. Arthur stated she prepared a report of the interview that was "a paraphrase based
upon my memory and the notes that I had, yes." (R. 1192.) These notes were hearsay.
The notes that she relied upon, she further stated, included the notes of "Mike Bernard and
Jim Hale" as well as her own. (R. 1191.) These notes were also hearsay. The "Interview
Summary," therefore was based on hearsay. UP never separated that portion of the
"Interview Summary" that was supposedly the product of Ms. Arthur's own recall of
alleged admissions from that portion that was a product of the notes of Messrs. Bernard
and Hale. Further, the "Interview Summary" only refers to an identified "I"as the source
of the questions that were allegedly asked of Mr. Francisconi.

These statements

attributable to "I" were hearsay. UP also asserted in its statement of facts that Mr.
Francisconi made certain admissions, none of which are actually contained in Ms. Arthur's
"Interview Summary." As such, the alleged admissions lack sufficient credibility, and are
hearsay (notes of Bernard, Hale or Arthur) within hearsay (Arthur's paraphrase of notes
or recollection).

*

"Summary" of alleged findings of corporate audit staff. In paragraph 32 of its
statement of facts, UP alleged that its corporate audit staff "prepared a summary of its
findings," and purported to attach a copy of that summary to its motion for summary
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judgment. (R. 1028.) In its response to the motion to strike, UP attempted to authenticate
the summary through the affidavit of Michael Bernard, and attempted to overcome the fact
that the summary was based entirely on hearsay by asserting: "Shortly after the
Francisconi interview, I prepared an Executive Summary of the expense report
irregularities disclosed by the audit." (R. 1471.) Clearly, the "Summary" is inadmissible
hearsay, and/or hearsay ("summary") within hearsay ("irregularities disclosed by the
audit").
Letter from Larry L. Reiff dated June 7. 1996. In support of the proposition that
it offered timely COBRA coverage to Mr. Francisconi, UP attached a purported letter
from Larry L. Reiff dated June 7, 1996. (R. 1028; R. 1137.) Mr. Reiff was never
deposed in this action, and UP did not file an affidavit from him to authenticate the letter.
It is also inadmissible hearsay.
Letter from Larry L. Reiff to Dennis Seals. In further support of the proposition
that it offered timely COBRA coverage, UP attached a purported letter from Mr. Reiff to
Dennis Seals of United Health Care of Utah. (R. 1029; R. 1139.) This document also
lacks authentication of any kind and is hearsay.
Letter from Rene Orosco to Kevin L. Newton, and letter from P.P. Matter to
Kevin L. Newton. In support of the proposition that the UPGRAPE Policy "has never
been applied to management employees," UP offered a letter from Rene Orosco to Kevin
L. Newton dated September 6, 1994, and a letter from P.P. Matter to Kevin L. Newton
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dated June 29, 1994. (R. 1029; R. 1162-63.) Neither of these three individuals was ever
deposed in this action, and they provided no affidavits. The letters lack authentication and
are hearsay.

i

In view of the clear inadequacy of the foregoing exhibits, the trial court abused its
discretion when it summarily and without comment admitted this evidence and,
presumably, relied upon the exhibits to grant summary judgment in favor of UP. The
remaining evidence4 was insufficient for UP to satisfy its ultimate burden of persuasion of
showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THERE IS NO
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT
CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT CLAIMS SHOULD BE
REVERSED
The Utah Supreme Court has summarized the standard for reviewing a trial court's
grant of a motion for summary judgment as

follows:

s

• ,

Summary judgment allows the parties to pierce the pleadings to
determine whether a material issue of fact exists that must be resolved by the
fact finder. In accordance with this rule, the party moving for summary
judgment must establish a right to judgment based on the applicable law as
applied to an undisputed material issue of fact. A party opposing the motion
is required only to show that there is a material issue of fact. Moreover, as
4

After striking the seven exhibits in question, the following exhibits remain: B
(deposition of Eugene Francisconi), D (Personal Expense Manual), F (Statement), G
(deposition of J. Neil Vargason), I (deposition of Arthur Shoener), J (proposed Separation
Agreement), K (deposition of Richard E. Messner), and N (UPGRADE Policy).
32
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to questions concerning material issues of fact, affidavits and depositions
submitted in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
may be used only to determine whether a material issue of fact exists, not to
determine whether one party's case is less persuasive than another's or is not
likely to succeed in a trial on the merits. Accordingly, because this is an
appeal from a summary judgment, we review the factual submissions to the
trial court in a light most favorable to finding a material issue of fact. A
genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record,
reasonable minds could differ on any material issue. [Ron Shepherd Insur.,
882 P.2d at 654-55 (internal citations and quotations omitted).]
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court purported to resolve factual disputes
that should have precluded summary judgment, and improperly placed the burden on Mr.
Francisconi to prove his case when he is only required to point to facts establishing the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. With respect to the employment contract
claims, the trial court stated:
Mr. Francisconi fails to make a persuasive case that either of these policies
[the "in lieu o f policy or the UPGRADE Policy] changed the nature of his
employment. Mr. Francisconi fails to marshal any arguments or show any
specific provisions in either of the above-referred to policies to indicate that
the nature of his employment changed in any way. Mr. Francisconi was an
at-will employee at the time he was terminated. [R. 1536-37, emphasis
added.]
The at-will presumption is just that-a presumption. Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores,
Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 400 (Utah 1998). An employee may overcome the presumption by,
among others, showing that an implied-in-fact contract of employment existed that
"prohibited an employer from terminating an employee without cause or without satisfying
other agreed-upon conditions." Id. Evidence of an employer's intention to modify the at-
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will relationship to create an implied-in-fact contract of employment may include employee
handbooks, company manuals, bulletins, oral statements, and the employer's course of
conduct. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1002 (Utah 1991). The
existence of an implied-in-fact employment contract is a question of fact for the jury.
Ryan, 972 P.2d at 401.5
A.

,

A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists as to Whether the "In Lieu Of" Policy
Shows an Implied-In-Fact Employment Contract
By 1996, approximately 50 percent of Mr. Francisconi's work-time as a safety

manager was taken up traveling from one location to another throughout a nine state area
of responsibility. (R. 1252-53.) The job of safety manager could not be performed
without extensive travel. (Id.) UP published the expense policy to Mr. Francisconi. To
induce him to perform his job as safety manager, UP agreed that it would not make Mr.
Francisconi's use of the "in lieu o f policy a basis for termination so long as the use was
proper.6 To suggest otherwise would be to say that UP and Mr. Francisconi impliedly
5

As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844
P.2d 303 (Utah 1992), "at-will employment is a bundle of different privileges, any or all
of which an employer can surrender through" an oral statement or other forms of
evidence. Id. at 307. "An employer can, for example, agree to use a certain procedure
for firing employees or promise not to fire employees for a certain reason, thereby
modifying the employee's at-will status." Id.
6

No Utah court has been asked to determine an implied-in-fact employment contract
in this context. However, Metcalfv. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 745 (Idaho
1989) is persuasive authority. In that case, under an employer's policy, an employee could
accrue sick leave at a rate of one day per month. While on full-time status, an employee
incurred some illness which required her to take sick leave. Although her illness did not
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agreed that he could be terminated for using the "in lieu o f policy even if the use is
proper. Mr. Francisconi did not agree to such a term, and UP could not attract qualified
employees if it had required them to self-finance travel.
UP claims it terminated Mr. Francisconi solely for alleged violations of the "in lieu
o f policy. (R. 1377.) Thus, in the event Mr. Francisconi's use of the "in lieu o f policy
was proper-and it was-UP breached its contract with Mr. Francisconi.
The question for the jury is whether Mr. Francisconi's use of the "in lieu o f policy
was proper. The trial court determined that Mr. Francisconi had violated the "in lieu o f
policy,7 even though he had presented evidence disputing the two main issues UP had

exhaust all of her accrued sick leave, the employee was absent for an extended period.
Later, the employee's manager reduced her status to part-time at least in part because of
her sick leave history. The employee sued for breach of employment contract. The
employer defended by asserting there was no written limitation on its rights to reduce the
employee's working hours. The trial court agreed with the employer, finding that the sick
leave policy did not "reach that level of specificity required to constitute an offer for
contract." The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that a material issue of fact existed
regarding whether, "by providing for accumulated sick leave benefits, the employer
impliedly agreed with the employee that the employment relationship would not be
terminated or the employee penalized for using the sick leave benefits which the employee
had accrued." Id. at 747. The Idaho Supreme Court applies the same principals as the
Utah Supreme Court to determine the existence of implied-in-fact terms of employment.
7

For instance, the trial court stated: "Mr. Francisconi did in fact misuse the v in lieu
of policy to the tune of approximately $2,500, using the policy to distribute gifts to
members of his family, not the person he stayed with on his business visits to Pocatello."
(R. 1538.) The trial court apparently had so concluded before oral argument on the motion
for summary judgment. Soon after Mr. Francisconi's counsel began to speak in opposition
to UP's allegations, the trial court cut counsel off. "That is not going to fly very far, Mr.
Burns," the trial court stated. "I mean if that's his explanation then he violated the policy,
as far as I'm concerned. That's a really lame (inaudible) to the allegation that he didn't
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raised in connection with the policy. Mr. Francisconi disputed the allegation that he failed
to give items to the host that were later reimbursed under the "in lieu o f policy (R. 1215),
and he showed he worked during each day he was in Pocatello in connection with the
disputed overnight stays (R. 1268-69; R. 1214; R. 1335). Each of those overnight stays
was also approved in writing by Gary Johnson, Mr. Francisconi's supervisor. (R. 1325;
R. 1214.)
The "in lieu o f policy did not prevent a host from using an "in lieu of" expenditure
to benefit someone else, and it did not require a detailed description on the expense report
of each meal, merchandise or other expenditure given to a host in lieu of commercial
lodging. (R. 1300.) Indeed, as Mr. Francisconi noted in his deposition, the "in lieu o f
policy expressly permitted an employee to give "cash" to a host. {Id.) The particular use
to which a host put the cash would, of course, be unknown. It therefore follows that a
host, such as Alfred Francisconi, could receive and then give an "in lieu o f expenditure
to a third person in the same way that he could accept cash and put it to any use, including
purchasing merchandise to give to a third person.
The only admissible evidence UP offered to prove that Mr. Francisconi did not give
the items to the host was the statement it coerced and defrauded from him at the meeting,
and Janice Arthur's notes of Mr. Francisconi's alleged admissions. He disavows the

use the policy properly." (Appx. H, at 16-17.) Counsel was not permitted to defend Mr.
Francisconi's actions.
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contents of that statement and swore in his affidavit that the admissions were fabricated.
It is for the jury to weigh his credibility in this regard.
B.

A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists as to Whether the UPGRADE Policy
Shows an Implied-In-Fact Employment Contract
The trial court asserted that Mr. Francisconi "fails to marshal any argument or show

any specific provision in . . . [the UPGRADE Policy] to indicate that the nature of his
employment changed in any way." (R. 1537.) However, Mr. Francisconi presented
substantial evidence that the pamphlet entitled UPGRADE Policy that UP published to him
provided certain procedures for dismissing him, thereby modifying his at-will status. See
Sanderson, 844 P.2d at 307.
The UPGRADE Policy states: "A formal hearing is required for Level 5 cases/'
(R. 1148.) A Level 5 case concerns permanent dismissal. (R. 1151.) Further, by way
of example only, the Overview section of the UPGRADE Policy states: "Discipline cases
for level 5 violations will be reviewed for consistent policy application by an Executive
Committee consisting of Representatives from human Resources, Labor Relations, and the
Employing Department." (R. 1145.) Similarly, "The UPGRADE Coordinator will be
consulted before an Employee is charged with a Level 5 offense, other than for Rule 1.5
(Rule "6")." (Id.) It is undisputed that UP did not follow the Level 5 procedures before
it terminated Mr. Francisconi.
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UP alleged in the trial court that the UPGRADE Policy was available to union
employees but not managers such as Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1032.) In support of this
proposition, UP referred not to the language of the UPGRADE Policy, but rather to two
obscure letters (id.) which Mr. Francisconi never saw, and which he moved to strike as
hearsay. It also offered the testimony of Arthur Shoener, who terminated Mr. Francisconi.
But Mr. Shoener admitted that he is unaware of any writing ever sent to employees stating
that the UPGRADE Policy is not available to managers, and could not point to a provision
in the Policy itself that says that. (R. 1350-51.) In short, UP presented no evidence that
Mr. Francisconi was ever told the UPGRADE Policy allegedly was not available to him.
UP's focus on its alleged official policy that Level 5 UPGRADE is not available to
managers was always a red herring.

The relevant evidence here is what did UP

communicate to Mr. Francisconi through its words and conduct that would have led a
reasonable person to believe that an offer to modify an at-will status had been made.
In addition to the specific language recited above, the first sentence of page one of
the UPGRADE Policy informed Mr. Francisconi that its procedures applied "across the
entire railroad system." (R. 1143.) The last sentence of that same page concluded: the
"UPGRADE Policy will achieve its goals and will be a benefit for all employees and the
company." Mr. Francisconi never received training on the UPGRADE Policy or was
otherwise told by anyone that it did not apply to persons in his position. (R. 1218.) There
was no reason for him to receive the pamphlet if it applied only to non-managers since he
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had not supervised employees since 1976. (Id.) As such, he had only the plain language
of the UPGRADE Policy itself to guide him on its application, and in this regard he
reasonably interpreted the language of the policy to mean what it said, namely, that it
applied "across the entire railroad system" and to "all employees," including managers.
Mr. Francisconi retained and still possesses the original pamphlet he received in 1994.
(Id.)

'-:-•"'

Mr. Francisconi was not alone in his belief that the UPGRADE Policy applied to
"all employees." Alan Hill, Mr. Francisconi's replacement as safety manager, testified
that the UPGRADE Policy applied to him (R. 1369-70), and Robert Rupp, formerly an
assistant manager, testified the UPGRADE Policy applies to all employees. (R. 1336-37.)
Also, it is undisputed that UPGRADE was first raised by Neil Vargason, the senior person
in the room at the Omaha meeting (R. 1366), and that Gary Lottman also mentioned the
UPGRADE Policy at the meeting (R. 1345). These facts created a genuine issue of
material fact.
C.

A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists as to Whether Union Pacific's Promise
that Gene Francisconi Could Keep His Job in Exchange for Signing the
Statement Shows an Implied-In-Fact Employment Contract
The trial court did not discuss or even mention this claim in its Memorandum

Decision. (R. 1536-40.)
Towards the end of the Omaha meeting, Mr. Francisconi asked UP's agents what
he could do to keep his job and avoid being dismissed as a result of the company's audit
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of the expense statements. (R. 1264.) Gary Lottman, in the presence of Neil Vargason,
offered to allow Mr. Francisconi to keep his job in exchange for writing and signing a
statement that Mr. Lottman would dictate to Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1264; R. 1344.) Mr.
Lottman admits he suggested Mr. Francisconi provide a statement. (R. 1344.)
Mr. Francisconi accepted this offer to modify his at-will status by writing out the
statement that Mr. Lottman dictated to him because it was Mr. Francisconi's
"understanding that by giving this statement I was saving my job." (R. 1264.) The
contract provision prohibited UP from dismissing Mr. Francisconi as a result of the audit.
By immediately dismissing Mr. Francisconi on that very basis the moment after he had
provided the statement, UP breached the oral agreement. Sanderson is on point and should
have precluded summary judgment on these facts.8 Mr. Francisconi's testimony coupled
with the admissions of Messrs. Vargason and Lottman created a genuine disputed fact.
D.

A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists as to Whether Union Pacific's Promise
That Gene Francisconi Could Choose Level 5 UPGRADE Shows an Implied-InFact Employment Contract
8

In Sanderson, the plaintiff, who was suffering from a serious illness of unknown
origin, was told by his employer to "take all the time . . . needed, do what needed to [be]
done. When [he] was ready to come back the job would be there." Id. 972 P.2d at 305.
When the plaintiff returned to work, he was informed that his supervisor was disappointed
in him and was told that he must accept a demotion or be terminated. The plaintiff chose
termination. The employee handbook explicitly provided that employment was at-will.
Following his termination, the plaintiff sued, alleging that his employer breached its oral
assurances that the job "would be there" when the plaintiff was ready to return to work.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the employer.
A jury could find that the employee had an implied-in-fact contract with the employer, the
Court held. Id. at 307.
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Here again the trial court did not discuss or even mention the claim. After Mr.
Francisconi had signed the statement and Neil Vargason and the others returned to the
conference room after conferring outside, Mr. Vargason told Mr. Francisconi that he faced
dismissal, and offered him two choices: invoke Level 5 UPGRADE or sign a resignation
and release of liability agreement that UP had brought to the meeting. (R. 1265.) Mr.
Vargason admits he may have mentioned UPGRADE to Mr. Francisconi at this juncture.
(R. 1366.) Mr. Lottman admits that Level 5 UPGRADE was mentioned as well. (R.
1345.) At the time, Mr. Francisconi understood Level 5 UPGRADE to mean that he
would have the right to a hearing on the merits of his dismissal, and the right to have a
committee review any adverse decision resulting from the hearing. (R. 1219.) Mr.
Francisconi refused to resign, and immediately accepted UP's offer of Level 5
UPGRADE.
By subsequently dismissing Mr. Francisconi without affording the Level 5
procedures, UP breached its oral agreement. Sanderson is on point here as well.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THERE IS NO
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT
CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS CLAIM SHOULD BE REVERSED
On this claim the trial court asserted:
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The allegations that Mr. Francisconi makes do not rise to the standard
required. Union Pacific had a right to terminate under the circumstances,
and the other allegations such as cutting off medical coverage and vacation
pay simply did not occur. In addition, credible evidence adduced on the part
of the defendant indicates that the allegations are not true. [R. 1538.]
The "standard required" to support a claim of infliction of emotional distress is
conduct which is "voutrageous and intolerable'" such that it offends against "vthe
generally accepted standards of decency and morality.'"

Retherford v. AT&T

Communications ofMt. States, 844 P.2d 949, 978 n. 19 (Utah 1992) {quoting Samms v.
Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961)). What that means is fact sensitive and a question
for the jury.9 In Retherford, for instance, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
the defendant was reversed due to conduct consisting of "shadowing [Retherfordfs]
movements, intimidat[ing] her with threatening looks and remarks, and manipulating]
circumstances at her work in ways that made her job markedly more stressful..." Id. at
969-970. UP's conduct pales by comparison.
UP's conduct, which the trial court apparently chose to disregarded because it found
that UP had a "right to terminate," may be summarized as follows:
During the April 26th meeting UP claimed that Mr. Francisconi was
a liar and a thief and threatened him with criminal prosecution (R. 1264; R.
9

"Juries are uniquely qualified to judge whether conductv falls above or below the
standard of reasonable conduct deemed to have been set by the community.'" Trujillo v.
Utah Dept. ofTransp., 1999 UT App 227, 142, 986 P.2d 752, 764 (quoting Darrington
v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 459 n. 4 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted)). Thus, "The court
[should intervene] only when it can say that the actor's conduct clearly meets the standard
or clearly falls below it." Darrington, supra (citing case).
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1219; R. 1346); it made threats to search the house of his father (R. 1219);
it subjected him to over 4 hours of interrogation and accusation without prior
warning and with no representation or opportunity to refute its accusations
(R. 1257; R. 1215); and it forced him to sign a statement in order to save
his job and then demanded that he resign or face criminal prosecution (R.
1264-65).
After the meeting, Mr. Francisconi was not allowed to return to
company headquarters, where he had left his briefcase, without a continuous
escort. Upon his return to Salt Lake City that same evening, he was met by
two railroad policeman the moment he exited the airplane. He was told he
must immediately relinquish his company vehicle and the keys to his office.
Now without transportation, he was fortunately able to obtain a ride home
from a co-worker who had been on the same flight. The railroad policeman
further told him he was no longer authorized to enter company property. He
was told that be would be contacted by law enforcement. (R. 1219.) Soon
after arriving home and through May 17th, Mr. Francisconi experienced
extreme anxiety resulting from his dismissal. He broke out in hives for
several days and could not sleep. (Id.)
A few days after the April 26th meeting, Thomas Campbell, an
Assistant Vice President and Arthur Shoener's personal assistant, sent Mr.
Francisconi a resignation and release of liability agreement. (R. 1220-21.)
For the next three weeks, and through May 17th, Mr. Campbell made at
least three phone calls to Mr. Francisconi's home, attempting to coerce him
into signing the agreement. (Id.) Mr. Campbell knew that Mr.
Francisconi's wife had had gall bladder surgery in early May, and that she
was scheduled to undergo non-elective surgery in June 1996. (R. 1237; R.
1373.) He told Mr. Francisconi that if he did not sign the agreement, his
health insurance would be canceled retroactively to April 30th and COBRA
medical coverage would not be offered, thus leaving him unable to pay for
his wife's surgery. (R. 1266-67.) Mr. Campbell also threatened Mr.
Francisconi with criminal prosecution, and told him that if he did not sign
the agreement then the company would deny accrued vacation, he would
receive no salary for the month of May, and any prospective employer
would receive a negative report about him. (Id.)
On May 17th, Mr. Francisconi informed Mr. Campbell that he would
not resign. (R. 1267.) UP thereafter acted to punish him. His wife's
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surgery had been scheduled for June 5, 1996, but had to be canceled two
days before that due to no insurance coverage. (R. 1220.) The surgery was
rescheduled for July 8th. Rene Lillard, a subordinate of Mr. Shoener's,
instructed the UP benefits department to not offer COBRA coverage to Mr.
Francisconi. (R. 1355.)
Mr. Francisconi had once dated Barbara Tower (R. 1270), who was
before, during and after the termination, the mistress of Arthur Shoener (R.
1358-59; R. 1362-63). Mr. Shoener knew that Mr. Francisconi had once
been intimate with Ms. Tower. (R. 1218.) Mr. Shoener made the decision
on behalf of UP to terminate Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1352.)

^

Of the 200 audited employees, only three in addition to Mr.
Francisconi were terminated or forced to resign as a result of the audit.
Most of those with audit irregularities were allowed to keep their jobs.
Indeed, of those employees within Arthur Shoener's line of authority (car
maintenance operations), only J.L. Frazier and Mr. Francisconi were
terminated as a result of the audit. (R. 1571, Appx. E, at 3.) Mr. Frazier
was, according to the Director of Auditing, Michael Barnard, the most
"egregious" violator of the expense policy of all 200 employees who were
audited. (Id.) By contrast, Mr. Shoener allowed James Gallamore to keep
his job even though, without question, his restitution amount of $5,000,
forfeiture of merit pay and a $10,000 bonus resulted from far worse
misconduct than that alleged against Mr. Francisconi. (Id., 4-5.)
Mr. Francisconi was singled out from all other audited employees.
He was, for instance, the only employee against whom UP pursued a
criminal case in connection with the audit. (Id., at 2.) A UP auditor was
unaware of any instance in which the company has ever made a criminal
referral as a result of an audit. (Id.) The arbitrary restitution amount chosen
by UP was easily the lowest amount paid by the four employees who were
allegedly terminated as a result of the audit, and was even less than other
employees who kept their jobs but paid restitution. (Id., at 3.)
A reasonable person could consider the foregoing objective conduct on the part of
UP, most of which UP does not dispute, outrageous. UP was motivated by the malice of
its number two official, Mr. Shoener, who seized upon the opportunity to punish Mr.
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Francisconi, a mere safety manager, for having a prior relationship with Ms. Tower. Mr.
Francisconi experienced subjective severe emotional anguish, including physical
manifestations. Accordingly, under the standard set forth in Retherford, a genuine issue
of material fact existed making summary judgment improper.10 The trial court had no
basis to say that UP's conduct clearly meets the standard or clearly falls below it. See
Darrington, 812 P.2d at 459 n. 4.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THERE IS NO
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT
CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
DEFAMATION CLAIM WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
AND SHOULD BE REVERSED
On this claim the trial court asserted: "Mr. Francisconi fails to show specific facts
admissible in court that there was any damage, or that the communication was not
privileged." (R. 1538.)
"A statement charging another with criminal conduct is slanderous or libelous per
se." Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286, 290 (Utah 1984) (citing cases). "Slander
per se does not require a showing of special damage because damages and malice are
0

The trial court disregarded evidence disputing its conclusion that "allegations such
as cutting off medical coverage and vacation pay simply did not occur." (R. 1538.) Cobra
coverage was not initially offered to Mr. Francisconi (R. 1355), and his wife's June 5,
1996, surgery was canceled due to the cancellation of his health insurance by UP (R.
1220). Indeed, but for the last minute intervention of Mr. Francisconi and his wife, the
re-scheduled surgery date of July 8th would have been canceled as well due to no COBRA
coverage. (Id.)
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implied." Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 321 (Utah 1979). Thus, to the extent the
statements attributable to UP concerned criminal conduct, the trial court erred when it
incorrectly assumed Mr. Francisconi had to prove damages in response to the motion for
summary judgement.
At the meeting in Omaha, UP, through its agents, said that Mr. Francisconi was a
liar and a thief and threatened him with criminal prosecution. (R. 1264; R. 1219; R.
1346). Further, Barbara Tower testified that Tom Haig, an employee of UP, told her that
Mr. Francisconi was terminated because he was "cheating on his expense accounts." (R.
1360-61.) It was defamatory for UP to allege that Mr. Francisconi was a liar and a thief,11
both statements impugning his reputation. UP obviously viewed the allegations against
Mr. Francisconi has criminal in nature, since it pursued a criminal case against him. (R.
1571, Appx. E, at 2.) The statement Mr. Hague made to Ms. Tower implied theft as well.
See 50 Am. Jur.2d, Libel and Slander, § 169 at 456-57 (implication of crime is
defamatory). See also, Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272, 274 (Utah
1951) (holding that statements concerning employee's discharge for dishonesty and loss
of money amounted to slander per se).

11

The elements of theft: "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof."
U.C.A. § 76-6-404 (1973). Theft by deception: "A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him
thereof." U.C.A. § 76-6-405 (1973).
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In addition to erring as a matter of law that damages had to be proven, the trial court
improperly found that the statements were privileged.

A defamatory statement is

qualifiedly privileged "in certain situations in which a defendant seeks to vindicate or
further an interest v regarded as being sufficiently important to justify some latitude for
making mistakes....'" Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991) (quoting
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts). A qualified privilege does not protect a
defamatory statement when the defendant acted with malice or the statement is excessively
published. Id.
"The issue of malice is ordinarily a factual issue." Id. at 59. {citing Lind v. Lynch,
665 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1983). Common law malice denotes ^personal hostility or
ill will.'" Id. {quoting Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 559 n. 1 (Utah 1988)). The evidence
of malice recited above raised a genuine issue of material fact that UP acted with hostility
or ill will toward Mr. Francisconi. Additionally, UP nowhere presented evidence that
there was no malice. See Lind, supra (summary judgment on slander claim improper
because defendant made no effort to respond to allegations of malice). Rather, it relied
upon the legal argument that the facts Mr. Francisconi presented could not satisfy the
standard to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Summary judgment was also improper because UP excessively published the
defamatory statement to Mr. Hague and/or to Ms. Tower. A statement loses its qualified
privilege when it is published to more persons than the scope of the privilege requires to
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effectuate its purpose. DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, 1 21, 992 P.2d 979 (citing
Brehany, supra). It did not further UP's purported interest in the audit to publish to Mr.
Hague, an employee of UP with no known connection to the audit, that Mr. Francisconi
had "cheated on his expense accounts." (R. 1360-61.) Similarly, Ms. Tower, who was
no longer employed by UP when the defamatory statement was repeated to her, had no
connection to the audit.
The trial court also found that truth was a defense in this case.
First, truth is a defense to a defamation claim and it is obvious that Mr.
Francisconi did in fact misuse the "in lieu of policy" to the tune of
approximately $2,500, using the policy to distribute gifts to members of his
family not the person he stayed with on his business visits to Pocatello. [R.
1537-38, emphasis added.]
Here again the trial court improperly weighed the evidence, and disregarded the
existence of facts which raise a genuine issue as to whether Mr. Francisconi violated the
"in lieu o f policy. Mr. Francisconi has disputed each and every allegation of abuse.
Moreover, the trial court applied the wrong standard in concluding that UP had a "right
to terminate."12 The existence of disputed facts concerning the elements of theft should
have precluded summary judgment in this regard as well.
POINTVI
12

"If a crime is imputed to the plaintiff, the defense of truth requires that the
defendant must fasten on plaintiff all the elements of the crime, both in act and in
intent.'" Auto West, 678 P.2d at 290 (citing cases) (finding that issue of intent was a
factual issue for the trier of fact). The defendant must prove the alleged criminal conduct
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing cases).
v
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THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THERE IS NO
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT
CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
FRAUD CLAIM SHOULD BE REVERSED
On this claim the trial court asserted:
Mr. Francisconi fails to allege specific admissible facts showing that
representations made by Union Pacific were false, that they were regarding a
presently existing material fact, and that he acted upon the representations. Mr.
Francisconi had nothing beyond his self-serving testimony to support his
argument on this issue. [R. 1539.]
Mr. Francisconi was confronted at the Omaha meeting with the purported results of
the expense audit and he asked what he could do to avoid being terminated at that time.
(R. 1274.) He did not request an assurance of future employment or release from future
acts in violation of expense policies. The conduct arising out of the audit and the potential
for termination were presently existing at the Omaha meeting. Indeed, UP terminated Mr.
Francisconi solely because of the audit. (R. 1377.) Mr. Francisconi asked what he could
do to keep his job on that day, and UP promised that he could keep his job if he signed a
statement on that day. (R. 1274, R. 1341.)
A jury could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that UP made a
misrepresentation to Mr. Francisconi, designed to induce him to sign the statement, and
that it was UP's intention when it made the misrepresentation to terminate him as soon as
he signed it. It could further find that Mr. Francisconi relied upon the misrepresentation
and was induced to act to his detriment.
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CONCLUSION
Gene Francisconi respectfully requests the following relief:
1.

That the trial court's order denying Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike UP's

amended memorandum in support of summary judgment be reversed, and the amended
memorandum stricken, and the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
UP be reversed due to the lack of a memorandum of points and authorities, and the trial
court's entry of judgment in favor of UP be vacated, and this action be remanded for a jury
trial on all claims set forth in the Amended Complaint.
2.

That the trial court's order denying Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike

exhibits contained in UP's amended memorandum in support of motion for summary
judgment be reversed, and the exhibits, or any of them, be stricken, and the trial court's
order granting summary judgment in favor of UP be reversed due to the lack of evidentiary
support, and the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of UP be vacated, and this action
be remanded for a jury trial on all claims set forth in the Amended Complaint.
3.

That the trial court's order granting UP's motion for summary judgment on

Mr. Francisconi's breach of employment contract claims, or any of them, intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim, defamation claim and fraud claim be reversed, and
the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of UP on the claims be vacated, and this action
be remanded for a jury trial on these claims.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of January, 2001.
PARSONS, DAVIS, KINGHORN & PETERS

DAVID J. BURNS
Attorneys for Appellant
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I hereby certify that on the 5th day of January 2001, I served the foregoing
PRINCIPAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT by mailing a copy thereof, by first-class United
States Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Jon E. Waddoups
Alexander Dushku
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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vs.

Case No: 9609.04423 CV

.UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
January 27, 2 0 00
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HEARING

.....,;..

Plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's amended memorandum in
support of motion for summary judgment is denied.. 'Plaintiff's
motion to strike fact exhibits contained in defendant's amended
memorandum is also denied.
A 40 minute hearing is set on defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
DEFT'.S MOTION SUMMARY JUDG is scheduled.
Date: 03/07/2.0.00 ....
Time: 09: 00 .a.m.
Location:: -Fourth Floor - W4 7
THIRD .DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
. SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge.: STEPHEN L. HENRI OD
Dated this ^ y 7 day of-

,•.-.-.
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STEPHEN'L. HENRI OD
District Court Judge
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Jon E. Waddoups (#5815)
Alexander Dushku (#7712)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EUGENE FRANCISCONI,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 960904423

vs.

UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO.,
a Utah Corporation,

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendant.

This action came up for oral argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on March 7, 2000. Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi was represented by Daniel Darger
and David J. Burns. Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company was represented by Jon E.
Waddoups and Alexander Dushku. The Court heard oral argument, accepted submissions, and
took the matter under advisement. The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on March 21,
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2000. Having rendered its decision based on the law and the facts of the case, the Court now
enters its judgment granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that
Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff
Eugene Francisconi is GRANTED. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint including all claims
against Defendant is DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendant is hereby awarded its reasonable
court costs to be established by Defendant's memorandum of costs.
Executed this

l/[

day ofjflafch, 2000.
BY THE COURT

4hwztMdJ^£±
Stephen L. Henriod
District Court Judge
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Defendant's Motion for summary Judgment was argued to the
Court on March 7, 2000,

Both parties were represented,, tixe Court

heard oral argument, accepted submissions, and took the matter
under advisement. The Court now rules as follows.
The standard far Summary Judgment is set forth in the case of
Trelosroen v. Tralooraan, 699 P.2d 747-748

(Utah 1985).

That

standard is that to successfully oppose a properly supported Motion
for Summary "Judgment, the party must present through sworn averment
specific admissible facts establishing a dispute of fact material
to the Motion. The defendant presented a properly supported Motion
for Summary Judgment.

The individual causes of action are

addressed below.
1.

The plaintiff started work for Union Pacific as an at-

will employee.

He alleges that the nature of his employment

changed and express and implied agreements came into existence as
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FRANCISCONI V. UPRC

PAGE 2 ,\

KEKORANDUK DECISION

a result of the "in lieu of policy" and the ,rU?RSRADE Policy e^ Mr,
Francisconi fails to make a persuasive case that either of these
policies changed the nature of his employment,

Mr. Francisconi

fails to marshal any arguments or show any specific provisions in
either 'of the above-referred to policies to indicate that the
nature of hie employment changed in any way, Mr. Franciscan! was
an at-will employee at the time he vas terminated,
2.

Plaintiff alleges that his termination was in violation

of public policy. In order to create an issue for the jury on this
cause of action he needs to identify a clear and substantial public
policy and show that the employer required him to violate said
public policy and that the alleged violation vas a factor in his
termination. Again, Mr. Francisconi fails to present through sworn
averment any specific admissible facts establishing that there'was
a clear and substantial public policy, that the employer required
him to violate"" It", or""that' the alleged "violation vas a factor in
his termination•"
3.

Plaintiff alleges defamation, claiming that a Onion

Pacific employee in Los Angeles communicated to a Union Pacific
employee in Seattle that Mr. Francisconi vas terminated for
violating the "in lieu of policy" and taicing advantage personally
of that policy. First, truth is a defense to a defamation claim and
it is obvious that Mr. Francisconi did in fact misuse the "in lieu
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of policy" to the tune of approximately $2,500, using the policy to
distribute gifts to members of hie family f not the person he stayed
with on his business visits to Pocatallo. The statements wars true
and plaintiff's'nurden is to show that the defendant published the
statements and that they were false, defamatory and not subject to
privilege, and that they were published vith the requisite degree
of fault, and the publication resulted in damage• Mr. Francisconi
fails to show specific facts admissible in court that there was any
damage, or that the communication was not privileged.
•4.

Mr. Francisconi's fourth cause of action for infliction

of emotional distress requires that hB show (1) that Union Pacific
intentionally

engaged

in

some

conduct

toward

the plaintiff

considered outrageous and intolerable; offending generally accepted
standards of decency and morality; (2) that there was a purpose to
inflict emotional """'distress; and

(3) "" that"" it resulted.

The

allegations that Mr. Francisconi makes do not rise to the standard
required.

Union Pacific ; had a right to terminate under the

circumstances, and the other allegations such as cutting off
medical coverage and vacation pay simply did not occur.

In

addition, credible evidence adduced on the part of the defendant
indicates that the allegations are not true.
5.

Mr. Francisconi6s fifth claim of relief is for fraud.

Fraud requires a higher standard, that of clear and convincing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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evidence. To survive, a fraud claim must require a representation
"made concerning a presently existing material fact which was false
and which the repreaenter Joiew to be false, made recklessly,
lowing there was insufficient Jcncr&rledge upon which to base such a
representation for the purpose of inducing the other party to act,
and that the other party did act reasonably, and in ignorance of
its falsity did rely upon it and was thereby induced to act to that
partyss injury and damage.

Mr. Francisconi fails to allege

specific admissible facts shoving that representations made by
Dnion Pacific were false, that they ware regarding a presently
existing material fact, and that he acted upon the representations,
Mr, Francisconi has nothing beyond his self-serving testimony to
support his argument on this issue.
For the above reasons, Summary Judgment is granted in favor of
Union Pacific.

Onion Pacific is to prepare a Judgment consistent

with this Memorandum Decision.

/)t

Bated this sf-1

day of March, 2000.

/iV
'••• .

STEPHEN L. HEHRIOD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision , to the following, this <£*y
March., 2000:

Daniel Darger
David J. Bums
A-tomsys for Plaintiff
9 Exchange Place, Suite 100 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jon E. Waddoups
JLLejcander Dushku
Attorneys for Defendant
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City/Utah
84145-0120
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David J. Burns, Esq. (#7157)
PARSONS, DAVES, KINGHORN & PETERS
185 South State Street, Suits 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Teiephone: (301)363-4300
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Attorney at Law
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Piace
Salt Lake~City, UTS4111
Teiephone: (801) 531-6685

!I
[! Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

i

EUGENE FRANCISCONI,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO. a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant.

•

Case No. 950904423
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Plaintiff Eugene A. Francisconi, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby
gives notice of his appeal of the Judgment entered by the Hon. Stephen L Henriod,
Judge, Third District Court, on April 11, 2000. This appeal is taken to the Utah Supreme

Court.
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DATED this J>~ ' day of May, 2000.
PARSONS. DAVJES, KINGKORN a PETERS
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DAVID J. BURNS
Attornevs for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF

|j APPEAL were served by maiiing copies thereof, by first-ciass United States mail,
r-i-f^

postage prepaid, this _ j y _ day of May, 2000, to the following:
Jon E. Waddoups
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Daniel Darger
Affrirno\/
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EUGENE FRANCISCONI vs.

UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO

CASE NUMBER 960904423 {Civil}

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
PARTIES
Plaintiff - EUGENE FRANCISCONI
Represented by: DANIEL DARGER
Represented by: DAVID J BURNS
Defendant - UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO
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DISCOVERY)
Note: FILED: NOTICE OF DEPOSITION
Note: FILED: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (INTERROGATORIES,
DISCOVERY)
Note: FILED: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING DEPOSITION OF ALFRED J.
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Note FILED: NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF ROY A. HALLETT
Note FILED: NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF GERALD N. OLSEN
Note FILED: NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF TAMARA GALE
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Note FILED: SUBPOENA ON RETURN SERVED TO TAMARA GALE
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Note FILED: CERTIFICATE OF DEPSITIONS
Note FILED: CERT OF SERVICE
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10-10 -97 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF DEPOSITION
susansf
10-17 -97 Note: FILED: MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
amysb
10-17 -97 Note: FILED: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINTP
AND
amysb
10-17- •97 Note:
amysb
JOIN PARTY PLAINTIFF
10-17- •97 Note: FILED: SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
amysb
10-23- 97 Note: FILED: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
amysb
11-12- 97 Note: FILED: OBJECTION TO NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
juliep
11-12- 97 Note: FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
juliep
11-13- 97 Note: FILED: CERTIFICATE OF FILING (DEPOSITION OF SHARLENE
FRANCISCONI
juliep
11-13-97 Note: FILED: CERTIFICATE OF FILING (DEPOSITION OF EUGENE
FRANCISCONI)
juliep
11-14- •97 Note: FILED: WITHDRAWAL NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
margeneg
11-25- 97 Note: FILED: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND
margeneg
11-25- 97 Note: FILED: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (DISCOVERY)
margeneg
12-30- 97 Filed : Motion to intervene as plaintiff
margeneg
01-07- 98 Filed: Memorandum in reply to defendant's memorandum opposed to
motion to amend and in support of motion to intervene
margeneg
01-07- 98 Filed: Affidavit of Sharlene Francisconi
margeneg
01-26- 98 Filed: Memorandum in Reply to Defendant's Memo Opposed to
Motion to Amend and in Support of Motion to Intervene
deborahw
deborahw
01-26- 98 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision
01-29- 98 MOTION TO INTERVENE scheduled on February 23, 1998 at 09:00 AM
in Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
amysb
02-26-98 Filed: Minute Entry - Taken Under Advisement Ruling Plaintiff's motions are denied. ATD to prepare the order.
Judge: shenriod
amysb
03-12-98 Filed order: Order Denying Motion to Amend and Motion to
Intervene
amysb
Judge
shenriod
Signed March 12, 1998
05-06- 98 Filed: Certificate of service
hilaryy
hilaryy
05-14- 98 Filed: Notice of dposition
hilaryy
05-21- 98 Filed return: Subpeona duces tecum on return
Party Served: LOUISE BOWN-Service Type: Personal
Service Date: May 14, 1998
06-29- •98 Filed: Certificate of service
hilaryy
hilaryy
08-05- -98 Filed: Appearance of co-counsel - David Burns (plft)
hilaryy
08-07- •98 Filed: Appearance of co-counsel
amyls
08-21- •98 Filed: Request For Trial Setting
lynettg
09-10- •98 Filed: Notice of change of address
amyls
09-14- •98 Filed: Request For Trial Setting
09-25- •98 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion For Order
Designation Place Of Depositions and Motion To Compel Discoveryamyls
Place Of
09-25- •98 Filed: Plaintiff's Motion for Order Designating
Depositions And Motion To Compel Discovery
amyls
amyls
09-29 -98 Filed: Certificate of Service
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10-13-98 Filed: Certificate of Service
amyls
10-15-98 Filed: Memo in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Order
Designating Place of Depositions and Motion to Compel Discoveryamyls
10-2S-D5 Filed; Reply Memo in Support of Plaintiff's Mo Lion for Order
Designating Place Of Depositions And Motion to Compel Discoveryamyls
10-2 6-98 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision on Plaintiffs Motion for
Order Designating Place of Depositions and Motion to Comple
Discovery
amyls
10-26-98 LAW & MOTION scheduled on November 17, 1998 at 09:15 AM in
Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
paulab
10-2 8-98 Filed order: Minute Entry
paulab
Judge shenriod
Signed October 28, 1998
11-03-98 Filed: Notice of law -n- motion on return unable to mail to
David Burns
hilaryy
11-12-98 Filed: Deposition Subpoena
matellew
11-12-98 Filed: Deposition Subpoena
matellew
11-12-98 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Rene Lillard
matellew
11-12-98 Filed: Notice of Deposition of John Ivester
matellew
11-30-98 Filed order: Scheduling order
matellew
Judge shenriod
Signed November 30, 1998
12-14-98 Filed order: Order
(pltfs motion for order designating place
of depositions and motion to compel
discovery is
granted)
matellew
Judge shenriod
Signed December 14, 1998
12-22-98 Filed: Certificate of Service
juliak
01-19-99 Filed: Certificate of Service
juliak
02-13-99 Filed: Certificate of service
susansf
02-13-99 Filed: Pltfs amended designation of trial witnesses
susansf
02-13-99 Filed: Certificate of service of discovery
susansf
02-16-99 Filed: defendants witness list
lynettg
03-05-99 Filed: Pltfs motion to compel information of enforcement of the
in-lieu of policy and the depositions of Arthur Shoener and
Thomas Campbell
susansf
03-05-99 Filed: Memorandum in support of pltfs motion to compel
information on the application of the in-lieu of policy and the
depositions of ARthur Shoener and Thomas Campbell
susansf
03-18-99 Filed: Memo In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Compel
Information On The Application Of the In-Lieu Of Policy And The
Deposition Of Arthur Shoener And Thomas Campbell
brandif
03-23-99 Filed: Notice of Depositions
brandif
03-25-99 Filed: Certificate of service
susansf
03-29-99 Filed: Reply memo in support of pla's motion to compel
information on the application of the in-lieu of policy and the
depositions of Arthur Shoener and Thomas Campbell
brandif
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03-29-99 F i l e d : Notice co subr,i~ for decision
03-29-99 Filed o r d e r : S t i p u l a t i o n for p r o t e c t i v e order and p r o t e c t i v e
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oruci

mauenew
Judge shenriod
Signed March 29, 1999
brandif
04-16- 99 Filed: Notice of Rule 30b6 deposition
04-21- 99 Filed order: Stipulation, motion and order
(discovery cut-off
extended to 6/30/99 & dispositive motions to be filed by
matellew
7/30/99)
Judge shenriod
Signed April 21, 1999
brandif
04-27- 99 Filed: Notice of deposition of Frank Kurek
brandif
05-07- 99 Filed return: subpoena duces tecum
Party Served: Frank Kurek
05-17- •99 Filed: Notice of deposition
brandif
05-17- •99 Filed: Notice of continuation of 30b6 deposition
brandif
brandif
05-17- •99 Filed: Notice of deposition (barbara Tower)
susansf
05-27- 99 Filed: Request for hearing to set trial date
brandif
06-01- 99 Filed: Amended notice of deposition of barbara J. Tower
06-18- 99 TELEPHONE SCHED CONF scheduled on August 09, 1999 at 09:45 AM
matellew
in Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
brandif
07-06- 99 Filed: amended notice of rule 30b6 deposition
brandif
07-19- 99 Filed: notice of depositions
brandif
07-19- 99 Filed: notice of deposition of John janzen
07-19- 99 Filed: second amended noticeof 309b)(6) deposition
brandif
07-22- 99 Filed: Pltfs supplemental memorandum in support of motion to
susansf
compel the depositions of Arthur shoener and Thomas Campbell
08-06- 99 TELEPHONE SCHED CONF rescheduled on August 27, 1999 at 08:45 AM
Reason: Conflict in Judge Schedule.
matellew
08-12- 99 Filed: certificate of service
brandif
08-13- 99 Filed: Notice of continuance of deposition (John Janzen)
susansf
08-18- 99 Filed: notice to submit for decision (oral agrument requested)
re .-motion to compel
brandif
08-27 99 MOTION TO COMPEL scheduled on September 03, 1999 at 11:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
matellew
09-01 99 Filed: supplemental memo in opposition to pla' s motion to
compel information on the application of the inlieu of policy
brandif
and the depositions of arthur shoener and thomas campbell
brandif
09-27-99 Filed: notice of depositions
matellew
09-28-99 Filed order: Order (re: 9/3/99 hearing-motion to compel)
Judge shenriod
Signed September 28, 1999
matellew
09-28-99 Filed order: Scheduling order
Judge shenriod
Signed September 28, 1999
brandif
10-01-99 Filed: certificate of service
- rDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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10-12-99 Filed: certificate of service
brandif
10-12-99 Filed: certificate of service
brandif
11-02-99 Filed: Motion and memo in support of motion to compel responses
to discovery
brandif
11-09-99 Filed: pla?s memo in support of motion for protective order re
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discovery
11-09-99 Filed: pla' s memo in support of motion to compel deposition
11-09-99 Filed: pla's motion to compel depositions (oral argument
requested)
11-09-99 Filed: affidavit of david j. burns
11-09-99 Filed: pla's memo in opposition to def's motion to compel
responses to discovery
11-09-99 Filed: plafs motion for protective order re discovery
11-17-99 Filed: Motion and memo in support of motion for extension of
dispositive motion cutoff
11-17-99 Filed: reply memo in support of motion to compel responses to
discovery
11-17-99 Filed: affidavit of j on e. waddoups
11-22-99 Filed: Notice to Submit
11-30-99 Filed: Motion for summary judgment
11-30-99 Filed: memo in support of motion for summary judgment
11-30-99 Filed order: Order (re: 11/22/99 hearing)
Judge shenriod
Signed November 30, 1999
11-30-99 Filed: ***DENIED***Ex-parte motion and order granting leave to
file overiength memorandum
12-14-99 Filed: plafs memo in support of motion to strike fact exhibits
12-14-99 Filed: pla' s motion to enlarge time for responding to def's
motion for summary judgment
12-14-99 Filed: Pla's motion to strike fact exhibits
12-15-99 Filed order: DENIED pla's ex-parte motion & order granting
leave to file over-length memo
Judge shenriod
Signed December 15, 1999
12-17-99 Filed: amended memo in support of motion for summary judgment
01-03-00 Filed order: Plaintiff's motion and order to enlarge time for
responding to defendant's motion for summary judgment
Judge shenriod
Signed January 03, 2000
01-03-00 Filed: transcript of deposition - alan hill
01-03-00 Filed: deposition of thomas wignstad
01-04-00 Filed: pla's memo in support of motion to strike fact exhibits
contained in def's amended memo in suppport of motion for
summary judgment
01-04-00 Filed: pla's motion to strike fact exhibits contained in def's
amended memo in support of motion for summary judgment
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brandif
brandif
brandif
brandif
brandif
brandif
brandif
brandif
brandif
brandif
brandif
brandif
matellew

matellew
brandif
brandif
brandif
brandif

brandif
matellew

brandif
brandif

brandif
brandif

01-04-00 Filed: pla's motion £ memo in support of motion to strike def's
amended memo in support of motion for summary judgment & motion
for summary judgment
brandif
01-04-00 Filed: affidavit of eugene a. francisconi
brandif
01-04-00 Filed: memo in opposition to def's motion for summary judgment
(oral argument requested)
brandif
01-10-00 Filed: notice of change of address - david burns
brandif
01-12-00 Filed: Defendant's reply memorandum in support of the motion
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for summary judgment
matellew
01-12-00 Filed: Memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion to strike
defendant's amended memorandum in support of motion for summary
judgment
matellew
01-12-00 Filed: Memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion to strike
fact exhibits contained in defendant's amended memorandum in
support of motion for summary judgment (hearing requested)
matellew
01-12-00 Filed: Notice to submit for decision (hearing requested)-motion
for summary judgment
matellew
01-12-00 Filed: Notice to submit for decision-deft! s motion for summary
judgment
matellew
01-22-00 Filed: Notice to Submit (pla' motion to strike def's amended
memo in support of motion for summary judgment & motion for
summary judgment)
brandif
01-22-00 Filed: Notice to Submit (pla's motion to strike fact exhibits
contained in def's amended memo in support of motion for
summary judgment)
brandif
01-22-00 Filed: reply memo in support of pla's motion to strike def's
memo in support of motion for summary judgment
brandif
01-22-00 Filed: reply memo in support of pla's motion to strike fact
exhibits contained in def's amended memo in support of motion
for summary judgment
brandif
01-27-00 DEFT'S MOTION SUMMARY JUDG scheduled on March 07, 2000 at 09:00
AM in Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
matellew
03-17-00 Filed: pla's supplemental memo in opposition to def's motion
for summary judgment
brandif
03-20-00 Filed: Plaintiff's supplemental memorandum in opposition to
defendant's motion for summary judgment
matellew
03-21-00 Filed order: Memorandum decision (3/7/00 hearing-summary
judgment granted in favor of Union Pacific—Union Pacific to
prepare an order consistent with this ruling)
matellew
Judge shenriod
Signed March 21, 2000
_;
03-22-00 Filed: def's supplemental reply memo in support of motion for
summary judgment
brandif
03-23-00 Filed order: Ex parte motion and order sealing memoranda
matellew
Judge shenriod
Signed March 23, 2000
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brandif
03-29--00 Filed: verified memo of costs
mateliew
04-11--00 Filed order: Judgment
Judge shenriod
Signed April 11, 2000
matelle
04-11--00 Case Disposition is Jdmt summary
w
matelie
Disposition Judge is STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
w
brandif
04-17--00 Filed: notice of entry of judgment
kathys
05-08--00 Filed: Notice of Appeal
mckaem
05-08--00 Filed: Notice of Appeal
05-09--00 Note: Cert. Copy of Notice of Appeal forwarded to Supreme Courtkathys
05-16-uu r n e a : supreme Court letter to counsel (sc # 20uu04ub-SC) -
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Notice of Appeal received by Supreme Court
05-18-00 Filed: request for transcripts (request from pla1)

iafiar n l i f ^ u r r t a tais..i]

(press 33£TE3*N)5
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APPENDIX E
Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Dated March 21, 2000
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| David J. Burns, Esq. (7157)
i PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS
I Attorneys for Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi
185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-4300

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
Plaintiff,! TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EUGENE FRANCISCONI,
•
vs.

UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO. a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant.

Case No. 960904423
Judge Stephen Henriod

Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi, by and through undersigned counsel, in accordance with the
Court's direction at oral argument, hereby submits the following supplemental memorandum in
opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Toward the conclusion of oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,

held on March 7, 2000, Defendant's counsel, John E. Waddoups represented to the Court that
as part of its 1996 corporate audit of employee expense reports, Union Pacific had created
category 1 through 3 exceptions to grade the severity of expense policy violations and ensure
uniformity of treatment. He referred to these categories as "buckets," and represented that Union
Pacific had determined at the time of Mr. Francisconi's audit that he was a category 3 exception.
Mr. Waddoups also represented that only the most serious offenders were placed in a category
3 "bucket" and all were terminated as a result of the corporate audit. These representations are
material misstatements of the record, and therefore require correction.
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II.

THE "BUCKETS" PLAYED NO PART IN THE DECISION TO TERMINATE
The "guidelines" establishing the category exceptions were created (if ever) well after Mr.

Francisconi was terminated (Bernard pp. 81, 88-89, Exhibit A hereto.) For this reason, any such
guidelines "would not have played a part in Mr. Shoener's or someone else's consideration of the
[April 27, 1996] interview, the result of the interview, [or] the recommendations contained in that
interview."

(Id. p. 81.)

Indeed, Union Pacific admitted Mr. Francisconi and other audited

employees were "retroactively categorized." (Id. p. 89.) Thus, contrary to Mr. Waddoups'
assertion, the "buckets" were not employed at the time of the corporate audit to ensure fair
treatment of Mr. Francisconi, and otherwise have no bearing on this case.1
III.

PLAINTIFF WAS TREATED AS A SPECIAL CASE
The record is also contrary to Mr. Waddoups' assertion at oral argument that Mr.

Francisconi was among the worst offenders of the expense policy. In fact, a simple comparison
of the exceptions noted in the audit report prepared for Mr. Francisconi and the reports prepared
for other employees, as well as 30(b)(6) deposition testimony concerning those reports, clearly
reveals that Union Pacific treated Mr. Francisconi as a special case in relation to all other
employees for whom expense account exceptions were noted.2 For instance, Mr. Francisconi
was treated unlike any other employee in the following respects:
•

Union Pacific pursued a criminal case against Mr. Francisconi, going so far as to
contact the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office. (Lawrence Curley p. 6,
Exhibit C hereto.) Union Pacific could not say that a criminal case was ever
pursued or even evaluated for any of the four other employees whose
employment ended as a result of the corporate audit. (Bernard p. 92.) Indeed,

1

That Union Pacific may have created the category exceptions solely in response to this
litigation is suggested by the fact that, despite specific request therefor, it has never produced a
copy of these "guidelines."
2

Michael Bernard, Union Pacific's Director of Auditing, prepared an audit report of findings
in connection with the audit of Mr. Francisconi's expense reports. On August 6, 1999, Mr.
Bernard provided 30(b)(6) deposition testimony on behalf of Union Pacific on the foregoing audit
report as well as reports that had been prepared for other employees. Attached hereto as Exhibit
B are copies of the audit reports for the other Union Pacific employees referred to in this
memorandum, which copies, because they were produced subject to a stipulated confidentiality
order, are here submitted under seal.
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Substantial evidence that he intended to defraud the company. (Bernard p. 151.)
For instance, responding to a derailment in Laramie, Wyoming, Mr. Frazier flew
there on the corporate jet, but claimed personal mileage traveling there. Changed
a $40 receipt to $250 in connection with entertainment of people involved in
cleanup. Collected ticket stubs at restaurants and used those as support for
fictitious items. Obtained claim checks that were in sequential order and used
them periodically to obtain reimbursement for fictitious items. Restitution:
$15,500.
G . L Benham, Systems Consultant (UP 001848-49).
On 20 occasions,
reimbursed for unused flight coupon but flew on the corporate jet. Reported 46
credit card purchases in Mexico City, Mexico, even though amounts billed by
American Express disclosed the exchange rate used by Mr. Benham was less
than the rate used by American Express. Claimed between $30 and $45 for oneway taxi fare from the Railroad's marketing and sales office to the Mexico City
airport although the current one-way fare is approximately $15. Submitted
duplicate requests for reimbursement on four occasions ($317). Expensed a
three-day trip to Bethlehem, PA but was in Omaha the whole time. Restitution:
$11,928.
,
Just as illuminating is the fact that other employees were permitted to keep their jobs
despite their serious violations of the expense policy. Indeed, the following examples clearly
demonstrate that Union Pacific tolerated patterns of abuse and fraud that far exceeded the worst
allegations made against Mr. Francisconi.
J.D. Gallamore, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations (UP 1800-01).
Reimbursed $1,984 for airline tickets. Paid for the tickets with his corporate credit
card and then was reimbursed twice, when he sought reimbursement for the
charge to his credit card and when he returned the coupon for reimbursement.
Reported an airline ticket ($534) that was charged directly to the company, even
though the ticket coupon had been stamped "non-reimbursable" by the travel
agent. Reimbursed $9,100 for 13 trips to St. Louis (his home town), where he
expensed weekend, holiday and vacation days. The purpose of the business trips
was not adequately explained. Purchased 160 Omaha Steaks gift certificates with
a value of $9,500. The Company was told that the steaks and gift certificates
were purchased for the Company's Spot Awards Program; however, the steaks
were distributed just prior to the year-end holiday season and were issued to Mr.
Gallamore's cousin, his neighbor, unidentified persons, senior-level managers,
and other inappropriate persons. Reimbursed $6,540 for payments to Thomas
Campbell for staying at his house in lieu of commercial lodging. For part of that
time, Mr. Gallamore paid Mr. Campbell $55 per day. Reimbursed on 43 occasions
($1,666) for entertainment of locally-based employees. These 43 instances
represented 37 percent of the workdays Mr. Gallamore spent in the Omaha office
during the 11-month period in question. Unable to account for much of the
expense report exceptions. Restitution: $5,202. Also, "He was suspended by
Mir. Shoener and Mr. Shoener told him to go home and don't come back to
the office for a week and think about why you want to stay employed with
Union Pacific, and that was the reprimand. Mr. Gallamore sacrificed his merit
pay for 1997. He did not receive a merit pay increase for 1997, and his bonus for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the 1996 performance year, which would have been approximately $10,000, was
not given to him." (Bernard pp. 110-11.)
D.E. Klaus, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations (UP 001801-02). Reported
an expense of $457 in connection with a rental car obtained in Pocatello for a trip
made to attend a meeting in Salt Lake City. Vehicle was rented by Mr. Klaus's
wife and was driven 1,523, although the round trip mileage between Pocatello and
Salt Lake City was only 325 miles. Reported vacation time during the period the
carwas rented. Initially denied that the vehicle was rented for anything other than
a business purpose, but later acknowledged that it was rented for personal
reasons and should not have been reported on his expense report. Also
submitted a report for an airline ticket that was charged directly to the company.
Reported on his expense report that the BTA ticket had been incurred by him
rather than the company. Also reported a portion of a car rental expense that was
used for a vacation trip taken in Missouri. Restitution: $1,168. Mr. Shoener
reprimanded Mr. Klaus and deferred his merit pay and bonus. (Bernard p.
114.)
J.A. Leutzinger, Manager, Health Promotion (UP 001843). Reported airline
tickets ($803) that had been charged directly to the company, even though travel
agents had stamped "non-reimbursable" on the tickets. Reimbursed for six
unused or exchanged airline tickets that were returned for credit. In nine
instances, reported expenses twice. Restitution: $2,747. No further action.
(Bernard p. 135.)
A . L Faulkner, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations (UP 001802-03).
Accounts payable processed the same expense report twice. The first check for
$1,159 was deposited by Mr. Faulkner on March 8, 1995, and a duplicate check
for $1,159 was deposited by Mr. Faulkner one week later, on March 17.
Restitution: $1,159. No further action; company accepted explanation that it was
an "honest mistake." (Bernard p. 117.)
CONCLUSION
Thus, to summarize, Union Pacific clearly attempted to mislead this Court when it
represented that Mr. Francisconi's termination was a product of a systematic process that was
designed to ensure fairness and uniformity of treatment. In fact, Mr. Shoener's decision to
terminate Mr. Francisconi, as well as his decisions with respect to other audited employees, was
the product of personal wim and carpiciousness. It cannot be doubted, for example, that the
intentional fraud of Messrs. Gallamore and Klaus was more serious than Mr. Francisconi's noted
exceptions, and yet the former employees were permitted to keep their jobs. The evidence points
inexorably to the conclusion that the exceptions noted for Mr. Francisconi were a pretext for the
termination. The true motivation was some other factor. The record creates a strong inference
that this other factor was his and Mr. Shoener's shared connection to Barbara Tower.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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an auditor was unaware of any instance where Union Pacific has ever made a
criminal referral as a result of an audit. (Henley p. 16, Exhibit D hereto.)
•

The restitution amount of $2,525 was the lowest amount paid by any other
employee whose employment ended as a result of the corporate audit, and was
even less than several other employees who had expense report exceptions noted
but were permitted to keep their jobs (e.g., $5,202 (J.D. Galiamore)and $2,747
(J.A. Leutzinger)).

•

. Arthur Shoener, Senior Vice President of Operations, approved the
restitution/discipline for all persons with noted exceptions who worked in car
maintenance operations; that is, Messrs. Francisconi, Frazier, Gallamore, Klaus,
Faulkner, Witt and Phillippie. (Bernard p. 139.) Of these persons, only the
employment of J.L. Frazier and G. Francisconi ended as a result of the audit.
Union Pacific determined that Mr. Frazier was the most "egregious" offender of the
two hundred employees reviewed as part of the corporate audit. (Bernard pp. 71,
154.)

Union Pacific asserts that Mr. Francisconi altered six receipts (amounts unaltered, but
itemization redacted) submitted under the "in lieu o f policy. (Bernard p. 52.) The receipts total
$978.15 in reimbursements.
restitution.

Union Pacific deducted $2,525 from Mr. Francisconi's pay as

Of that amount, $1,934 relates to use of the "in lieu o f policy and $261 to

unauthorized weekend stays. The airfare statements and expenditures for basketball league fees
also mentioned in the audit report were "honest mistakes." (Id. p. 61.)3
'

•'<'•

* - • . • . • • $ * - $ , .

•.

..

As further proof that Mr. Francisconi was unjustifiably treated as a special case, it is
helpful to compare the exceptions noted for other employees whose employment, Union Pacific
asserts, also ended as a result of the audit.4
J.L. Frazier, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations (Exh. D, UP 001827-37).
Reported fictitious personal mileage that he claimed at $5,000; inappropriate
meals and entertainment charges totaling $3,200; altered and fabricated receipts.

3

Union Pacific has never adequately described the way in which it calculated the
restitution amount. Attached as Exhibit E is the breakdown that Union Pacific provided to Mr.
Francisconi. After the interview of April 26,1996, Union Pacific claims it had Gary Johnson, Mr.
Francisconi's supervisor, review the expense reports he had previously approved to determine
whether any weekend stays were unauthorized after all. (Bernard p. 68.) The second time
around, Mr. Johnson apparently identified 18 unauthorized days, 10 of which relate to stays in
Pocatello in April 1995 just prior to and at the death of Mr. Francisconi's mother. Union Pacific
then assigned a value of $43.73 to each one of the unauthorized days ($787) and multiplied by
50% the remaining value of total "in lieu of reimbursements on 27 occasions ($1,147).
4

Union Pacific claims that four persons other than Mr. Francisconi were terminated as a
by the Howard
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DATED this / 7

day of March, 2000.
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS

//^U^_
DAVID J. BURNS
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the l~> day of March, 2000, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered to the following:
Jon E. Waddoups
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

\
'

and sent via US Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Daniel Darger
Attorney at Law
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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"N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EUGENE FRANCISCONI,

CIVIL NO. 960904423

Plaintiff,
v.

D-E-P-O-S-I-T-I-O-N-

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendant.

DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL BERNARD, taken before Allan G.
Kuhlman, a Registered Professional Reporter and General Notary
Public within and for the State of Nebraska, beginning at the
hour of 9:25 a.m., Friday, August 6, 1999, at 1416 Dodge
Street, Omaha, Nebraska, taken on behalf of the plaintiff in
the above-entitled matter, pursuant to the within
stioulations.

ALLAN G. KUHLMAN
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER
OMAHA, NEBRASKA
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION

in written form on the expense statement?
A.

I think my testimony was that he needed to have an

itemized receipt.
Q.

If he doesn't have an itemized receipt, he can have a

receipt with the amount and then identify the description on
the expense statement, right?
A.

An itemized receipt was provided to us.

Q.

Is there a requirement that you provide the itemized

receipt, or can you'just provide the same information on the
expense statement by writing it in?
A.

You need to have an itemized receipt.

Q.

So that refers to two of the receipts where there were

some redactions?
A.

Six.

I thought there was -- almost all the receipts were

not itemized.
Q.

Two receipts you've identified had the deletions made,

right?
A.

There were six receipts that were altered.

Q.

Six receipts were altered.

When you say altered, the

descriptions were redacted, right?
A.

Meticulously cut out.

Q.

There were deletions from the receipt, right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

That would refer to six of the receipts?

A.

Yes.
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION

58

A.

It may or may not be.

Q.

Are there any other items?

A.

I think that's pretty much it.

Q.

The total amount that you found that needed to be

reimbursed -- excuse me -- returned, I guess, would be the
best way to describe it, to Union Pacific was $2525; is that
right.
A.

That was with input from Gary Johnson.

Q.

I'm sorry.

A.

That was input from Gary Johnson.

What was that?
We produced a list of

days that appeared to be personal in nature and he should not
have claimed any business expenses and along with the list of
the in lieu of lodging gifts and he determined the amount.
Q.

The total amount for all of the problems that you've

identified, the receipts, under the in lieu of policy, the
airfare, and the- expenses for weekend stays that weren't'
approved or authorized, that accumulated to $2525?
A.

Yes.

Q.

The total for the airfare problems that you identified, is

that $269, plus $110?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you know what the amount was on the weekend stays?

A.

No.

Q.

So those two categories are the airfare minus - - o r

subtracted from the $2500, okay.
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION

7

A. No.
Q.

Let's pull out what has been marked as Exhibit 4.

If you

will look at the audit report.
I'm curious about the statement in the introduction
to the first report which concerns Mr. Gallamore, the sentence
states we expanded our review of expense reports -A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

And that was of the car maintenance operations?

A. Yes.
Q.

Why was the review expanded under these circumstances?

A.

Our initial review, we started with roughly two hundred of

the top reimbursements, the two hundred employees who.had
received the most reimbursements.
Q.

Is this according to gross amounts?

A. Yes.
Q.

You took the two hundred highest and just looked at them?

A.

That's how we started.

And John Frazier and Jim Gallamore

hit that sample, and I think Gene Francisconi was on there,
t O O .

Q.

•• ,.;.•

•

•

'

r

-.

,

. •":...•

Was Gene part of the car maintenance operations

department?
A.

I think he was.

Q.

Do you know --

A.

He would have worked -- I can't speculate.

worked in the diesel shop.

I think he

I'm not sure where he worked.
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A.

8

I assume so.
MR. BURNS:

We will want a copy of those.

MR. WADDOUPS:

I'll be happy to look for you if you

send me a ieuter.
Also David, for the record, I think we ought to
clarify when uhe business conduct committee came into being
and when these were created.
It's my understanding that was after Mr.
Francisconi's interview and you may want to cover that now.
Q.

(By Mr. Burns)

Were the guidelines created after Mr.

Francisconi's interview on approximately April 27, 1996?
A.

I believe so.

Q.

When generally were they actually created?

A.

I think it was in the summer of 1996 sometime.

I don't

know the specific date.
Q.

So these guidelines would not have played a part in Mr.

Shoener's or someone else's consideration of the interview,
the result of the interview, the recommendations contained in
that interview.

Is that what you're saying?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are these guidelines -MR. WADDOUPS:

Just for the record here, to clarify,

I just have had a conference with Ms. Henley and she has a
recollection as far as the creation of the guidelines that was
a little bit different than that.

When she is deposed we may
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honest pattern of abuse?
A.

8

Is that fair?

An example would be in the case of Mr. Gallamore, where he

had traveled to St. Louis on quite a few occasions and he
would stay, he would schedule his trip around a weekend or a
holiday.
There was a pattern.

In my opinion, there was a

pattern of abuse there.
Q.

We were starting to talk about Mr. Gallamore.

You have

identified five instances in which he was reimbursed for
unused airline coupons.

We talked about that.

I'll let much

of this just speak for itself.
Mr. Gallamore was also reimbursed in the amount of
$9,100 for thirteen trips to St. Louis, which was his
hometown, you noted?
A. Yes.
Q.

Did you prepare this report?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Did you prepare all the reports you're testifying about

today?
A.

Yes, with the exception of, I think Janice Arthur prepared

one of them.
Q.

Do you recall which one that was?

A.

No, I don't.

Q.

Let's go back to the interrogatory real quick.

In

interrogatory twenty IT? has stated that there are 4 6 employees
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who had category one exceptions.

B9

Is that a true statement?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Interrogatory number twenty-one says there were eight

individuals who were classified as category two exceptions.
Is that also true?
A.

Yes.

Q.

There were four persons who were assigned a category three

exception?
A.

I think so, yes.

Q.

Who were the eight persons who were assigned a category

two exception?
A.

Jim Gallamore.

Joe Leutzinger.

Q.

Before you get into this, when were these assignments

made?
A.

After the committee had formally assembled.

Q.

Did it consider all of these persons at the same time or

separate times?
A.

Any of the employees where interviews had already taken

place they went back and retroactivity categorized them.
Q.

Does the business conduct review team, do they produce

minutes from their meetings?
A.

No, not to my knowledge.

Q.

Is there any written record that is prepared when those

meetings are held?
A.

No, not to my knowledge.
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o2

A.

No.

Q.

No discipline whatsoever?

3

A.

That's correct.

4

Q.

Did he have to pay back --

5

A.

He had to pay back che amount, yes.

6

Q.

That's not really discipline.

7

anybody disciplined?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Anyone else?

0

A.

Rich Elder.

1

Q.

Three of eight were disciplined?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Of category three, was a criminal referral made of any of

1

these persons?

Of those eight persons was

Jim Gallamore; Dan Klaus.

A.

No.

Q.

How about Gene Francisconi?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

You note in your report that Mr. Lottmann indicated

pursuit of a criminal case against Mr. Francisconi would be
evaluated.
Was a criminal case against any of these other four
persons in category three evaluated?
A.

Not to my knowledge.

Well, I take that back.

Frazier might have been.
Q.

But you are not sure?
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Q.

110

Was Mr. Gallamore aware of the policy on being reimbursed

for entertaining locally-based employees?
A.

Yes.

Q.

But he still submitted the request for reimbursement?

A.

In certain situations it's appropriate for local employees

to entertain each ocher.
In the case of Mr. Gallamore the amount of
entertainment was excessive, in my opinion, and Mr. Gallamore,
in my opinion, exercised poor business judgment.
Q.

But you found no intent to deceive?

A.

That's right.

Q.

Is that why he is not category three?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Mr. Vargason informed Mr. Gallamore, you've written at the

bottom, Mr. Gallamore would be disciplined for these issues,
et cetera, et cetera.

What was the discipline that he

received?
A.

He was suspended by Mr. Shoener and Mr. Shoener told him

to go home and don't come back to the office for a week and
think about why you want to stay employed with Union Pacific,
and that was the reprimand.
Mr. Gallamore sacrificed his merit pay for 1997. He
didn't receive a merit pay increase for 1997.
And his bonus for the 1996 performance year, which
would have been approximately ten thousand dollars, was not
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12

given to him.
Q.

So Mr. Shoener had the ultimate, or the last word, I

should say, on the discipline that was meted out to Mr.
Gallamore?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How about Mr. Klaus?

What problems were noted with him?

And I believe Mr. Klaus was a -A.

Category two.

Q.

-- category two, okay.

A.

As I recall, he had reported a car rental expense that

pertained to a -- it was not a business related expense.
It was for a vacation he had taken.

He also reported

a BTA ticket.
Q.

Didn't Mr. Klaus in particular attempt to defraud Union

Pacific by renting a car for personal reasons and then
declaring it as an expense, a business expense?
A.

Did he attempt to defraud?

Q.

Let me separate that.

Isn't it true that he admitted that

he rented a car for personal reasons and reported it as a
business expense?
A.

He admitted that, yes, he admitted that he had rented the

car for personal reasons and had accidentally reported it on
his expense report.
Q.

You don't say that in your report.

What was the basis for

your conclusion that he accidentally did that reporting?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION

A.

1

Yes, unless uhe employee admits that he knew what he was

doing and he put it down on the expense report.
Q.

Fair enough.

Was there an interview held for Mr. Klaus?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was there any review by Mr. Shoener of the discipline for

Mr. Klaus?
A.

Yes. .

Q.

What was the recommendation of the parties that attended

the interview?
A.

The recommendation was to reprimand Mr. Klaus; to defer

his merit pay and bonus.
Q.

That was the extent of the discipline, right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Plus restitution?

A.

Plus restitution, yes.

Q.

Did either Mr. Gallamore or Mr. Klaus prepare any kind of

a statement at the interview about what had happened?
A.

I believe Mr. Gallamore may have prepared a handwritten

personal statement.
Q.

Was he asked to do that or did he volunteer to do that?

A.

I don't recall.

Q.

Mr. Klaus didn't prepare a personal statement?

A.

Not that I remember.

Q.

Mr. Witt, what was his problem?

A.

He had two instances of --
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A.

II

Well, first of all, it was nothing that Mr. Faulkner had

done to receive the second check.
He didn't create any action that would cause him to
be paid the second check.
Q.

Granted, but cwo checks received within a week for a

relatively sizable amount, he wouldn't have caught that?
A.

That's why I interviewed him.

Again, he travels all the time.

He didn't remember that.
He gets a lot of expense

checks .
He didn't realize that that other check was exactly
the same amount of the check that he had received ten days
earlier.
Q.

Basically you accepted his explanation for what happened

and left it at that?

"

A.

I accepted his answer, but I challenged him on it.

Q.

Was any further investigation done to determine whether lie

is telling the truth or not, that it was just an honest
mistake?
A.

No.

Q.

He was a category one?

A.

He was a category one.

That was the only mistake we

found.
We looked at all these individual's expense reports
for a two year period and that was the only problem we had
with Mr. Faulkner.
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Also

_L

J>

135

any of this was int ention B.1 he could always

fall bac:k on *:he fact chat he really didn't do tilis, bu t that
his associate did it.

Q.

T

was bochered by it •

Did he instruct his assistant to seek reimbursement for

these tickets?
A.

He gave her the tickets.

Q.

For the purpose of being reimbursed?

A. Yes.
Q.

So at least it's suspicious, wouldn't you say?

A. Yes.
Q.

It also says that expenses totaling $691 were reported

twice.

Was that just one instance in which there was double

reporting?
A.

There were nine items.

It may have been one instance, but

it happened with nine items during that particular time
period.
Q.

Could it have been nine separate instances?

A.

Right.

Q.

Was Mr. Leutzinger disciplined in any way?

A.

He was required to provide restitution to the company.

Q.

Was an interview provided for him?

A.

We interviewed him, yes.

Q.

Other than restitution, no discipline?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Did Mr. Shoener review the decision?
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Q.

13

So it was only when discipline was considered, that's when

he was involved?
A.

In the case of the employees that worked for Neil

Vargason, he was very concerned with those issues.
Q.

Why is that?

A.

Because it had the appearance of being something that was

out of control.
Q.

Was Mr. Francisconi in Neil Vargason's chain or line of

authority if Mr. Wagenseil had been in good health?
A.

I'm not sure what the reporting relationship was.

Q.

Mr. Johnson reported to Mr. Wagenseil when he was in good

health; is that correct?
A.

I don't know.

Q.

Was there any question when you were conducting this audit

that Mr. Wagenseil's line of responsibility was, as you say,
out of control?
A.

No.

'

-

Q.

Is it your testimony that Mr. Shoener reviewed the

decisions on all the category two and three disciplinary
decisions?
A. Yes.
Q.

Those would have included persons other than the car

maintenance staff, right?
A.

*

I don't know with respect to Mr. Parry and Mr. Leutzinger.

I'm not sure if he was involved in those decisions or not.
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He reported inappropriate meals, entertainment
charges totaling S32 00.

There were alteration and fabrication

of these.
" There was a substantial evidence that he intended to
defraud the company.
Q.

Would you say that there was an intent to defraud with

respect to the other category three persons or just Mr.
Frazier?
A.

I think there was an intent to defraud for any category

three, I think by definition, any person that has been
categorized as category three there was an intent to defraud.
Q.

How did Mr. Frazier alter receipts?

A.

In one case he flew out to Laramie, Wyoming, on the

corporate jet.

There was a derailment.

He was playing golf and he got a phone call around
3:00 o'clock.
And he was told to get out to Laramie, there had been
a derailment, and the corporate jet is flying out there.
, He went out there on the corporate jet, but what he
did was he claimed personal mileage going out there.
He reported that he had entertained a number of
people that were involved in the clean up of the derailment,
and he had a $40 receipt, a credit card receipt, and he
changed the $40 to $250.
Q.

That was one instance.

Was that indicative of the other types of alterations of
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Q.

154

Mr. Lottmann was in attendance a: Mr. Frazier's interview?

A. Yes.
Q.

Did Mr. Lottmann indicate that a criminal referral would

be made for Mr. Frazier?
A.

Did he indicate --

Q.

That any kind of criminal referral or criminal matter

would be pursued for Mr. Frazier?
A.

During the interview?

Q.

During the interview or any time afterwards?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

Do you know if a criminal referral was ever made for Mr.

Frazier?
A.

I don't know.

Q.

Do you think this was a more serious circumstance than Mr.

Francisconi's?
A. Yes.
Q.

This is probably the most --

A.

Egregious.

Q.

-- serious violation of the expense policy as a result of

'•.. ;'- v

the audit you did at this time?
• ':-;•

r

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did Mr. Shoener review Mr. Frazier's discipline?

A.

Yes.
MR. BURNS:

Thank you very much for coming by.

"-••_ MR. WADDOUPS:

Before we conclude the deposition,
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UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION
Corporate Audit Staff
Expense Report Irregularity of
J. L. Frazier. Senior Director - Maintenance Operations (Car")

- ^ - ^ ^

On March 1, 1996, R. D. Banse, Director - Auditing, and I, together with Railroad
representatives G. T. Lottmann, Director - Police Operations, and J. N. Vargason, Chief
Mechanical Officer (Car), met with J. L. Frazier, Senior Director - Maintenance Operations
(Car), to discuss numerous alleged expense report irregularities.
Our review covered the 13-month period ended January 31, 1996 during which Mr.
Frazier was reimbursed 575,000 including purchases of merchandise aggregating $8,500
(primarily golf merchandise) and $7,500 for use of his personal car (over 25,000 miles). Mr.
Frazier was also reimbursed $4,200 for entertainment expenses that were supported only by
restaurant stubs and for duplicate expenses of $1,500.
We identified numerous instances in which receipts were altered and expenses were
fraudulently reported by Mr. Frazier. For instance, a $40 receipt was altered to indicate $250;
the cost of a stereo system and speakers was reported as the purchase of two computer
printers; a sports blazer was represented as a " spot award"; and golf equipment for Mr.
Frazier's personal use was reported as a retirement gift for M. L. Wall, former Assistant Vice
President - Maintenance Operations. On numerous occasions, Mr. Frazier reportedly used his
personal auto for travel to various business sites; however, examination of credit card charges,
cellular phone records, and other business receipts disclosed that the automobile trips were not
legitimate. In addition, none of the meal and entertainment expenses documented by
restaurant stubs appeared on Mr. Frazier5 s Corporate American Express card and we
determined that a number of the charges were fictitious.
*©*•

Initially, Mr. Frazier denied any wrongdoing; however, he later admitted that he had
intentionally reported fraudulent expenses and resigned from the Company. Mr. Frazier
agreed to restitution of $15,500 representing fictitious business trips ($5,000), inappropriate
restaurant and entertainment charges ($4,200), personal merchandise ($2,900), duplicate
expenses ($1,500), and other miscellaneous items ($1,900).

M. E. Bernard

March 1, 1996
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Union Pacific Railroad Company
1S95 Personal Expense Review
Expense Reporting
12/31/1995

nployee:
itle:

SRDIRMAINTOPER

epartment

Mntcs Operations

npioyee Location:

Omaha

Mr. John Frazier

(CEPT10N DOLLAR AMOUNTS:
List the total dollar amount of over (under) payment to employee due to expense reporting: $15,500.25.
List the total number of exceptions noted for expense reporting: .

iriod Reviewed:

12/3/94 to 1/31/96

jta! Number of Expense Reports during period:

16

)tal Amount of Personal Expenses during period:

$75,052.00

CCEPTIOHS NOTED:
ite: Mr. Frazier's employment was terminated. He repaid the Company $3,295.82 on 6/10/96.

:ulations for the dollar amount of over payment to employee:

heduiesthat document the exceptions of John Frazier

A M T _ _ D U u-.XLS

h RAZirzR.XLS

"Jffl
anscript from interview with John Frazier on March 01,199B:

FRAZ_JNT.DOC

Summary of Expense Report Review
3pies of Airline Tickets:
All airline ticksts that wers submitted had the date tabs pulled off. If possible, flight dates were verified from
:

EC0 data set.

acation Expenses Charged to the Company:
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Vacation claimed January 5 and January 6. The following expenses were noted as part of a trip to Oklahoma
City:
Lodging:

$151.14

Meals:

67.42

Phone

15.10

Ent.

81A4

$325.10

Vacation claimed February 3. Frazier included receipts from a trip to Oklahoma City that occurred on 2/2 to 215.
Page two was missing from the expense report, but the totals of the lodging receipt and mileage were included in the
amount asked for reimbursement:
Lodging:

$240.31

Mileage:

$338.72

$579.03

Vacation claimed on April 16. Entertainment at Pinnacle Peak Golf Course was expensed. The explanation was to
discuss emergency equipment placement.
Golf:

$ 76.07

Vacation claimed on May 19. An expense for hardware (AMEX bill) was submitted with no explanation.
Westlake

$ 41.45

Vacation claimed July 31 and August 1. Entertainment receipts were submitted for reimbursement. Explanation
for July 31 was to discuss D (or P)/M changes. No explanation was provided for 8/01.
7/31 Champps Americana
8/01 Charlies

$21.50
54.31

$ 75.81

Vacation to Virginia/West Virginia. Round trip airfare for Frazier and his spouse (B/17 to 8/20) to fly to Roanoke,
VA were claimed as WABCO meeting (no date • the expense was noted on the July 95 report). Car rental was claimed as
part of the Cozad derailment on 9/14 (mileage also expensed). Golf Prize for Tournament from Greenbrier Pro Shop in WV
was claimed as part of a KC trip on 8/20. Frazier claimed meals and mileage on 8/20 as part of a trip to KC to audit MBO.
Frazier returned to Omaha from Roanoke at approximately 11:25 AM (parking receipt) on 8/20.
Airfare
Car Rental

$1185.00
90.69

Golf Prize

187.09

Meals/Mileage

172.45

$1636.23

Vacation claimed October 5. A receipt from Tiburon Golf Course, dated 10/05, was listed as other on 10/02 (no
trip was claimed that day). The explanation on the receipt was a Prize for Maint. Op. Golf Tournament Oct. 14th.
Golf Receipt

$ 150.35

Vacation to Pebble Beach, CA on October 13 to October 15. Airfare from Portland (business trip) to San Jose to
Omaha was claimed as part of TTX Meeting in Carmel (10/12 and 10/15 only). Golfing merchandise from Spanish Bay golf
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was claimed as entertainment to 6'iscuzs ????. Meal receipt dated 10/13 from TSB Bar & Grili in Pebbis Beach was
expensed 10/12 as dinner. Meals were claimed on 101/5.
Airfare

$319.00

Golf

111.83

TSB

27.44

Meals

'"•;

-

33.39

$ 495.SB

Pull Tabs:
Frazier submitted 44 pull tabs for $4,133.36. None of the pull tabs appeared on his American Express bills. Most
of the pull tabs were for entertainment. Several pull tabs have been refuted, as is highlighted below.
Pull Tabs in Sequence:
311232 9/7

$57.98

Colonial House in Pine Biuff, AR

Merger SP/UP

Claimed Entertainment with H.Wagenseil, J. Santamaria,M.Legg,
and 3 other SP employees. Wagenseii, Santamaria, and Legg were
in El Paso
511233 1/17/96

311234 5/5

$53.41
Echo Restaurant in Hinkle Discuss Hinkle etc.,
with Smith and R. Beilsmith (Hermiston, OR).
$132.41

Echo Restaurant

Discuss ops., etc.,
with M. Smith (other names are difficult to read).

led Lion Pull Tabs:
I)
Frazier had dinner and drinks with at least one other person at the Red Lion (Maxi's) in Portland on October 10.
The meal and tip cost $49.95, and was billed to Frazier's hotel room. The dinner was later broken out as a separate
ixpense, and claimed as entertainment for $49.95 on Fraziers personal expense report on October 11. The explanation on
:
orm 32253 was dinner to "Discuss ALB Oper." Frazier listed Rick Philiippie (Portland) and C. Glenn (Hermison?) as persons
mtertained. The ticket number of the guest receipt was 55336 (faxed copy of receipt).
Frazier claimed another entertainment expense for $86.05 from the Red Lion in Portland on October 12. The
supporting documentation was the matching pull tab from the previously mentioned guest receipt, numbered 5539B.
'10/12" and "$86.05" were written on the pull tab. The explanation on Form 32253 was lunch to "Discuss Shop". Milton
Hunt (Portland), R. Middleton (possibly Lloyd Middlston), George Rosebrook (Portland), and Rick Philiippie (Portland) were
isted as persons entertained.
I)

Frazier and another person ate dinner at the Red Lion in Pendleton on January 17. The meal and tip cost $34.40,

ind was billed to Fraziers hotel room. The dinner was later broken out as a separate expense, and claimed as entertainment
in Fraziers personal expense report on January 17. No explanation for the meal was provided on Form 32253. The ticket
lumber of the guest receipt was 75347 (faxed copy of receipt).
. On January 19, Frazier claimed another entertainment expense for $35.05 from the Pendleton. The supporting
iocumentation was the matching pull tab from the previously mentioned guest receipt, numbered 75347. 1/15 and $35.06
vere written on the pull tab in handwriting that is similar to Fraziers. The explanation on Form 32253 was entertainment
o discuss safety. Frazier listed C. Smith (unable to determine), Rick Beilsmith (Hermiston), and K. (last name looks iike
Vhithiker) as persons entertained:
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Marriott Pull Tabs
Frazier claimed entertainment at the Marriott in Salt Lake City on April 24. A pull tab from Fazzios in the Portland
Marriott was used as supporting documentation. The Salt Lake City Marriott has no restaurant named Fazzios. The cost
was

$44.66. The business purpose was to Discuss Provo Funding & IQDO Mi, and Frazier stated that he entertained John

Renth from Salt Lake City.
Frazier claimed entertainment at the Marriott in San Francisco on November 25. A pull tab from The Paviliion in
the St. Louis Marriott was used as supporting documentation. The San Francisco Marriott has no restaurant named The
Paviliion. The cost was $75.81. The business purpose was to Discuss Operations, and Frazier stated he entertained a
party of 1 (name difficult to read).

Entertainment at Harrys in St Louis:

-

Entertainment for $173.17 was expensed on May 18. The supporting receipt was a pull tab that was originally
dated 5/23. 5/17 was written over the date. The explanation on the supporting detail provided no establishment and
stated the purpose was to Discuss Union Issues and Merger.
Entertainment for 115.75 was expensed on May 17 as part of a trip to St. Louis. The supporting detail was a pull
tab, originally dated 5/24. 5/16 was written over the date. The explanation on the supporting detail was dinner at Harrys
in St. Louis to Discuss Union Issues. Harrys accepts American Express and it gives customers the original check as a
receipt for cash payments. Harrys does not use quest receipts/pull tabs for receipts (phone conversation • 2/13).
Cross Reference on Pull Tabs:
"fUVf't r.

•••:-

.

.

Six pull tabs were refuted through cross referencing for a total of $588.74.
Merchandise Purchases:
Frazier submitted 51 purchases for $8475.17 for reimbursement. Purchases included golf merchandise, stereo
equipment, and clothing.
Purchases at Best Buy:
Ten receipts from Best Buy for a total of $2304.68 were submitted for reimbursement. Products that were
purchased are listed below:

I

Amount

Items Purchased

$79.45

Dunston leather computer case and film

No business reason given

$151.58

Panasonic Phone w Caller ID

Phone for Staff Mtg (a)

Business Reason
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$284.23

2-Phone handsets, Camcorder BTY, Panasonic Phone w/Calier

Equip, for Video Camera for Derailment

ID, Blank Video Tape, and Universal Twin Light for a

investigation(a)

[

Camcorder
i

$388.69

2 • 4MB memory chips and Microsoft Fiioht Simulator, V. 5.1.

Upgrade for Laptop (a)

$51.97

3-Music CD's, Surge protector, Adapter switch, printer cable,

No business reason given

and phone cord.

$400.35

Motorola 14.4 Modem, 3-VHS C Adapters, Leather Case for a
Celiular Phone, and Camcorder Case.

No business reason given

$291.78

Electronics/Appliances (AMEX Bill was the receipt)

Scanner (a)

$376.91

Shelf System Mini Stereo and 1-Music CD

Portable Printer ??? (a)

$107.11

Texas instrument graphic calculator and batteries

No business reason given

$172.51

G200 2-way stereo speaker

Printer ("Printer for Lab Top" on receipt)

$2304.68

urchases at Office Depot;
Frazier purchased a color bubble jet printer for $382.35 and a graphic calculator for $95.84.
ilf Merchandise:
Frazier claimed 12 purchases for golfing merchandise for a total of $2518.78. Details are presented below:

Items Purchased

Amount

$111.83

1

$77.97

$191.17

2-golfing gloves ($22.00 each) and clothing ($61.00)

Sweaters (Look at AMEX)

Taylor Made Putter, Odyssey Dual Force Putter, Ping Solid Color
Shirt, Hat

$111.78

Men's Shorts, Putter, and 2-accessories under $20
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$139.45

Sporting Goods/Apparel (AMEX Bill)

$243.89

Apparel/Accsssories (AMEX Bill)

$81.32

Sporting Goods Eauioment (AMEX Bill)

$88.94

Men's Shirt ($57) and a hat ($17)

$484.56

Posted as Entertainment

$210.86

Golf Merchandise

$425.99

Merchandise

$150.36

Sporting Goods/Equipment (AMEX Bill)

$286.59

"Golf" is written on the receipt

$2,492.89
1

Dm ah a Steaks
Frazier claimed a total of $697.00 in Omaha Steak purchases. The business reason for mostof the purchases
was spot award for people that did not work for Frazier.

Items Purchased

Amt

$79.95 1 Steaks

Business Reason

Dan ?????

i

$72.90

Steaks

Ron Sagehorn (Supervisor • Dave Levyl/Dave Archuleta (Supervisor • Dave
Levy)

$95.45

Gourmet Steaks

Spot Award for J. Methany (Supervisor • AL Faulkner)

$155.95

Meat/Seafood (AMEX Bill)

Spot Award for Rick Thomas (Nampa, ID; Sup. • R. Thomas?)

$291.75

Meat/Seafood

Spot Award Thomas, Huiet (No supervisor listed), Smith, Vargason
(Frazier's supervisor), and Wakefield (Supervisor • A. StrongU. Frazier).
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$697.00

Duplication of Expenses:
Airline Tickets
An airline expense for $421.00 was claimed on January 9 and January 10 for a trip to Portland. The dates were
on two different expense reports. There were no supporting documents with the January 9 posting, but a copy of an
airiine ticket, Delta #114605036, was submitted with the January 10 expense.
January 9

No ticket enclosed

January 10

Ticket# 1145505036

Car Rental
A car was rented from Portland and returned to Pasco, WA on 6/19 to 5/23. Frazier claimed car rental expense of
$264.74 for 6/18 to 6/23, supported by a Hertz receipt. On 7/8, car rental was expensed for $290.93 as part of a business
trip to Kansas City (mileage was also claimed). The supporting receipt (from Hertz) was for a rental that was picked up
from Portland and returned to Pasco on 6/19 to 6/23. The vehicle numbers on both receipts are identical. The difference in
the totals was due to a mistake in the sales tax on the receipt for $264.74. Frazier's AMEX bills showed that he was billed
once for $290.93.
Meal Duplicates
There were 11 instances when Frazier claimed entertainment and a meal.

THE MEAL THAT WAS DUPLICATED

AMOUNT

15-Dec

Dinner and Entertainment

$156.81

11-Jan

Dinner and Entertainment

$231.41

14-Jan

Dinner and Entertainment

$252.86

B-Feb

Dinner and Entertainment

$116.77

3-May

Dinner and Entertainment

$24.65

10-Jun

Lunch and Entertainment

$12.88

28-Aug

Dinner and Entertainment

$93.76

DATE

1

29-Aug

Dinner and Entertainment

$173.41
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5-Sep

Dinner and Entertainment

$57.98

11-Oct

Dinner and Entertainment

$44.00

12-0ct

Dinner and Entertainment

$86.00

25-Oct

Dinner and Entertainment

$83.17

.17-Jan

Dinner and Entertainment

$34.40

$1,378.10

HotelDeposit
Frazier incurred a charge of $105.00 on his American Express account on 5/11 and 5/27 for a total of $210.00.
The charges were deposits on a reservation at the La Duinta Hotel (La Duinta, CA) for an upcoming trip on 6/8 • 6/12. Dn
5125, Frazier claimed $105.00 on his personal expense report. No explanation was provided, but the receipt from the 5/11
deposit was.used as supporting documentation.
Frazier stayed at the La Duinta on 6/8 • 6/9. The total charges were $244.10 for lodging ($233.10) and phone
($11.00), but the bill was credited $210.DDso the balance due was $34.10. Frazier claimed the entire lodging and phone
expenses on his personal expense report on 6/9 and 5/10. Since he also received reimbursement for one of the deposits,
Frazier was overpaid $105.00.
^
Trip to Kansas City
A trip to Kansas City was claimed on April 8 (Saturday) and April 9 (Sunday) on two separate expense reports.
Fraziers phone bill (Motorola Monthly Statement) showed that Frazier was in Omaha on April 9. The amount claimed for
April 9 was $161.26.
Unverified Derailments:
There were 13 claimed derailments which were either contradicted by the derailment report or Frazier's receipts.
Costs associated with those derailments totaled $3988.18.
L a ramie Derail men t:
Frazier claimed mileage, entertainment, and meals as part of a trip to Laramie to inspect
November 17 and 18. The derailment occurred at 1:32 PM on November IB.

the derailment on

The only supporting documentation was a credit card receipt from the Best Western Country Inn for the
entertainment. The receipt had been altered from $40.03 to $250.03. Fraziers American Express account was billed
$40.03 (credit card bill). The date on the receipt and credit card bill was November 12.
There was a Tiburon Golf receipt submitted with the expense report, which indicated that Frazier played golf on
the morning of November 18. Fraziers celiuiar phone bill also showed that he was in Omaha during the afternoon of
November 13.
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Frazier claimed mileage for $413.00, entertainment for $250.03, and meals for $50.00.

rcher, Wyoming
Frazier claimed expenses for a derailment in Archer, Wyoming on October 29 (Sunday). He stated that he drove
205 round trip miles in one day, before flying to Salt Lake City the next day. A derailment occurred in Archer on October
4.
rownson, Nebraska
Travel expenses of $358.70 were claimed on October 22 (Sunday) for 8 derailment in Brownson, Nebraska (475
.lies from Omaha).

Brsonal Mileage
Sixty seven trips were claimed as personal mileage for a total of 25,129 miles ($7513.59).

luncil Bluffs Trips:
. A total of 939 miles for $281.14 was claimed for trips to Council Bluffs.
eekend Kansas City Trips:
There were 11 instances of weekend trips to Kansas City for a total of $2138.34.
dahoma City Weekend Trip
On May 13 to May 14, Frazier claimed a weekend trip to Oklahoma City to Audit Facility. Oklahoma City is out of
aziers jurisdiction. Total expenses were $434.91.
sals Expensed After Returning to Omaha:
Frazier returned to Omaha on December 16 J 994 before 1:34 PM (parking receipt). He claimed dinner for $13.30.
Frazier returned to Omaha on February 26 before 12:55 PM (parking receipt). He claimed dinner for $12.87.
Frazier returned to Omaha on May 18 before 3:33 PM. Dinner was expensed for $14.33.
Frazier returned to Omaha on July 7 before 1:53 PM (parking receipt). He charged dinner and entertainment (Red
n in Portland • dated 7/05) for $29.88.
Frazier returned to Omaha on September 8 before 11:47 AM (parking receipt). At 1:37, he had a charge from
braska Golf for $425.99, which was explained as a retirement gift for Ml Wall. The expense was claimed on September
is part of a business trip to Houston.
tertainment in Omaha:
Frazier entertained employees from his office in Omaha on 38 occasions for a total of $1414.81.

UP 001835
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TELECOMMUNICATION EXPENSES
1. List the number of purchases of leiecommunciaiions equipment [i.e. cellular phones):

0

Provide a brief description of the item(s) expensed.: NA

2. List the number of telecommunications services that individual expenses (Examples would include PC lines and cellular phone charges.
List the number of services expensed -not the number of bills submitted.) : 0
Provide a brief description of the service(s) expensed.: NA

Ivester 05/09/96
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CONFIDENTIAL

UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION
Corporate Audit Staff
Expense Report Irregularity of G. L. Benham, Systems Consultant,
Union Pacific Pvaiiroad Company

On May 17, 1996, representatives of the Corporate Audit Staff, together with
J. B. Baird, Director - Telecommunications Operations, and G. T. Lottmaim, Director - Police
Operations, met with Mr. Benham to discuss expense reporting discrepancies. These discrepancies were identified during our review of expense reports processed during the 27-month period .
ended March 31, 1996 for which Mr. Benham was reimbursed S137.335.
Mr. Benham's responsibilities included providing telecommunications and LAN
administration support for the Corporate office. Mr. Benham informed us that he coordinated his
travel to Bethlehem with the Administrator - Corporate Travel in order to use Corporate aircraft
when possible. Our review identified 20 instances in which Mr. Benham claimed round-trip
airfare (includes six tickets purchased by Mr. Benham for other business associates) although his
American Express Corporate Card had been credited ($9,106 total) for a portion of each ticket It
was determined that Mr. Benham or associates of him used Corporate aircraft for one leg of most
of the trips. In addition, Mr. Benham reported round-trip airfare and meals during a three-day
period in October 1995 when he claimed to have traveled to Bethlehem; however, we noted that
no airline, car rental, or lodging receipts were provided for this trip. Furthermore, the unused
airline ticket was returned for credit within a few days of the time Mr. Benham submitted his
October 1995 expense report and three purchases from Omaha-area retailers were charged to Mr.
Benham's American Express Corporate Card during the time he claimed to be in Bethlehem.
Mr. Benham also traveled to Mexico City and Monterrey, Mexico on a number of
occasions. Comparison of the amounts reported by Mr. Benham for 46 credit card purchases in
Mexico with amounts billed by American Express disclosed the exchange rate used by
Mr. Benham was less than the rate used by .American Express on 41 occasions (over half of the
rate variances exceeded 10%) and, as a result, Mr. Benham was overpaid SI,875. In addition, Mr.
Benham claimed between $30 and S45 for one-way taxi fare from the Railroad's marketing and
sales office to the Mexico City airport although the current one-way fare is approximately SI5. It
was also noted that supporting documentation was not provided for the taxi expenses
(undocumented taxi fares during the review period aggregated SI,209).
Our review also disclosed that Mr. 3eiiham incurred personal mileage between
Omaha and North Platte, Nebraska on 19 occasions. Although Mr. Benham was reimbursed for
the milease, he also reported related fuel expenses totaling S522. In addition, we noted four
instances in which Mr. Benham duplicated expenses of S317.

U? 001848
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Mr. Benham acknowledged that he returned the unused airline coupons to the
American Express travel group with the intent of receiving credits to his American Express
Corporate Card. He also agreed that expenses incurred in Mexican currency were not convened
accurately and that the Company was owed SI,875. He informed us that he did not keep track of
the taxi expenses inclined in Mexico but reported what he felt was a reasonable amount.
Although he agreed that the fuel expenses and other duplicated items should not have been
included on his expense reports, he indicated that he was unaware that fuel expenses were not
reimbursable or that he had inadvertently-duplicated the other items. Mr. Benham's employment
was suspended pending farther review and he agreed to repay the Company for the overcharges
($11,928).
M. E. Bernard

(date)
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UNION PACIFIC CORPORAHON
Corporate Audit Stair
Expense Report Discrepancies of
Employees of Car Maintenance Operations

I SXH/BITMO!21
JA- KUHLMAA/

As a result of our disclosure of fraudulent activities attributable to J. L. Frazier, forms M
Senior Director - Maintenance Operations (Car), we expanded our review of expense reports
prepared by employees of the Car Maintenance Operations function. Our review primarily
covered reimbursements processed during 1994 and 1995. On March 28, 1996, J. A. Hale,
Jr., Assistant Controller - Auditing, and I, together with J. N. Vargason, Chief Mechanical
Officer (Car) and G. T. Lottmann, Director - Police Operations, met with six management
employees (three of which had approved Mr. Frazier's expense reports) to discuss expense
report discrepancies. Significant findings are summarized in the following paragraphs:
\ D. Gallamore, Senior Director - Maintenance Operations (Car)
Mr. Gallamore was reimbursed $79,200 for personal expenses during 1994 and 1995.
3ur review identified five instances (SI,984) in which Mr. Gallamore was inappropriately
eimbursed for unused airline coupons that were either returned for credit to his American
Express card or exchanged for other tickets. Mr. Gallamore also reported an airline ticket
S534) that was charged to the Company's Business Travel Account (the ticket had been
tamped "non-reimbursable" by the travel agent); 23 meals ($239) occuring prior to departure
>r after return from a business trip; 17 duplicate meals ($181); and seven instances ($144) of
nappropriate lodging or meals.
During 1994 and 1995, Mr. Gallamore was reimbursed $9,100 for 13 trips to St.
(Mr. Gallamore's home town) involving a weekend layover including 10 trips in which
Ir. Gallamore departed for St. Louis either on a Friday, Saturday, or the day before a
oliday. Four trips revolved around holiday weekends and Mr. Gallamore reported vacation
me for four of the other trips. Although business expenses were generally claimed
iroughout the weekend, holidays, and vacation days, the purpose of the business trips was not
dequately explained.

JDUIS

During 1994 and 1995, Mr. Gallamore purchased 160 Omaha Steaks gift certificates
ith a value of $9,500 and Mr. Frazier purchased an additional 268 packages of Omaha Steaks
alued at $16,500. We were informed that the steaks and gift certificates were purchased for
te Company's spot awards program; however, these items were generally distributed just
dor to the year-end holiday season. Fifteen packages or certificates (51,300) were distributed
) senior-level managers in the department including six packages (S465) received by either
[r. Gallamore or Mr. Frazier; two gift certificates (SI 12) were redeemed by Mr. Gallamore's
)usin (resident of St. Louis) or Mr. Gallamore's neighbor; and six certificates (S342) were
deemed at the Omaha Steaks head office by three unidentified persons. Mr. Gallamore
formed us that the department did not maintain a list of persons receiving the gift certificates
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or steal: packages nor did the department maintain an accounting of unissued or unredeemed
certificates.
Mr. Gallamore was promoted to the position of Senior Director in January 1994 and
was required to relocate from the Kansas City area to Omaha. Although his relocation was
delayed until July 1994, he was authorized to claim meals, lodging, and travel expenses in
Omaha during the period January 1994 to July 1994. T. A. Campbell, Assistant Vice
President, provided lodging for Mr. Gallamore at his residence during the eight-month period
ended August 31, 1994. Between January 1, 1994 and August 31, 1994, Mr. Gallamore was
reimbursed $6,540 for payments'to Mr. Campbell. Effective July 15, the rate paid Mr.
Campbell increased from S600 per month to S55 per day for the 45-day period following the
permanent relocation of Mr. Galiarnore's spouse to the Omaha area. Although the lodging
arrangement between Mr. Campbell and Mr. Gallamore had been approved in advance by Mr.
Vargason, the rate increase had not been authorized. We noted the transaction between Mr.
Gallamore and Mr. Campbell had not been disclosed on Mr. Campbell's conflict-of-interest
statement and Mr. Campbell was not issued a form 1099 from the Company.
The expense policy allowed entertainment of in-town personnel by other employees of
the same office/facility only in extenuating circumstances. Our analysis of entertainment
expenses reimbursed to Mr. Gallamore during the 11-month period ended November 30, 1995
identified 43 instances ($1,666) in which Mr. Gallamore entertained or was entertained by other
locally-based employees. Further analysis indicated that the 43 instances represented 37 percent
of the work days Mr. Gallamore spent in the Omaha office during the 11-month period.
Mr. Gallamore agreed to repay $5,202 attributable to expenses inappropriately claimed
on expense reports. He informed us that he did not keep track of his actual meal expenses
which, in his opinion, caused the erroneous meal expenses. He contended that, while in St.
Louis, he worked throughout the weekend and holidays and, consequently, should be
reimbursed for all travel expenses; however, Mr. Vargason advised us that the amount claimed
($2,081) beyond Saturday afternoon and certain other entertainment and meal expenses should
not be reimbursable. He also informed us that the vacation records attributed to him were
inaccurate.
Mr. Gallamore indicated the Omaha Steaks gift certificates issued to his neighbor and
cousin were appropriate because they had provided transportation for him to or from the
Omaha or St. Louis aiipons. He denied having knowledge of the six gift certificates redeemed
at the Omaha Steaks head office.
Mr. Vargason informed us Mr. Gallamore would be disciplined for these issues and
that he would not qualify for a merit pay increase or management incentive compensation in
1996. Mr. Vargason also Indicated that, effective January. 1, 1996, entertainment of locallybased employees had been discontinued.
D. E. Klaus. Senior Director - Maintenance Operations CEast)
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On June 2, 1995, Mr. Klaus reported expenses of $457 in connection with a rental car
obtained in Pocatello during the period May 16 through May 22, 1995. Mr. Klaus specified
on his expense report that the rental car expenses were incurred in connection with a trip made
by employees attending a meeting in Salt Lake City. Our review identified that the vehicle (a
Ford Explorer) was rented by the wife of Mr. Klaus and that the vehicle had been driven
1.523 miles although the roundirip mileage between Pocatello and Salt Lake City was only 325
miles. Furthermore, Mr. Klaus reported vacation on Thursday, May 18 and Friday, May 19
and the vehicle was not returned to the Pocatello rental agency until the following Monday.
During the interview, Mi. Klaus contended that the vehicle was rented for the Duroose
stated on his expense report but could not recall who attended the conference in Salt Lake City
or why the car had been driven over 1.500 miles. He also indicated the vehicle was probably
returned to Pocatello on Friday and parked at the Railroad facility over the weekend.
Subsequent to conclusion of the meeting, Mr. IGaus acknowledged that the vehicle was rented
for personal reasons and should not have been reported on his expense report.
^

J.

Our review also identified an instance in which Mr. Klaus was reimbursed for a S655
airline ticket charged to the Business Travel Account and another instance in which Mr. Klaus
reported a portion of a car rental expense that was used for a vacation trip taken in Missouri.
Mr. Klaus agreed to repay the Company (SI, 168). Mr. Vargason informed us Mr.
Klaus would be disciplined for these issues and that he would not qualify for a merit pay
increase or management incentive compensation in 1996.
H. G. Witt. Jr., Manager - Freight Car PS&P
Our audit identified two instances (S253) in which Mr. Witt reported the same expenses
twice and, three instances ($580) in which Mr. Witt was inappropriately reimbursed for
unused airiine coupons that had been returned for credit. In connection with his relocation to
Omaha, Mr. Witt was also reimbursed for lodging expenses of SI,700 (based on $45 a day)
for payments made to his mother, a resident of Omaha.
Upon review of these issues, it was determined that Mr. Witt had not reported the
expenses of a one-way airline ticket acquired, in part, through an exchange of an unused
airline coupon and Mr. Witt repaid the net amount owed the Company (S552). Mr. Witt
informed us that the arrangement between his mother and him had been approved by his
supervisor and, at our request, he provided copies of cancelled checks issued to Mrs. Witt.
A. L. Faulkner. Senior Director- Maintenance Operations (Car)
Accounts Payable personnel processed the same expense report twice and,
consequently, Mr. Faulkner was overpaid SI, 159. The first check was deposited by Mr.
Faulkner on March 8, 1995 and the duplicate check was deposited by Mr. Faulkner on March
17.
Mr. Faulkner refunded the Company SI,159.
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p.. L. Phillippie, Manager - Mechanical Maintenance
On Thursday, October 12, 1995, Mr. Phillippie traveled to Las Vegas for a meeting.
Personal expenses were reported through Monday, October 16, which was also reported as a
vacation day. In addition, we noted an instance in which Mr. Phillippie claimed an extra night
of lodging expense after he had checked out of the hotel.
Mr. Phillippie acknowledged that he should not have been reimbursed for travel
expenses in Las Vegas after October 13 or for the extra night of lodging and he repaid the
Company S892.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UP 001803

STRICTLY

PRIVAXE

CONFIDENTIAL
UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION
Corporate Audit Staff
Expense Report Discrepancies of J. A. Leuizinger. Manager - Health Promotion,
Union Pacific Railroad Company

On June 3, 1996, representatives of the Corporate Audit Staff, together with
R. S. Bannister, Director - Health Promotion, and G. T. Lottmann, Director - Police Operations,
met with Mr. Leutzinger to discuss expense reporting discrepancies. These discrepancies were
identified during our review of expense reports processed during the 24-month period ended
December 31, 1995 for which Mr. Leutzinger was reimbursed 270,000. Mr. Leutzinger's expense
reports were approved by M. L. Trainer, Health Services Project Coordinator, rather than by
Mr. Bannister, Mr. Leutzinger's immediate supervisor.
The review identified four instances in which Mr. Leutzinger claimed airline
expenses totaling S803 although applicable tickers had been charged to one of the Company's
.American Express business travel accounts (BTA). On two of these occasions, travel agents had
stamped " non-reimbursable" on the tickets. We also noted that (1) Mr. Leutzinger was
inappropriately reimbursed SI.253 for six unused airline coupons that were either returned for
credit to his American Express Corporate Card or exchanged for other tickets; (2) expenses
totaling S691 (represented nine charges) were reported twice; and (3) Mr. Leutzinger expensed a
S232 "no show" charge incurred at the Washington D. C. Marriott hotel on October 17, 1994 as
well as a S250 lodging expense at another Washington D. C. hotel.
At the outset of our discussion, Mr. Leutzinger informed us that Chris Hawes, a
contract employee, prepared his expense reports at his direction. Mr. Leutzinger speculated that
Ms. Hawes did not understand that tickets charged to the BTA and unused flight coupons did not
represent reimbursable expenses. Mr. Leutzinger informed us that Ms. Hawes had been instructed
to sign his name to his expense reports and that he seldom reviewed the reports prior to submittal
to the accounts payable function. Mr. Leutzinger also indicated that Ms. Hawes had been
requested by him to reconcile all expense report items with individual charges to his American
Express Corporate Card and that Ms. Hawes had erroneously determined that some credit card
charges had been omitted from his expense reports. Mr. Leutzinger agreed to provide restitution
of S2,747 to the Company and to comply with expense reporting procedures in the future;
however, he informed us that he should not be responsible for the i; no show" charge inasmuch as
American Express Travel Service agents had failed to cancel his guaranteed reservation
M. E. Bernard

(date)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
EUGENE FRANCISCONI
4
Plaintiff,
5
vs.

Civil No. 960904423CV

6
7

UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO. a
Utah Corporation,

8

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

9
10
11
12
DEPOSITION OF
13
LAWRENCE CURLEY
14
100 0 BOSTON BUILDING
#9 EXCHANGE PLACE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

15
IS

- MAY 19, 1997 17
18
19
20
21
22

HORIZON REPORTING & VIDEO, INC.
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 52 7
POST OFFICE BOX 1675
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84110-1675
(801) 53 2-DEPO (3376)
(801) 322-FAXX (3299)

23
Reported by:
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JULIE N. CLEGG, CSR, RMR
REGISTERED MERIT REPORTER
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Q.

Do you know what the circumstances were that Mr.

Schleiger told you this?
3

A.

What were the circumstances?

4

Q.

Yes, sir.

5

A.

As far as what?

6

Q.

Why was he telling you this, just to be friendly

7

I

or --?

8

A.

I -- just pass on information I guess.

9

Q-

Okay.

10
11
12

Did you have any role in any investigation of

Mr. Francisconi?
A.

At one point I was requested by Mr. Schleiger to

contact the D.A.'s

office to inquire about the case.

13

Q.

Did you?

14

A.

I did.

15

Q.

Who did you contact?

16

A.

I contacted Craig Bown, I believe, B-O-W-N.

17

Not too

sure on the spelling on that.

18

Q.

"Bown" or "Bownd"?

19

A.

B-O-W-N.

20

Q.

And who was he with?

21

A.

He was with the D.A.'s office here in Salt Lake.

22

Q.

So the District Attorney now?

23

A.

I believe he is a screening officer.

24

Q.

As a part of your assignment to contact the -- was it

25

I don't know how to pronounce it for sure.

a prosecutor?
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EUGENE FRANCISCONI,
3

CIVIL NO. 960904423

Plaintiff,

A

D-E-P-O-S-I-T-I-O-N
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.,
a Utah Corooration,
Defendant,

DEPOSITION OF CHANDRA HENLEY, taken before Allan G.
Kuhlman, a Registered Professional Reporter and General Notary
Public within and for the State of Nebraska, beginning at the
hour of 3:20 p.m., Friday, August 6, 1999, at 1416 Dodge
Street, Omaha, Nebraska, taken on behalf of the plaintiff in
the above-entitled matter, pursuant to the within
stipulations.

ALLAN G. KUHLMAN
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER
OMAHA, NS3RASKA
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CHANDRA HENLEY - DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q.

You are personally not aware of any?

A.

No, not that I was involved in, no.

Q.

By involved, you mean directly involved?

A.

Meaning where the railroad's internal audit staff was

1

involved from a period of 1994 to 1996.
Q.

Are you familiar with any instance where the railroad has

ever even contacted the criminal authorities regarding any
finding of fraud or any finding as a result of an audit?
A.

As a result of an audit?

No.

Q.

Mr. Fillmore was asked to provide restitution of how much?

A.

He was not.

Q.

He was not asked to provide restitution?

A.

No.

Q.

Why was that?

A.

The issue was not che money.

-..;.

The issue was the nature of

the act, and the railroad, the department head, had the
discretion to make a decision about restitution prior to the
implementation of the business conduct committee.
Q.

Did the business conduct committee make the ultimate

decision about this person's status?
A.

No, the business conduct committee was not in place, I

don't believe, until 1996.

So it was after this event.

Q.

When did the interview occur?

A.

This was 1995.

Q.

So the committee's recommendation was that restitution not
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EXHIBIT E
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K£imDurjpemeni Q-iicuuiv

IN-LI5U OF LODGING
Amount Spent
Date Claimed

4
o
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

4/22/94
7/24/94
8/13/94
10/15/94 '
2/1/95
3/11/95
4/22/95
4/30/95
5/5/95
5/20/95
6/3/95
6/8/95
7/15/95'
8/16/95
8/28/95
9/15/95
9/28/95
10/15/95
10/18/95
10/30/95
11/21/95
12/12/95
1/4/96
1/26/96
2/24/96
3/19/96
3/31/95

Location

Pocatello
Pocatello
Pocatello
Pocatello
Reno
Pocatello
Pocatello
Pocatello
Pocatelio
Pocatello
Pocatelio
Pocatelio
Pocatello
Pocatello
Pocatello
Pocatello
Stockton
Pocatelio
Portland
Pocatello
Pocatelio
Pocatello
Pocatelio
Pocatello
Pocatello
Pocatello
Denver

Total in Lieu of Gifts
Disallowed Lodging Days
(used avg per day :$42.73 MS)

Remaining In Lieu of Gifts
Disallowed ln-Lieu of Amount

Number of
on In-Lieu of
Days
Lodging Gifts Disallowed
S74.30
S55.45
541.99
$84.79
S45.90
S79.00
S303.45
$86.64
534.64
$66.14
$86.52
$198.44
$183.01
$223.95
$93.18
$136.71
$150.83
$45.36
$48.95
$46.11
$198.43
S214.57
$150.88
$41.55
$157.50
$149.01
$48.68
CJ

ntH

1
1
1
1
10
2

1

1

TR

S3,C3*
S787

S2.294
X 50%
$1,147

•OTAL DISALLOWED IN-LIEU OF LODGING EXPENSES:
'87 + 1147)
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$1,934

DISALLOWED PQCA7ELLO EXPENSES

52.00

Mar-94

Sun 20

Pocatelio

3eIirr.an/Tip

Apr-94

Sat 23
Sun 24

Pocatelio

Dinner
Breakfast
Lunch

S14.9B
SB.25
S10.00

Jul-94

Sat 23

Pocatelio

Lunch
Dinner
Breakfast
Lunch

S8.35
514.95
58.55
S9.B5

Sun 24

Lunch

SB.50

Aug-94

Sun 14

Oct-94

Sat 15
Sun 16

Pocatelio

Dinner
Breakfast
Lunch

514.92
57.85
5B.75

Mar-95

Sun 12

Pocatelio

Breakfast
Lunch

57.75
56.25

Apr-95

Sat 29

Pocatelio

Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner

S7.B0
59.10
514.92
SB.05
SB.90
S14.93

Sun 30

Aug-95

Sat 25
Sun 27

Pocatelio

Dinner
Breakfast
Luncn

$14.93
57.70
56.95

Nov-95

Sat 18
Sun 19

Pocatelio

Dinner
Breakfast
Lunch

$14.94
SE.35
59.50
5251

TOTAL
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APPENDIX F
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Strike Fact Exhibits Contained in Defendant's Amended
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
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David J. Bums, Esq. (#7157)
DAVID J. BURNS, P.C.
1000 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
Facsimile: (801) 531-6690
Daniel Darger (#0815)
Attorney at Law
1000 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EUGENE FRANCISCONI,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO., a
Utah Corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE
FACT EXHIBITS CONTAINED IN
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 960904423

)

Defendant.

)

Judge Stephen Henriod

Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi, through his counsel, hereby files the following memorandum in
support of his Motion to Strike Fact Exhibits Contained in Defendant's Amended Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment.
FACTS
1.

Plaintiff moves to strike the Affidavit of John A. Ivester.
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By way of background, on or about August 22, 1996, Plaintiff served a First Set of
iterrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on Defendant Union Pacific Rail Road Co.
iterrogatory no. 1 of that discovery asked Defendant to identify "all persons with discoverable information
Pairing to this action." Defendant identified nine persons. Defendant did not identify John A. Ivester
> one of those nine persons. Later, Plaintiff took the depositions of most of the latter persons at
efendant's headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. During the course of these depositions, Defendant's

"
-

nployees identified John Ivester as the person who conducted the actual financial audit of Plaintiffs -•—
:pense reports. This was the first time that Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Ivester's existence. Defendant
lrported to terminate Plaintiff as a result of this audit.
After the Omaha depositions, Plaintiff requested that Defendant produce in Salt Lake City,
[r. Ivester and another critical employee it had failed to identify. Defendant's counsel denied the request,

'

guing that Defendant's answer to the interrogatory was "accurate and appropriate." Plaintiff thus moved
compel the depositions and this Court granted the motion. On December 1, 1998, Plaintiffs counsel
i

jposed Mr. Ivester in Salt Lake City. The deposition lasted approximately three hours and spanned 95
iges of transcribed testimony. Defendant's counsel declined to ask any questions of Mr. Ivester or to
herwise clarify any of his statements.

(

In the fact section of its memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment,
sfendant has submitted 42 numbered paragraphs. Approximately one-third of the numbered paragraphs
late to exhibit c of the motion for summary judgment, the Affidavit of John A. Ivester and attached "In
eu Of Lodging Schedule." No other deponent or fact item is more relied upon by Defendant in support
• its motion for summary judgment. Apparently, Defendant now counts Mr. Ivester a person "with
scoverable information pertaining to this action."
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(

Plaintiff moves, in part, to strike the affidavit because it contradicts the 30(b)(6) testimony
of the company. In particular, on August 6, 1999, Plaintiff took the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of the
company. Item number seven of the 30(b)(6) notice of deposition instructed Defendant to identify its
designee who would provide testimony on the following subject matter: "The basis for your belief that
Plaintiff violated the 'payment "in lieu o f policy' by 'altering receipts, concealing the true nature of
expenses, and by requesting and subsequently receiving reimbursement for improper unauthorized
expenses' as more fully set forth in the audit report prepared for Plaintiff and produced at UP 000208,
passim."1 Defendant identified Michael Bernard, the director of auditing, to testify on behalf of the
company.
2.

Plaintiff moves to strike the "interview summary" purportedly prepared by Janice Arthur.

In her deposition, Ms. Arthur was asked about why the "interview summary" read like a transcript, even
though she claimed that the recording device she brought to the interview was not used. For instance, she
was asked why her purported summary states that the interviewer said, "Okay, Lets [sic] back up for a
•A

minute." She replied in her deposition: "I guess you'd have to say it was a paraphrase. I mean, I distinctly
recall him [Bernard] saying, 'Okay. Let's back up for a minute.' But as far as the other three or four
sentences that are in that paragraph, you know, it was probably a generalization or a, you know, shortness
of, you know, the questions that he asked,..." (Janice Arthur depo. p. 29, Exhibit A hereto.) She went
1

Earlier, in response to an interrogatory which asked it to state "which company rules
Plaintiff allegedly violated and how said rules were violated," Defendant had answered that
Plaintiff had violated the company's personal expense policies "by altering receipts, concealing the
true nature of expenses, requesting and subsequently receiving reimbursement for improper and
unauthorized expenses." (Defendant's answer to Interrogatory No. 6 of Plaintiffs First
Interrogatories.) Thus, because the company itself had refused to provide definitive testimony on
the precise violations which it relied upon in terminating Plaintiff, the 30(b)(6) deposition was
designed to obtain concrete testimony on the subject matter.
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i to acknowledge that it was "very difficult to keep up with the pace of the conversation. I did the best
could." (Arthur depo. p. 30.) Even so, she says she was able to write notes not only in the printed
aestionnaire she had but also on blank pieces of paper. (Arthur depo. p. 31.) She admitted that she left
le room at some point in the interview. (Arthur depo. p. 31.)
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ARGUMENT
A motion for summary judgment must be supported by the existing record. Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(c) identifies the record as the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file," as well as affidavits. In other words, the available record consists of sworn
testimony, and evidence otherwise admissible at trial. See also, 4-501(2)(B) CJ.A. (the points and
authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment "shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the opposing party relies"). The following exhibits attached to Defendant's
motion for summary judgment should be stricken because they are not part of the record in this
action.
I.

The "Application For Employment" Attached As Exhibit A Should Be Stricken
In paragraphs one and two of its fact section, Defendant offers as exhibit a a document it

describes as "Application for Employment," which, it alleges, contains a statement of the "Terms
and Conditions of Employment." Defendant makes a cursory and unsupported assertion that Plaintiff
signed a document entitled statement of terms and conditions of employment. (Defs Mem. at i.) But the
document that Plaintiff was shown at his deposition is not the same document that Defendant offers as
exhibit a. At the deposition. Plaintiffs counsel objected to the document that was offered as an incomplete
copy of whatever it purported to be. (Eugene Francisconi depo. p. 10, Exhibit B hereto.) With respect
to the document that he was shown, Plaintiff was not asked to authenticate the document that was offered
(i.e., never confirmed that the document is what Defendant claims). Instead, he was only asked if he
recalled signing page three of the document, which is dated August 10, 1970. He replied that he did not.
(Francisconi depo. p. 10.)
The document submitted as exhibit a is not the document that was offered at Plaintiffs
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position, and Defendant makes no showing that it has ever been authenticated. Absent this condition
ecedent to admissibility, exhibit a is inadmissible, and should be stricken. Utah R. Evid. 901(a). In
dition to lack of authentication, exhibit a is inadmissible hearsay because it is a statement, other than one
ade by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
atter asserted. Utah R. Evid. 801(c).
The Affidavit of John A. Ivester Attached As Exhibit C And "In Lieu Of Lodging
Schedule"Attached As Exhibit CI Should be Stricken
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an affidavit supporting or
)posing a motion for summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
ich facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
stify to the matters stated therein." Thus, for an affidavit to be effective in support of a motion for
immary judgment, it must set forth facts that would be admissible at trial. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d
57 (Utah 1983). Moreover, as a general rule, a party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that
mtradicts his deposition testimony. Webster v. 5/7/, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d
130 (Utah App. 1990).
Mr. Ivester's affidavit should be stricken because it fails to satisfy the evidentiary requirements
f Rule 56(e) and contradicts his prior deposition testimony. In particular, it contains statements for
iiich there is a lack of foundation and that are conclusory in form. The statements are also duplicative
f those made in Mr. Ivester's deposition and/or have not been previously disclosed despite specific request
lerefor.
Three general objections may be made to Mr. Ivester's affidavit.

First, the affidavit is a

lear attempt to circumvent the statements Mr. Ivester made in his lengthy deposition. By submitting an
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affidavit, he is able to avoid cross-examination at deposition. Whereas Mr. Ivester was equivocal in his
deposition, he is emphatic in his affidavit. Further, Mr. Ivester's affidavit is an attempt to proffer either
duplicative testimony or testimony that contradicts his deposition. Plaintiff has made repeated requests
to discover the basis for Defendant's belief that Plaintiff altered receipts and otherwise received improper
reimbursement.
Mr. Ivester was asked to disclose this same information in his deposition. Therefore, the
only relevant information that can be contained in Mr. Ivester's affidavit has either been stated in his
deposition, or should have been stated in his deposition or in a previous interrogatory propounded
to Defendant. In either case, the affidavit is inappropriate and designed to circumvent the ordinary
practice of discovery. Defendant's offer of the affidavit is a bald attempt to ambush Plaintiff with new
evidence after the close of discovery.

This Court has already stricken Defendant's most recent

discovery requests on the same subject matter as untimely.
Second, Defendant does not demonstrate either through Mr. Ivester's affidavit or elsewhere
4

in its motion for summary judgment, that the factual assertions contained in the affidavit were ever
communicated to and relied on by any decision maker of the company. The personal knowledge of
an agent of the corporation who is not a corporate officer regarding the facts to which he has sworn
will not be presumed, and therefore the specific "means and sources" of his information must be
shown. Utah Farm Prod, Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 137 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987). There is, for instance,
no foundation established in Mr. Ivester's affidavit or elsewhere in Defendant's memorandum indicating
that Arthur Shoener, the Vice President of Operations who made the decision to terminate Plaintiffs
employment, ever relied on the specific assertions made in Mr. Ivester's affidavit As such, his assertions
are irrelevant.
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The assertion in paragraph thirteen of Mr. Ivester's affidavit stating that he "turned the In
leu of Lodging Schedule and supporting audit materials over to my supervisor, Janice Arthur,
r further action," does not alter this conclusion. No evidence is presented elsewhere in Defendant's
emorandum that Ms. Arthur ever in fact received the information and that she communicated to Mr.
loener the specific information contained in Mr. Ivester's affidavit and the lodging schedule that is
tached as Exhibit 1 to the affidavit. The assertion in paragraph 33 of Defendant's statement of facts
at Mr. Shoener met with unspecified "auditors" to review audit information does not establish the ,jcessary link between Mr. Ivester and Mr. Shoener.
In addition to general objections of duplication, contradiction and lack of foundation establishing
ie relevance of the assertions, Mr. Ivester's affidavit is objectionable because it is superseded by the Rule
3(b)(6) testimony of the company on the same subject matter. The testimony of the 30(b)(6) deponent,
lichael Bernard, director of auditing, is the company's testimony on the foregoing subject matter. That
^position testimony is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." There the company stated that 22 receipts were
Dt "adequate" because they did not contain "itemized descriptions," but refused to identify which specific
jceipts were problematic, because that would require it to "speculate." (Michael Bernard depo. pp. 57-58,
xhibit C hereto.) Since this limited testimony is the company's testimony, Mr. Ivester's testimony on the
ime subject matter is irrelevant.
More particularized objection can be made to each of the substantive, numbered paragraph
l Mr. Ivester's affidavit:
•

In paragraph 5, Mr. Ivester asserts that Plaintiff

"received reimbursement for a

lrge number of 'in lieu of expenses." In his deposition, Mr. Ivester never asserted that Plaintiff
ad received reimbursement for a "large" number of such expenses. As made in the affidavit, the
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assertion is without foundation, is conclusory and opinion.
•

In paragraph 6, Mr. Ivester asserts that 27 "in lieu o f lodging expenses for which

Plaintiff received reimbursement "involved trips to Pocatello where Mr. Francisconi's father, Alfred
Francisconi, resided." In his deposition, Mr. Ivester testified that neither he nor anyone else that he was
aware of ever contacted Alfred Francisconi concerning the stays. At the time of the audit, "we weren't
even sure who the items were going to, because we did not have a name of the person that these items
went to." (John Ivester depo. p. 45, Exhibit D hereto.) Thus, paragraph 6 is inadmissible because it
contradicts Mr. Ivester's deposition testimony.
•

In paragraphs 7 through 10, Mr. Ivester provides testimony that is duplicative of

his deposition.
•

In paragraph 11, Mr. Ivester opines that Plaintiff altered six store receipts "to conceal the

nature of the merchandise purchased." This statement is inadmissible opinion. Moreover, the statement
contradicts Mr. Ivester's deposition testimony. There he stated that he did not make independent decisions
concerning the appropriateness of Plaintiffs expense statements, but rather would defer to his supervisors.
(Ivester depo. p. 46.)

>

The foregoing arguments can also be made to exclude exhibit cl, the In Lieu Of Lodging
Schedule, which Defendant cites separately in the fact section. Among other deficiencies, this document
lacks foundation and is grounded on hearsay within hearsay. Paragraphs 25-27 and 29 of Defendant's facts
section explicitly refer to unnamed "store personnel," unidentified "information to the auditor," unattached
American Express statements, and the like as the basis for the information contained in the
Schedule. The document is entirely derivative and therefore inadmissible hearsay.
III.

The 'Interview Summary" Attached As Exhibit E Should Be Stricken
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Defendant also offers in support of its motion for summary judgment, a document which it
fers to as an "interview summary" and which it alleges was prepared by Janice Arthur. In paragraph 20,
jfendant asserts that Ms. Arthur "took detailed notes of the interview," and "then prepared a written
mmary of the questions asked and given by Mr. Francisconi." (Defs Mem. at iv.) However, Defendant
>es not attach the sworn testimony of Ms. Arthur or any other person to authenticate the "interview
mmary" that is attached as exhibit e to Defendant's memorandum.
Defendant cites but does not attach to its memorandum, certain deposition testimony of
s. Arthur. Pages 26 through 28, referred to by Defendant, and pages 29 through 31, are attached hereto
Exhibit "B." From this testimony, it is clear that the "interview summary" was never made an
thenticated exhibit to Ms. Arthur's deposition. Nor was Plaintiff ever asked in his deposition to
thenticate any of the alleged admissions contained in the "interview summary." Accordingly, the
iterview summary" is inadmissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 901(a).
The "interview summary" is also inadmissible because it is not based on personal knowledge,
her deposition, Ms. Arthur stated she prepared a report of the interview that was "a paraphrase
sed upon my memory and the notes that I had, yes." (Arthur depo. p. 28.) The notes that she had,
e further stated, included the notes of "Mike Bernard and Jim Hale" as well as her own. But she
ide no attempt to identify which part, if any, of the "interview summary" was a product of her notes
d of other's notes. (Arthur depo. p. 27.) Therefore, contrary to Defendant's assertion that Ms.
rthur "took detailed notes" and "then prepared a written summary," the document is entirely
irivative. By Ms. Arthur's own admission, it is merely a paraphrase of her memory and scribbled
•tes that may or may not be her own.
The "interview summary" is also inadmissible because it is hearsay, and/or hearsay Within
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hearsay. It purports to contain statements by a person or persons other than Plaintiff. That other
person or persons are identified in the body of the summary only by the letter "I." These statements
attributed to "I" are inadmissible hearsay.
As for the admissions attributed to Plaintiff, these too are hearsay. Curiously, none of the
alleged statements that Defendant has cited in its memorandum as an admission of Plaintiff appears in the
handwritten notes Ms. Arthur says she prepared at the time of the interview. It is reasonable to assume
that if Plaintiff had made a statement against interest, then it would have been recorded somewhere in the
fifteen pages of notes kept by Ms. Arthur. The alleged statements are therefore, as Ms. Arthur admits, at
best "a paraphrase" of her memory. But a vague paraphrase is not direct evidence of anything, and is only
hearsay. Moreover, each of the statements Defendant attributes to Plaintiff is also hearsay (notes of
Bernard, Hale or Arthur) within hearsay (Arthur's paraphrase of notes or recollection).
IV.

The "Summary" Attached As Exhibit H Should Be Stricken
In paragraph no. 32 of the fact section, Defendant represents that the "Corporate Audit
4

Staff prepared a summary of itsfindings,"and that summary is attached thereto as exhibit h. However,
no demonstration is made as to the authenticity of the document or why it is not hearsay. A "summary,"
by its very nature, is derivative and in this instance, hearsay within hearsay.
V.

The "Separation Agreement" Attached As Exhibit J Should Be Stricken
In paragraph no. 35 of the fact section, Defendant claims that Plaintiff received a "Separation

Agreement" from the company. In his deposition, however, Plaintiff merely acknowledged that he
received an unspecified document after speaking with Thomas Campbell. Plaintiff was never asked
to authenticate exhibit j and it was never offered as an exhibit at his or anyone else's deposition. The
document is also inadmissible hearsay.
7
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I.

The Letter Attached As Exhibit L Should Be Stricken
In paragraph no. 38 of the fact section, Defendant claims that in a letter dated June 7, 1996, "Mr.

-ancisconi was notified of his right to elect COBRA continuation coverage." Plaintiff claims that
efendant threatened to withhold COBRA coverage to force Plaintiff to resign, and when he did not
sign, Defendant withheld the coverage in violation of law.
The letter purports to be from Larry L. Reiff, but Defendant did not depose Mr. Reiff and
is not attached an affidavit to its motion for summary judgment, authenticating that the document
what Defendant claims. Moreover, the document is stamped "Cobra Offer File," in yet Defendant
is not shown that the document satisfies the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Finally,
efendant did not offer the letter dated June 7, 1996, as an exhibit at Plaintiffs deposition and did
3t even question Plaintiff about it. Indeed, there is no showing that the letter was ever sent to
laintiff or that he ever received it.
II.

The letter Attached As Exhibit M Should Be Stricken
The foregoing grounds for striking exhibit 1 apply as well to exhibit m. This document .

urports to be a letter from Larry L. Reiff to Dennis Seals of United Health Care of Utah. Defendant
[aims that this document demonstrates that on June 21, 1996, "Sharlene Francisconi [Plaintiffs wife]
lected COBRA coverage." (Def s Mem. at 9.) However, there is no demonstration that Mr. Reiff ever
Lithenticated the document, that it in fact was delivered to Mr. Seals, was kept in the ordinary course of
usiness, or that it otherwise proves what it purports to prove, namely, that Ms. Francisconi elected
10BRA coverage on that date.
TIL The Letters Attached As Exhibit O Should Be Stricken
In paragraph no. 41 of the fact section, Defendant offers exhibit o in support of the affirmative
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8

allegation that the UPGRADE Policy "has never been applied to management employees."

But

rather than attach sworn testimony, Defendant merely proffers two letters: one dated September 6, 1994,
from Rene Orosco to Kevin L. Newton, and another (unsigned copy) dated June 29, 1994, from D.D.
Matter to Kevin L. Newton. Both of the letters are inadmissible.
What Mr. Orosco or Mr. Matter allegedly stated to Mr. Newton in 1994 is irrelevant and
hearsay. It is irrelevant because the issue in question is whether Defendant breached an implied-in-fact
contract of employment based on the UPGRADE Policy's guarantee of certain grievance procedures
before an employee may be terminated, and in this regard the law is only concerned with the
representations made between employer and employee. Defendant did not offer the letters at Plaintiffs
deposition, or otherwise attempt to establish that Plaintiff received copies of the letters or was ever made
aware of their contents. As such, they are irrelevant to the question whether an implied-in-fact contract
existed.
Additionally, the letters are hearsay. As noted above, Defendant has submitted the letters
4

in support of the affirmative allegation that the "policy never applied to management employees."
As such, under Utah R. Evid. 802, the letters are inadmissible hearsay.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi respectfully requests that the following
exhibits attached to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment be stricken
because they are not part of the existing record, along with the corresponding numbered paragraphs in
Defendant's "Statement of Undisputed Facts":
1.

The "Application for Employment" attached thereto as exhibit a (paragraph nos. 1-2)

on the grounds of lack of authentication and inadmissible hearsay;
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2.

The Affidavit of John A. Ivester and "In Lieu Of Lodging Schedule" attached thereto as

tiibits c and cl (paragraph nos. 5-7, 9-15, and 25-29) on the grounds of irrelevance, lack of foundation,
nclusory in form, and duplicative and/or contradiction of prior deposition testimony;
3.

The "Interview Summary" attached thereto as exhibit e (paragraph nos. 20-23, 28,

d 30) on the grounds of lack of authentication, lack of personal knowledge and inadmissible
arsay;
4.

The "Summary" attached thereto as exhibit h (paragraph no. 32 (last sentence)) on

5 grounds of lack of authentication and inadmissible hearsay;
5.

The "Separation Agreement" attached thereto as exhibit j (paragraph nos. 35 (last

itence)-36) on the grounds of lack of authentication, inadmissible hearsay and irrelevance;
6.

The letter attached thereto as exhibit 1 (paragraph no. 38) on the grounds of lack of

thentication, inadmissible hearsay and irrelevance;
7.

The letter attached thereto as exhibit m (paragraph no. 39) on the grounds of lack

authentication, inadmissible hearsay and irrelevance; and
8.

The letters attached thereto as exhibit o (paragraph no. 41) on the grounds of lack

authentication, inadmissible hearsay and irrelevance.
DATED this 3^> day of December, 1999.

.
DAVID J. BURNS, P.C.

DAVID J. BURNS
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3°

day of December, 1999, a true and correct copy of the foregoing

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE FACT EXHIBITS
CONTAINED IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was sent by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to:
Jon Waddoups
KIRTON & McConkie
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Daniel Darger
Attorney at Law
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

2

STATE OF UTAH

3
4

EUGENE FRANCISCGNI,
Plaintiff,

5

Civil No. 960904423CV
6

vs
D E P O S I T I O N

7

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.,
a Utah Corporation,

8
Defendant.
9
10
11
12
13

DEPOSITION OF JANICE ARTHV?
DEPOSITION OF JANICE ARTHUR, taken before Tammy
J. Gonyea, a General Notary Public within and for the
State of Nebraska, beginning at 1:50 p.m., on Tuesday,
June 3, 1997, at 1416 Dodge Street, Omaha, Nebraska, to
be read in evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, pursuant
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

14
APPEARANCES
15
For the Plaintiff;
16
17

Mr. Daniel Darger
Attorney at Law
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Mr. Jon E. Waddoups
Attorney at Lav;
Suite 1600
50 South Main Screet
Salt Lake City, Utah

84144

18
For the Defendant
19
20
21
Al so Pre sent:

Mr. Eugene Francisconi

22
23
24
25

TAMMY J. GONYEA, RPR
Registered Professional Reporter
Matheson-Tauiborg Court Reporters
7602 Pacific Street, LL101
Omaha , Nebraska 68114
4 02/3 97-9669 - 402/298-7157
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DIRECT - ARTHUR

2-

A.

I'm net sure.

He may be a finance major.

Q.

Is he still in college?

A.

No.

Q.

Let me direct your attention to -- if you'll look at
volume one, page 154.
MR. WADDOUPS:

While she's looking for

that, let's go off the record for a minute.
(An off-the-record discussion was held.)
Q.

(By Mr. Darger)

If you could look at page 154 of volume

one .
A.

Okay.

Q.

Do you recognize the document that starts at 154 of
volume one?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What is that document?

A.

It's the document that I prepared from my notes and my

4

4'

recollection of the interview on April 26th.
Q.

How were your notes recorded?

A.

In longhand.

Q.

There wasn't a recorder there?

A.

No.

Well, I believe that there was a recorder there, but

it wasn't used.
Q.

Why wasn't it used?

A.

Well, we had had -- I really don't know why i- wasn't
used.

I had brouaht the recorder over, and I believe I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DIRECT - ARTHUR

27

gave it to Mike Bernard, and he - - when we had used
recorders in the past, they hadn't been very successful
in the quality.

You couldn't hear.

So I just think we

decided to skip it.
Q.

Well, let me ask you about this thing.
Mow, other than the individuals listed up at the top
of the page here, no one else was in the room during this
interview?

A.

No.

Q.

And let me just go through a few things here.
Look at page 155, and I'd like to sort of track
this, what you've written here in this interview with
your notes, which starts on 116.

So maybe if you could

just like put a little stick-em on 116, and that way you
can kind of go back and forth.
Are those notes on 116 taken by you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Are these the notes that you say were the basis of the
transcript at 154?

A.

These, and some others that I wrote on some plain paper
and, also, notes that I got from Mike Bernard and Jim
Hale.

Q.

Nov/, uhe ones you wrote on plain paper, would they scar:
at 125?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DIRECT - ARTHUR
Q.

Okay.

28

Look, if you will, again, to 155.
Well, first of all, let me just ask you, generally,

this transcript: that starts at 154 appears to be almost
like a verbatim quoted transcript such as the one that's
going to be prepared of your testimony today.

Is it your

testimony that the interviewer actually asked these
questions as they're written and Mr. Francisconi answered
them as they are written, or is this a paraphrase based
upon your memory?
A.

It's a paraphrase based upon my memory and the notes that
I had, yes.

Q.

For example, look at page 155, if you would, the fourth
• paragraph down.

The interviewer:

"Okay.

Let's back up

for a minute."
Could you show me where in your notes that comment,
"Let's back up for a minute," is found?
A.

It may not be in my notes.

I said that not only did I go

from my notes bun my memory of the conversation that took
place during the interview.
Q.

How long after the interview did you write this
transcript?

A.

Maybe an hour.

Q.

And who was ihe interviewer that said, "Okay.

Let's back

up for a minuce"?
i
I

ii

Mv recollection is is thai was Mike Bernard.
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DIRECT - ARTHUR

29

Q.

And y o u r e c a l l e d

A.

Yes,

Q.

Okay.

I

him s a y i n g

that?

do.

Now, is that question that he's got there, is that

a verbatim quote of his question, or is it just a
paraphrase based upon your memory?
A.

Which question are you referring to?

Q.

"Okay.

Let's back up for a minute," and then the rest of

that paragraph.
A.

I guess you'd have to say it was a paraphrase.
distinctly recall him saying, "Okay.
minute."

I mean, I

Let's back up for a

But as far as the other three or four sentences

that are in that paragraph, you know, it was probably a
generalization or a, you know, shortness of, you know,
the questions that he asked, and I'm sure that he -- Gene
Francisconi answered before, you know, Mike asked the
next question that I have listed there, but it was a
series of questions that he asked.
Q.

At the top of 156'-- actually, that's the wrong one.
Where is it?
There it is.

The middle of 157.

Could you show me

in your notes where Mr. Francisconi said, "I've never
bought a pair cf Docker pants in my life"?

In fact,

according to your transcript, he said it twice.
A.

I don't see where I specifically wrote that in my notes.

Q.

Well, that seems sort of like a auote to me.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Did you

DIRECT - ARTHUR

3Q

just make up that wording or - A.

No, I didn't.

That's what I recalled Mr. Francisconi

said.
Q.

Okay.

Look at the second to last paragraph on 157, the

last sentence:

"I don't know if the company would

approve" -- "I don't know if the company would approve of
the purchases."
How do you know that that's what he said in response
to that question?
A.

That's what I recalled from being at the interview.

Q.

And so you were able to go through, and with either your
notes or your memory, determine which specific things he
said in response to various specific questions?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So then this is not really what Mr. -- necessarily what
Mr. Francisconi may or may not have said; it's what you
remember that he said.

Is that right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, I notice in your notes that begin on 116, there are
a lot of questions for which you didn't write any
answers.

A.

Is there any reason for that?

It was very difficult: to keep up with the pace of the
conversation..

Q.

1 did the besi I could.

Was it difficult sometimes to keep up with just listeni:::'
tc the conversation cr just writina it?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DIRECT - ARTHUR

31

A.

Writing it.

Q.

But you were able to, apparently, write notes not only in
the printed questionnaire but, also, on blank pieces of
paper at the same time?

A.

Yes, I had both of those items.

Q.

And you remembered all of the comments that he made, as
well.

That's pretty good.
Did Mr. Francisconi have anybody there with him as

opposed to people who were interviewing him?
A.

Gary Johnson and Neil Vargason were there.

Q.

Well, they were there to interview him, right?

A.

They didn't participate in the interview.

Q.

Neil Vargason didn't participate?

A.

He was in the room, but he didn't ask any questions.

Q.

Wasn't there a period of time when Mr. Vargason and some
of the gentlemen stepped outside of the room for a few
minutes?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Which gentlemen were they besides Mr. Vargason?

A.

Gary Johnson, Jim Hale, Mike Bernard, and Gary Lottmann.

Q.

Do you know what they were doing out there?

A.

Not the whole time.

I, myself, left the room at some

peine.
Q.

And what were they doing out there when you were out
there?
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EUGENE FRANCISCONI,
Plaintiff,
-V-

NO.

960904423CV

Deposition of:
EUGENE FRANCISCONI

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendant.

--0O0--

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of September, V
1997,

the deposition of EUGENE FRANCISCONI, produced as a

witness herein at the instance of the defendant, in the
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named
court, was taken before JENNIFER KENDELL, a Registered
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State
of Utah, commencing at the hour of 1:30 p.m. of said day at
at the offices of Van Cott Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 50
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Notice.

CERTIFIED COPY
INDEPENDENT REPORTING
& VIDEOGRAPHY
1710 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
97-339161-7801
• *
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)538-2333
Court
FaxLibrary,
(801)J.538-2334
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JENNIFER KENDELL
CSR No.

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Reporting

straight, we can also refer to these by UP-102.

It's -- I

think that's how we referred to it in Volume 1, Page 102, and
that would be-this document as I take it.
MR. WADDCUPS:

That's a good suggestion.

Let's

refer to this as UP-102, 103 and 104.
MR. DARGER:

My only question is it appears to

start with Paragraph 20 which indicates that this isn't the
entire document.
9 I

That is.

actually a question I had about the original

0

page.

And I don't mind you asking him questions about the

1

rest of it but I'd like to have the entire document.

2

MR. WADCOUPS:

You've received everything that

3 J was in the personnel file, but we can go back and check on
that as well.
.5 I
6
L7

MR. DARGER:
Q4-

All right.

(By Mr. Waddoups:)

I appreciate it.

Mr. Francisconi, this

document appears to be dated August 1970, is that correct?

L8

A.

That's correct.

19

Q.

Do you recall signing this document?

20

A.

I don't, no. .

21

Q.

But that appears to be your signature on the last

22

page, doesn't it?

23

A.

That's definitely my signature, yes.

24

Q.

All right.

£3

Mr. Francisconi, you began to work

for Union Pacific Railroad during 1970.

Did you work for the
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1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

2
EUGENE FRANCISCONI,

CIVIL NO. 960904423

3
Plaintiff,
4
V.

D-E-P-O-S-I-T-I-O-N

5
6
7

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendant.

9
10
11

DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL BERNARD, taken before Allan G.

12

Kuhlman, a Registered Professional Reporter and General Notary

13

Public within and for the State of Nebraska, beginning at the

14

hour of 9:25 a.m., Friday, August 6, 1999, at 1416 Dodge

15

Street, Omaha, Nebraska, taken on behalf of the plaintiff in

16

the above-entitled matter, pursuant to the within

17

stipulations.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ALLAN G. KUHLMAN
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER
OMAHA, NEBRASKA
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q.

57

In your report you've identified thirty-two occasions

where Mr. Francisconi was reimbursed $3470 for gifts for
individuals who provided him lodging.
So of those thirty-two, which receipts did Union
Pacific determine were inappropriate, not authorized by the
expense policy or any other policy?
A.

The receipts that do not provide, that were not adequate,

in our opinion, were the twenty-two that did not have itemized
descriptions.
Q.

Which twenty-two are those?

Why don't you read those into

the record, the dates on those receipts.
MR. WADDOUPS:

I'll object here as going beyond the

scope of the notice of the deposition.
Mr. Bernard, I'll instruct you, if you know, you can
answer, but I'll also instruct you not to speculate.
Q.

(By Mr. Burns)

Which means you can answer the question,

if you can.
A.

I don't want to speculate.

Q.

Do you have a document in front of you that would allow

you to answer that question?
A.

No.

Q.

In number seven of my notice, plaintiff's notice of

30(b) (6) deposition, we have requested that a person be
provided by Union Pacific to answer questions as to "The basis
for your belief that plaintiff violated the payment in lieu of
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION

53

policy by," quote, this is a quotation out of Union .Pacific's '
answers to interrogatories, I'll represent, "Altering
receipts, concealing the true nature of expenses, and by
requesting and subsequently receiving reimbursement for
improper, unauthorized expenses," that's the end of the quote,
"as more fully set forth in the audit report prepared for
plaintiff and produced at UP 00028, passim," which 208 is your
audit report, right?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

I'm trying to understand which receipts are problematic.

A.

Can I answer that question?
MR. WADDOUPS:
THE WITNESS:
MR. WADDOUPS:

If you know you can answer.
Do I have to speculate?
Do not speculate.

MR. BURNS: Then somebody needs to be provided to
answe^' that question, because we clearly identified the
subject matter to be questioned, and it was Union Pacific's
responsibility to identify a person who can answer questions
on that topic.
MR. WADDOUPS:

We have identified a person who can

speak generally as to those topics, but we haven't received
specific notice as to whether you want greater detail that
goes beyond the face of that audit report.
And now you're questioning him about another document
that is beyond the face of that audit reoort and we haven't
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®PV
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

1

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2
3.

EUGENE FRANCISCONI,
4
Plaintiff,
5
6
7
8

vs.

Civil No. 960904423

UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO., a
Utah Corporation,

Judge Stephen Henriod

Defendant.

9
10
•11
DEPOSITION OF
12
JOHN A. IVESTER
13
14
15

TAKEN AT THE LAW OFFICE OF KELLEY & KELLEY
1000 BOSTON BUILDING, #9 EXCHANGE PLACE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

16

- DECEMBER 1, 1998 -

17
18
19
20

HORIZON REPORTING & VIDEO, INC.
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, STE. 52 7
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

21
22

(801) 532-DEPO (3376)
(801) 322-FAXX (3299)
horizon@xmission.com

23
REPORTED BY:
24
25

JULIE N. CLEGG, CSR, RMR
REGISTERED MERIT REPORTER

HORIZON FILE NO. 120198J

- HORIZON REPORTING & VIDEO, INC
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1

in-lieu-of policy, correct?

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

A.-

We concluded that it represented a potential,.

violation of the in-lieu-of policy.
Q.

Did you also conclude that it represented an abuse of

the in-lieu-of policy?
A . I

think what we concluded, that it was more of a

violation as opposed to an abuse, sir.
Q.

Were you ever in a meeting where Mr. Bernard or

9

Janice Arthur or yourself recommended to Mr. Hale that it was

0

an abuse or violation?

1

A.

I never met with Mr. Hale directly on this.

2

Q.

How about a couple of lines down, the R.V.

3

battery,

the three plastic pots, the battery post, the washer, etc?
•••••

4

What was your conclusion as to the appropriateness of those

5

gifts?

6

A.

7

Q.

'

i

I did not feel they were appropriate.

**

8
9

Did you ever contact Mr. Francisconi's father to

determine whether or not he had requested those items? '
A.

At the time, we weren't even sure who the items were
i

0

going to, because we did not have a name of the person that

1

these items went to.

2
3

Q.

So, no, I did not.

Well, at the time or anytime, do you know whether

anybody ever contacted him?

4

A.

I do not believe so.

5

Q.

And you certainly didn't, did you?

v

45
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1

A.

No, sir, I did not.

2

Q.

Would it have changed your mind as to cheir

3

appropriateness if you, for example, found out: that they were

4

indeed given to him and that he had requested those items as

5

a gift?

6
7
8
9
10

A.

I don't know.

That's something I would have to talk

to Janice and Mike to -- depending on the situation.
Q.

So what I am getting here is that you would not

independently make a decision as to appropriateness; you
would review them with Janice and Mike?

11

A.

That is correct.

12

Q.

Okay.

Well, tell me what on this list -- just go

13

down one by one and tell me what items that you and Janice

14

and Mike determined were inappropriate and why the food &

15

beverage, the first one --

16

A.

I personally did not feel that was inappropriate.

17

Q.

Were all of these items on this list felt by

18

somebody -- either the items, the amount or the documenta-

19

tion -- are all of the items on this list determined to be

20

problem items?

21
22

A.

I don't believe so.

This is just a summary of

everything, the in-lieu-of lodging.

23

Q.

Do you recall which one of these were problem items?

24

A.

The Bon Marche receipts were a problem, right,

25

because the objects had been cut out.

The Fred Meyer
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APPENDIX G
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Fact Exhibits Contained in Defendant's Amended
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
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David J. Burns, Esq. (#7157)
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS
185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-4300
Facsimile: (801) 363-4378
Daniel Darger, Esq. (#0815)
Attorney at Law
1000 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EUGENE FRANCISCONI,
Plaintiff,
vs.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE FACT
EXHIBITS CONTAINED IN DEFENDANT'S
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO. a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant.
Case No. 960904423
Judge Stephen Henroid

Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi, by and through counsel, hereby submits the following reply
memorandum in support of his Motion to Strike Fact Exhibits Contained in Defendant's Amended
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
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ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs motion to strike is a "technical" attack on the exhibits in
jestion.

This argument is consistent with Defendant's ongoing cavalier approach to the

>verning rules. But Defendant should not be allowed to so easily disregard these rules, which
this instance provide that a motion for summary judgment must be supported by the existing
cord. The record consists of sworn testimony, and evidence otherwise admissible at trial.

UTAH

CIV. P. Rule 56(c); 4-501 (2)(B) C.J.A. Because the following exhibits would not be admissible
trial based on the foundation provided by Defendant, they must be stricken.
The Fact Exhibits Should Be Stricken
In general, Plaintiff moves to strike most of the exhibits in question on grounds of lack of
thentication, inadmissible hearsay (including hearsay within hearsay), and inadmissible opinion.
UTAH

R.

EVID.

901 (a) provides that the requirement of authentication or identification is a

Dndition precedent to admissibility" andrequires a showing of "evidence sufficient to support a
ding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Authentication and identification
present a "special aspect of relevancy," Rule 401. M.
IOCEDURE

GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

§ 6821 at 668. For instance, a telephone conversation offered to show knowledge

the part of a speaker is not relevant unless the person speaking is sufficiently identified, nor
a purported letter of the defendant relevant unless it is properly shown that the defendant
tually wrote the letter. See, e.g., Mayer v. Angelica, 790 F.2d 1315,1338 (7th Cir. 1986), cert,
nied, 479 U.S. 1037 (1987) ("The basic error is the admission of the four letters without any
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authentication whatever. There was no proof that Frank Kimball wrote any of the letters, that any
of them were ever sent, or that Angelica ever received or saw any of them.")
UTAH

R.

EVID.

Rule 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule, provides

that otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be admissible but only after the following showing is
made:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation in any form, of
acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnosis, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge,
is kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Admissibility under Rule 803(6) rests upon "proof of a routine of making accurate records."
M.

GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE

&

PROCEDURE

§ 6757 at 341. Whoever provides foundation

testimony must show that
the gathering of the information, its transmission, and its
memorialization must all occur (1) in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity and (2) it must be the regular practice of
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation in the form in which it was made. Thus the familiar
questions: "Was it the regular course of business to make this
record?" and "Was this record kept in the regular course of business?"
An alternative form of question gaining popularity is "Was this record
kept in the regular course of a regularly conducted business activity?"
With respect to either alternative, the following questions are added:
"Was this record made at or near the time of the matter recorded?"
and "Was the record made by a person within the business with
knowledge of, or made from information transmitted by a person
within the business with knowledge of the acts, events, conditions,
opinions or diagnosis appearing in it?"
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f. at 354-358.
Defendant primarily attempts to qualify Michael Bernard, director of auditing of the
)mpany, as the custodian of some of the documents in question. When a party attempts to
>tabiish the foundation through the testimony of the custodian of the record or other person
miliar with the business and its mode of operation, the custodian must identify the record and
itablish that it was made in the regular course of a regularly conducted business activity by or
)m information transmitted by a person within the business with knowledge.1 Thus, the records
jst be made by a person with knowledge or created from information transmitted by a person
th knowledge.2 In addition, all persons furnishing and recording information must be under a

1

See Coghlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290, 307 (5th Cir. 1978) (There
n be no doubt but that the party who seeks to introduce written evidence must in
me way authenticate it. We agree that under the [business records] exception, 'the
sstimony of the custodian or other qualified witness who can explain the record
eping of the organization is essential. If the witness cannot vouch that the
^uirements of Rule 803(6) have been met, the entry must be excluded." citing, 4
EINSTIEN'S, EVIDENCE § 803(b) [02] at 803-143 (1972)); United States v. Reese, 561
Id 894 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (copy of car rental agreement not admissible as business
:ord without calling of custodian of car rental records); United States v. Hitsmsn, 604
Id 443 (5th Cir. 1979) (copy of college transcript not admissible absent custodian or
alified witness to testify as to how such records are kept).
2

/c/.ln N.LR.B. v. First Termite Control Co., Inc., 646 F.2d 424, 425-30 (9th Cir.
81), the plaintiff, N.L.R.B., attempted to establish the necessary amount of interstate
mmerce, and in this regard introduced evidence in the form of freight bills that were
spared by Southern Pacific Railroad, but delivered to the purchaser of the goods,
;onomy Lumber Co. ("Economy"). Tthe custodian of records for Southern Pacific,
wever, was not called as a witness. Instead, the N.LR.B. called Economy's
okkeeper as a witness. The bookkeeper testified that she had received the freight
I, and that she had paid it, no other witnesses were called to support the admission of
3 freight bill. The defendant objected to the introduction of the freight bill on grounds
hearsay. On appeal, the N.LR.B. argued that under Rule 803(6) it is not necessary
at the witness have knowledge of the preparation of the record; that it is sufficient if
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duty to do so. United States v. David, 96F.3d 1477,1481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The mere custody
of the record by the proponent of the record does not incorporate the record into the proponent's
business records. Belberv. Upson, 905 F.2d 549, 552 (1 st Cir. 1990).
A.

The "Application for Employment" Should be Stricken Because it Lacks
Proper Authentication and is Inadmissible Hearssay.

Defendant maintains that Plaintiff authenticated the "relevant portions" of exhibit a during
his deposition. (Def s Mem. at ii.) This assertion is false. Exhibit a was never shown to Plaintiff
at his deposition. Plaintiffs counsel objected to the document that was offered as an incomplete
copy of whatever it purported to be. (Eugene Francisconi deposition p. 10, attached to Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Fact Exhibits.) With respect to that document, Plaintiff

the records "have all the indicia of trustworthiness that the federal rules require for the
admission of hearsay evidence." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this
argument, stating:
The provision in the rule [803(6)] that requires that the
record be supported by "the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness" ensures the presence of some
individual at trial who can testify to the methods of keeping
the information. If the witness is not knowledgeable as to
the manner in which the records are made and kept, he or
she cannot be subjected to meaningful cross-examination.
Without cross-examination on the keeping of the records,
the trier of fact would have no rational basis on which to
evaluate the accuracy of the record, and therefore the
trustworthiness of the evidence. Thus, "[t]he testimony of
the custodian or the qualified witness who can explain the
record-keeping of his organization is ordinarily essential.' 4
J. WIEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, WIEINSTIEN'S EVIDENCE fl 803(6)
[02] at 151-52.
With these principles in mind, the Ninth Circuit excluded the freight bills. "The
bookkeeper from Economy had no knowledge of how Southern Pacific's records were
made or maintained." Id.
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as never asked if he recognized it. He was only asked if he recalled signing page three, which
dated August 10, 1970. He replied that he did not. (Francisconi Depo., p. 10) Clearly, an
cknowledgment that his signature is affixed to some unrecognized document does not establish
lat Plaintiff has personal knowledge that the application is what Defendant claims. Thus, if
efendant was to properly authenticate the document through personal knowledge, it had to do
) through the testimony of some witness other than Plaintiff. Defendant's decision to forego
Gaining this other necessary testimony is fatal.
Exhibit a is also inadmissable hearsay. Michael Bernard, the Director of Auditing for the
)mapny, alleges:
No. 6 Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a copy of the Application for
Employment of Eugene Austin Francisconi dated August 10, 1970.
Contained within the Application for Employment is a statement of the Terms
and Conditions of Employment. The Application for Employment including
the Terms and Conditions of Employment is part of the company's official
records and is maintained in the normal course of business within Mr.
Francisconi's personnel file.
lefs Mem. at ii.) The basis for this conclusory assertion is not given.
Mr. Bernard's statement completely fails to establish record evidence that exhibit a was
epared by a person with knowledge or transmitted to the custodian of the record by a person
th knowledge, fails to identify the regularly conducted business activity that supposedly
merated exhibit a, fails to identify the record keeping practices of the company pursuant to which
e record was supposedly maintained over the past 30 years as part of a regularly conducted
jsiness activity, fails to identify the location of the alleged personnel file, and so forth. This
>mplete and utter failure to satisfy the requirements of 803(6) is understandable, however, since
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Mr. Bernard is the Director of Auditing. It would be surprising indeed if his duties included
custodian of records more likely found in the personnel department or some department other
than auditing. As such, exhibit a should also be stricken because it is inadmissible hearsay.
B.

The Affidavit of John Ivester and "in Lieu Of Lodging Schedule" Should be
Stricken Because They Lack Proper Authentication and are Inadmissible
Hearsay.

Exhibit c, the Affidavit of John Ivester, is irrelevant because Defendant provided 30(b)(6)
deposition testimony on the exact same subject matter. It was precisely because Plaintiff had
received a variety opinions on the same subject matter that the 30(b)(6) deposition was taken.
That the 30(b)(6) deponent declined to provide detailed testimony on the basis for Defendant's
belief that Plaintiff submitted improper expense statements does not alter the fact that that was
the company's testimony on the subject matter. Mr. Ivester's testimony on the same subject is
therefore improper. Moreover, Mr. Ivester's personal knowledge as an agent of the corporation
regarding the facts alleged in his affidavit cannot be presumed to have been imparted and relied
upon by any decision-maker of the company. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n. v. Watts, 737 P.2d
154 (Utah 1987). No showing is made that anyone at the company relied upon any information
allegedly gather by Mr. Ivester. For this reason his testimony is irrelevant.
Mr. Ivester's affidavit is a clear attempt to circumvent the statements that he made in his
lengthy deposition. By submitting the affidavit, he is able to avoid cross-examination. At his
deposition he was asked to disclose all information concerning his audit of the expense
statements. Therefore, the only relevant information that could be contained in Mr. Ivester's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
7
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ffidavit has either been stated in his deposition, or should have been stated in his deposition or
i a previous interrogatory propounded to defendant.
The affidavit also contains inadmissible opinion. For instance, Paragraph 11 of the affidavit
Dines that Plaintiff altered six store receipts "to conceal the nature of the merchandise
jrchased." This opinion further contradicts Mr. Ivester's deposition testimony. There he stated
at he did not make independent decisions concerning the appropriateness of plaintiffs expense
atements, but rather would defer to his supervisors. (John Ivester deposition p.46).
With respect to the In Lieu of Lodging Schedule, this summary contains hearsay within
>arsay, and is entirely derivative. This point is proven conclusively by paragraphs 25 through
7

and 29 of Defendant's statement of facts, which rely upon the summary for information

legedly supplied by unnamed "store personnel," unidentified "information to the auditor,"
lattached American Express statements, and so forth.
No foundation is laid that the summary is based on personal knowledge, and that the
immary satisfies the business records exception. Mr. Ivester's conclusory assertion that the
immary "are business records maintained in the normal course of business" is completely
thout foundation.
C.

The "Interview Summary" Should be Stricken Because it is Inadmissible
Hearsay.

Defendant attempts to rehabilitate the "interview summary" by attaching an affidavit from
nice Arthur, the purported author of the summary. But Ms. Arthur's affidavit cannot be offered
contradict her deposition testimony, wherein she testified that she had prepared a report of the
:erview that was "a paraphrase based upon my memory and the notes that I had, yes." (Janice
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Arthur Depo., p. 28). The notes that she had, she further stated, included the notes of "Mike
Bernard and Jim Hale" as well as her own. She made no attempt (and makes no attempt in her
affidavit) to identify which part, if any, of the "interview summary" was a product of her notes and
of others' notes. (Arthur depo., p. 27). As such, the summary is not based on Ms. Arthur's
personal knowledge, and is therefore irrelevant. By Ms. Arthur's own admission, the summary
is merely a paraphrase of her memory and scribbled notes that may or may not be her own.
Defendant fails completely to lay a proper foundation for the business records exception
as well. The summary is hearsay, and/or hearsay within hearsay, because it purports to contain
statements made by a person or persons other than Plaintiff. Moreover, that other person or
persons are identified in the body of the summary only by the letter "I." The statements attributed
to "I" are inadmissible hearsay. With respect to the admissions attributed to Plaintiff, these too
are hearsay. It is notable that none of the alleged statements that Defendant has cited in its
memorandum as an admission of Plaintiff, appears in the handwritten notes Ms. Arthur says she
prepared at the time of the interview. The alleged statements are, as Ms. Arthur admits, at best
a paraphrase and a product of her notes, others' notes and her memory. Since there is no attempt
made to distinguish between Ms. Arthur's memory and the others' notes, the alleged statements
are inadmissible hearsay.
D.

The "Audit Summary" Should be Stricken Because it is inadmissible Hearsay.

Defendant alleges that the "summary" is a product of Mr. Bernard's participation in the
interview of Plaintiff on April 26,1996 as well as "the expense report irregularities disclosed by the
audit." (Def s Mem. at vi). However, no attempt is made to distinguish between Mr. Bernard's
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srsonal knowledge about the statements made in the summary, if any, and statements made
:the interview. The latter statements are primarily hearsay within hearsay, or information derived
Dm some indirect source. The summary is also inadmissible hearsay because no attempt is
ade to satisfy the business records exception.
Eu

Exhibits "L", "M" and "O" Should be Stricken Because They are Inadmissible
Hearsay.

Without reference to the record, Defendant makes a cursory and groundless assertion that
e letters attached as exhibits I and m are "maintained in the company's COBRA offer and
ections files and constitute business records maintained in the normal course of business."
r

ithout more-much more-the letters are therefore inadmissible hearsay. The same situation

evails with respect to exhibit o, for which no foundation is laid either.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court strike the foregoing
chibits for the reasons stated.
DATED this ^ /

v

day of January, 2000.
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS

xL~j?, / ^ „ DAVID J. BURNS"
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE FACT EXHIBITS CONTAINED IN
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT was delivered via United states mail, postage prepaid this ^ ^ d a y of January,
2000, to the following:
Jon E. Waddoups
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Daniel Darger
Attorney at Law
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

//jLc^-_.
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APPENDIX H
Transcript of Hearing on Union Pacific's Motion
for Summary Judgment, Dated March 7, 2000
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[N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EUGENE FRANCISCONI,
Plaintiff,

)
)
Case No. 960904423
Supreme Court No. 20000408

vs.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD )
CO, a Utah Corp,
)
Defendant.

BEFORE:

)

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
March 7, 2000
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
Third District Court Judge

For the Plaintiff:

David L. Burns
SUITTER, AXLAND & HANSON
175 S. West Temple #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Daniel Darcrer
9 Exchange Place #1000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)531-6686

For the Defendant:

Transcribed by:

Jon E. Waddoups
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
MCCARTHY
50 South Main #1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Telephone: (801)532-3333

Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT

1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVENUE
PROVO, UTAH 84606
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027
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-2P R O C S S D I N G S
(Electronically recorded on March 7, 2000)
MR. WADDCUPS:

(Court already in session when recorder

was turned on) thank you, your Honor, and seated at counsel
table with me is co-counsel, Alexander (inaudible).

Your

Honor, in order to proceed most efficiently through the
argument today, I would like to just work our way through the
various causes of action. There are five specific causes of
action—
THE COURT: As I said a minute ago, I've read
everything you submitted.

You did a good job outlining the

five causes of action and why you believe that the plaintiff
made a case on any of them, but you don't need to be redundant.
MR. WADDOUPS: All right, let's go ahead and dive
right through it, then. First of all, your Honor, I'd like to
start with the second cause of action, this is the one for
termination in violation of public policy.
You'll note that plaintiff doesn't contest our
arguments as to why this cause of action is without merit, and
therefore we really don't need to address that any further.
The second cause of action that I'd like to address is
the third cause of action of the complaint. This is the cause
of action for defamation.

There are some facts in dispute in

this case, but even with the facts in dispute we believe that
this cause of action is without merit and should be dismissed.
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-3The alleged factual basis for this cause of action is
a statement by an employee, Tom Hague, on Union Pacific wherein
he told a former employee, Barbara Tower, that Mr. Fransisconi
had been terminated because he had been, quote, "cheating on
his expense account," end quote.
Putting aside for a moment the hearsay nature of this
statement which was made by Barbara Tower during her deposition
concerning the statement by another employee, Tom Hague, this
cause of action is without merit for a number of reasons. Very
first of all, there is no evidence that Mr. Hague made this
statement, if he made this statement, within the course and
scope of his employment for Union Pacific. Mr. Hague was not
involved in the investigation of Mr. Fransisconi's expense
accounts.

He was not involved in a decision to terminate him.

He wasn't in the same chain of authority as Mr. Fransisconi,
and indeed appeared to have absolutely nothing with Mr.
Fransisconi's employment or termination.
THE COURT:

Doesn't Mr. Fransisconi admit that he

cheated on the in-lieu of account?
MR. WADDOUPS: That's the next issue, your Honor, is
that even if the statement were made and even if it were within
the course and scope of the employment, the statement itself is
true.

Any other statements that the representatives of the

company may have made are privileged because they were made
within the narrow scope of trying to determine what should
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happen to Mr. Fransisconi in connection with the investigation.

2

Finally, Mr. Fransisconi hasn't put forth any evidence of any

3

damages associated with that claim for defamation.

4

Next, your Honor, I'd like to address the fourth cause

5

of action, and this is for intention infliction of emotional

6

distress. Again, the facts on this are in dispute, but let's

7

look at the specific allegations and to see if this would

8

possibly rise.

9

First of all, Mr. Fransisconi claims that Union

10

Pacific accused him of being a liar and a thief during a four

11

hour meeting in Omaha, and that they were considering pursuing

12

criminal prosecution against him.

13

threatened to have the police search his father's home for

14

stolen property.

15

Fransisconi to sign a statement admitting responsibility in

16

order to save his job, but then subsequently denied that and

17

fired him anyway.

18

He alleges that they

He claims that Union Pacific induced Mr.

The most significant allegation that's raised here is

19

that Union Pacific attampted to somehow coerce him into signing

20

a separation agreement by threatening to withhold COBRA

21

benefits while his wife needed some elective surgery that was

22

associated with it.

23

Now your Honor, even if those facts as alleged by Mr.

24

Fransisconi were true, and we believe that they are not true,

25

your Honor, but even if they were they wouldn't meet the very
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high standard that's necessary in order to make that a cause or
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
There's an extremely high standard there.

It's not enough,

even if the conduct is offensive or even immoral conduct. It
has to be an extraordinary high standard of outrageous conduct
that would support such a cause of action.
We believe that the claim fails because any of these
allegations or all of the allegations taken together doesn't
allege a conduct that is sufficiently severe as to support a
claim for intentional infliction.
Let's look at the COBRA issue. First of all, let's
make it real clear that Union Pacific did offer COBRA
continuation coverage to Mr. Fransisconi and to his wife. Mr.
Fransisconi declined that coverage and Mrs. Fransisconi
accepted that COBRA continuation coverage.

She had her

surgery, and thank goodness she's fine with that.
The indication we have, your Honor, is that for a
brief period of time Union Pacific was considering the
possibility of not offering COBRA continuation coverage to Mr.
Fransisconi.

It was entitled to do this under the COBRA

provisions because of Mr. Fransisconi's gross misconduct.
There is a gross misconduct exception to the COBRA coverage.
If an employee commits a very serious misconduct, for example,
misappropriation of company funds, then the company is not
required to offer COBRA continuation coverage to the employee
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2

or to any covered dependents.
Union Pacific considered this for a period of time,

3

had even discussed with Mr. Fransisconi that it intended not to

4

offer him COBRA continuation coverage if he didn't accept the

5

separation agreement, but Union Pacific later made the

6

determination that it would in fact offer the coverage and it

7

did, and everything is fine, thank goodness.

8
9

Next, your Honor, I'd like to address the cause of
action for fraud.

Essentially within the cause of action Mr.

10

Fransisconi alleges that Gary Lottman, who was director of

11

police operations for Union Pacific during the April 26, 1996

12

interview in Omaha, Mr. Fransisconi claims that Mr. Lottman

13

told Mr. Fransisconi that if he would just sign a statement

14

acknowledging his guilt then he could keep his job and all of

15

his benefits if he would just sign that statement.

16

First of all, your Honor, it didn't happen, but let's

17

presume for a moment that it did.

Even if it happened as Mr.

18

Fransisconi says it did, well, first of all the claim has got

19

to fail, first of all, because in order to state a cause of

20

action for fraud there has to be a misstatement of a presently

21

existing fact. Mr. Fransisconi claims that the promise that

22

was made to him was some future performance, that if he signed

23

now he would be allowed to keep his job in the future.

24

Therefore, that is a statement of some future conduct, and

25

specifically it is not sufficient to support a cause of action
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2

for fraud.
Next thing, your Honor, there was no detrimental

3

reliance on behalf of Mr. Fransisconi.

4

his position in any way in reliance on the alleged promise. He

5

signed a statement acknowledging his responsibility for his

6

misconduct.

7

relieved from his employment and he was offered a separation

8

agreement, but he really didn't do anything and change in

9

reliance on that promise.

10

He really didn't change

However, he didn't do anything different.

He was

Next, your Honor, there's absolutely no clear and

11

convincing evidence, specifically in dealing with a cause of

12

action for fraud, as the Court well knows, a case must be made

13

out with absolutely clear and convincing evidence, and there is

14

no such proof here.

15

Mr. Fransisconi is talking about something that

16

occurred in a meeting with lots of people in attendance, and

17

none of these people indicates that there was any such a

18

promise, and in fact, Mr. Lottman himself did not have

19

authority to make any such a promise on behalf of the company.

20

Finally, your Honor, I'd like to turn to the first

21

cause of action, and this is the most significant one that we

22

need to deal with, and this is for the breach of an express

23

contract.

24

Fransisconi's opposition memorandum is that he does not really

25

claim that there was an express contract.

One of the things that is clear from Mr.

Instead he claims
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that there were several incidents that gave rise to an implied

2

in fact contract between himself and Union Pacific.

3

In fact, when you look at the various claims that Mr.

4

Fransisconi makes and as you work through them individually,

5

it's clear that none of these alleged incidents really creates

6

any sort of an entitlement to continued employment by Mr.

7

Fransisconi.

3

I'd like to just highlight some of the key points that

9

have been identified in our memoranda in support for the Court.

10

First of all, your Honor, Mr. Fransisconi first became employed

11

during 1970, and contained within his application for

12

employment is a statement of the terras and conditions of his

13

employment.

14

our motion for summary judgment as Exhibit A.

15

This is attached to our memorandum in support of

If you turn to that specific statement of the terms

16

and conditions of his employment, if you look right below where

17

it says, "Terms and conditions of employment," the very first

18

paragraph is something we need to point out.

19

"Nothing in this application contained shall be construed as a

20

contract of employ, but I hereby agree that in the event of my

21

employment by the company pursuant to the foregoing application

22

and continuing during the entire period or periods of my

23

employment with the company in any capacity whatsoever, the

24

following shall constitute the terms and conditions of my

25

employment with the company, except insofar as any of such

It says, quote,
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-9terms or conditions may be in conflict with applicable
collective bargaining agreements or prohibited by law."
That's a very important point, your Honor, because it
brings out the issue that the railroad has both agreement
employees who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement,
and non-agreement employees, such as management employees who
are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and do not
have the benefits of that bargaining agreement.
The other points which we have pointed out, paragraph
No. 2 where it describes the term of employment, and in this
paragraph Mr. Fransisconi specifically acknowledges that his
employment except as identified during that first paragraph is
at-will, it can be terminated at any time either with or
without cause. &.>••
Then if you turn a couple of pages into the document
to paragraph 20, there's the reflection that Mr. Fransisconi
agrees that there can't be any waiver or modification of these
terms and conditions of employment, including the at-will
provision, unless there is a specific writing.
Now with that in mind, your Honor, let's go ahead and
turn back to Mr. Fransisconi's specific allegations. In his
memorandum in opposition to the motion he relies on the in-lieu
of policy, and he's got kind of a novel theory that the in-lieu
of policy itself creates an implied in-fact contract, and the
contract was that he wouldn't be terminated for using the in-
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1

lieu of policy, and he cites this Idaho case, 1989 Idaho case

2

of Metcalf vs. Intermountain Gas. Well, your Honor, that's

3

inapplicable for a couple of reasons.

4

Very first of all, that's not Utah law.

As a matter

5

of fact, we have a case right on point, and we cite this in

6

footnote 3 of our reply memorandum in support of the motion.

7

This says the —

8

Utah Fuel Company.

9

which the court of appeals specifically rejected that same

here we go. This is the case of Robertson vs.
This is Utah Court of Appeals 1995 case in

10

argument that an employer's policy itself creates an implied

11

contract that says, "Well, you can't be terminated, you're no

12

longer an employee at-will."

13

This makes perfect sense, your Honor.

If we turned

14

every alleged violation of a company policy into a jury issue,

15

there is no employment at-will doctrine, and a jury and not the

16

company determines what its-policies are and what the

17

applications are there.

18

Finally, your Honor, I'd like to look at Mr.

19

Fransisconi's claim that the upgrade policy itself somehow

20

created an implied in-fact contract of employment. Now let's

21

look at what Mr. Fransisconi has to say about that. He says,

22

"Well, the upgrade policy itself created an implied contract of

23

employment because on the very first page of the document,

24

which is a transmittal letter, there is a statement that the

25

policy will soon be implemented across the railroad's system."
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-11Well, that doesn't mean anything for Mr. Fransisconi. It's
simply indicating it's being implemented throughout the system
rather than on a pilot program.
In addition, Mr. Fransisconi looks at the same letter
down at the bottom and he says, H0h, there's a provision down
there where it says, 'Oh, look, this upgrade policy is a good
thing, the company is going to implement it, and it's going to
end up working as a benefit for all employees and for the
company.'"

Well, your Honor, that description itself indicates

simply that it's going to be a good thing for the company, it's
going to be a positive thing, and it doesn't make any
indication that Mr. Fransisconi is going to be covered.
When you look at the policy itself, and we've
identified this in our memoranda, there are numerous provisions
within a policy that make it very clear that this is intended
to apply only to employees who are not covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. There are numerous provisions in there
dealing with representation by union representatives, being
allowed to consult with your union representative, being
allowed to be represented by a union representative during an
upgrade hearing, et cetera. Of course, none of these applied
to Mr. Fransisconi because he was a management employee.
Your Honor, finally we have — Mr. Fransisconi himself
has been employed — he had been employed with the railroad for
approximately 25 years, couldn't identify one single incidence
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-12in which a management employee had been offered an upgrade
proceeding or had participated in an upgrade proceeding.
We have the undisputed testimony of the executive vice
president of the company saying that the upgrade policy was
never intended to apply to management employees, but only to
collective bargaining employees, and it has never been applied
such.
THE COURT: We do have Mr. Lottman saying something
about a level 5 violation in that interview they had with Mr.
Fransisconi?
MR. WADDOUPS:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Level 5 is clearly referred to, at least

some provisions in the upgrade policy.
MR. WADDOUPS:

That's correct, and your Honor, when

you read Mr. Fransisconi's deposition —

excuse me, when you

read Mr. Lottman's deposition and determine what it is that he
was talking about, Mr. Lottman was using —

had referred to a

level 5 upgrade as an indicia of how serious the misconduct was
by Mr. Fransisconi.
THE COURT:

That's how Mr. Lottman tries to explain it

after the fact, but it seems to me like maybe Mr. Lottman was
mistaken and thought the upgrade thing did — why else would he
use (inaudible).
MR. WADDOUPS: Well, what he said within his -\
deposition, your Honor, was that he wanted—
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I've read the transcript (inaudible),

MR. WADDOUPS: He wanted Mr. Fransisconi to understand
that.

Further, your Honor, let's presume for a moment that Mr.

Lottman somehow misunderstood that and thought that upgrade
applied to Mr. Fransisconi. Mr. Lottman was not in a position
to be able to change the terms and conditions of employment.
You go back to the very first document that we had talked
about, it's Exhibit A, which is the agreement where Mr.
Fransisconi says, "Hey, my employment is at-will, it can be
terminated at will at any time either with or without cause,
and the only way that this can be changed is by an agreement in
writing."

We've got that very strong thing there.
The next thing that you have to examine, your Honor,

is when you're looking at an implied in-fact contract, as Mr.
Fransisconi indicates, it's the burden of the plaintiff to
establish very clearly that there was some sort of indicia of
assent of intention by the employer to offer something other
than employment at-will. It's got to be a very clear thing.
In addition to that, the employee's belief that the employer
offered some sort of employment other than at-will has to be
very clear as well, and it has to be a reasonable belief.
Now here's what we've got, your Honor. We've got a
company with 20,000 employees in it, and in not one instance in
which any management employee has been offered an upgrade
hearing or has been placed into upgrade proceedings at any
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-14time, there's just absolutely no evidence of any management
employee ever being placed in that.
very strong indicia,

We believe that that's a

_ ?r. ,•••

Just to summarize, your Honor, Mr. Fransisconi got
caught.

He got caught altering receipts, he got caught

purchasing things like makeup, pantyhose, maxi pads for his
wife, RV batteries, a whole plethora of things that were
identified in our memoranda. We've laid it out there for you.
The termination was very clear. Mr. Fransisconi himself signed
a statement indicating his acknowledgement of the facts. Even
if you take that statement to the side, we've got Janice
Arthur's notes that identify Mr. Fransisconi's own admissions
and his statements against his interest that these items were
purchased and they were given to his wife, they were given to
his son, to his sister, that he altered the receipts to conceal
the nature of the merchandise purchase and he knew that it was
wrong.
With that, your Honor, I'd like to reserve a little
bit of time and we'll just leave Mr. Fransisconi to respond as
he will.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Waddoups.
Mr. Burns, are you going to argue for the plaintiff?
MR. BURNS: Yes. Well, actually, our first cause of
action and Mr. Darger will pick-up on the others.

I'm not

going to be repetitious and repeat the comments we make in our
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-15memorandum in opposition.

I just wanted to address the

comments that are made primarily in the defendant's reply
brief.
Your Honor, the plaintiff has not made any admission
that he violated the expense policy.

He's not made any

admission that he cheated on his expense policies. Gene
Fransisconi is an honorable man, he's spent 26 years working on
the railroad, he's a third generation railroader, a training
officer, a meticulous person.
I think it's important to dampen down some of the
hysteria that seems to come out of the defendant's memorandum.
If I might approach, your Honor, I want to (inaudible) the
Court (inaudible) of what is being offered (inaudible). Union
Pacific's position is that the receipts on the left were
appropriate, and that's true for Gene Fransisconi as well as
any other Union Pacific employee, and we know that from the
many expense statements that they produced for other employees
as well.
Their position is that the expense —

excuse me, the

receipt on the right is a violation of the expense policy. We
think that's a jury question as to whether in fact—
THE COURT:

Now these are the receipts Mr. Fransisconi

carefully cut the receipt or took away the part that described
what he actually purchased and left only the total, right?
MR. BURNS: Gene Fransisconi was told this, your
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-16Honor, he was told to get all the receipt onto one page
(inaudible) cut out the itemized portion.
There are two issues with respect to the expense
policy.

It is, was there a violation of the original receipt

requirement?
receipt.

Gene Fransisconi always submitted the original

Sometimes that original receipt contained those

deletions, but it always contained the pertinent information
which —

again, the receipt on the left, which is appropriate,

contains information like a date, name, the business, the total
amount.

He never submitted a receipt where the total amount

wasn't exactly as it was on —
THE COURT:

at the point of sale.

I don't think the defendant is alleging

that he did that, they're saying he covered up the actual
purchases because had they been visible people would have known
he was buying things for his wife and other people and not just
for his father with whom he stayed in Pocatello.
MR. BURNS: And that's the second issue with respect
to the alleged violation of the expense policy, wasn't it
appropriate for Alfred Fransisconi?

Now Union Pacific has

simply misrepresented the record, to my mind, when it says that
Gene Fransisconi has admitted that he bought these things for
his wife, for his sister. That's simply not the case. Gene's
testimony, the testimony of Alfred Fransisconi is that Alfred
Fransisconi (inaudible) that those items—
THE COURT: That's not going to fly very far, Mr.
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I mean if that's his explanation then he violated the

policy, as far as I'm concerned.

That's a really lame

(inaudible) to the allegation that he didn't use the policy
properly.
MR. BURNS: Well, that's the undisputed testimony,
your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BURNS: With respect to the contract — well, it's
our position that all of the material issues of fact are
disputed, and I'd refer the Court to the language in the inlieu of policy, which simply says that you will submit an
original receipt in-lieu of some other expense.
With respect to their —

to the contract claims and

their positions on that, the disclaimer, I think, is easily
disposed of as a matter of law.

The law in Utah is very

explicit when it comes to disclaimers in the point of
contracts.

Disclaimers have to be conspicuous and they have to

be set out ordinarily in bold print. We have an application
that was executed in 1970. Gene Fransisconi didn't even have
any personal knowledge of having signed it.
The way that the disclaimer cases fall out, I give you
an employment manual, I set forth in that employment manual a
disclaimer.

That disclaimer then is considered or is

interpreted to be a part of any provision of that employment
manual.

For that reason this disclaimer had to be a part of
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the expense policy, and it had to be a part of the upgrade

2

policy that was to control those documents.

3

We know from the Sanderson case, which involved an

4

oral statement by a bank officer, "Take the time you need, get

5

yourself better, you can come back when you feel better," that

6

there was an expense —

7

manual, it had a disclaimer, the oral agreement superseded

8

that.

9

contracts that we've alleged.

10

excuse me, that there was an employment

There was no disclaimer with respect to any of the

With respect to the consideration argument, continued

11

employment provides the necessary consideration.

12

Fransisconi was prevented from further performance. His

13

further performance was (inaudible) in other words his

14

continued employment, but that was rejected and he wasn't

15

allowed to continue to be employed.

16

consideration issue here.

17

Gene

We don't think there's a

With respect to the first cause of action — excuse

18

me, the first claim that goes to the expense policy, in-lieu of

19

policy in particular, the primary response on that is that

20

Johnson is on point.

21

Court, cert was denied, has not been applied by any other court

22

in the State of Utah.

23

facts. The plaintiff in that case was not terminated because

24

he used the drug policy.

25

take a drug test you may be terminated or disciplined if you

Johnson was not reviewed by the Supreme

To my mind it's distinguishable on its

It simply said that if we ask you to
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-19refuse to take that test.
Gene Fransisconi was terminated, and they've
admitted —

and this is subject to an interrogatory, he wasn't

terminated he used the expense policy.

One of the critical

distinctions between Johnson and Mr. Fransisconi's situation is
that Gene Fransisconi could not perform his job unless he used
that expense policy.

It was a necessary intregal part of his

job, he spent 5 0 percent of his time on the road throughout the
nine state area, his area of responsibility (inaudible)
necessarily that that became an implied part of that employment
contract, the expense policy.
Metcalf, we believe, is directly on point. Yes, it is
an Idaho Supreme Court decision, but the facts are especially
relevant; therefore, we think it certainly should have some
persuasive authority.
With respect to the upgrade policy, what seems to be
the upgrade policy of Gene Fransisconi was delivered in 1994
(inaudible).

At the time he was delivered that —

by the way,

I should parenthetically say that Union Pacific has referred to
numerous references in their upgrade policy to union employees,
et cetera, but it doesn't cite anywhere in its memoranda the
so-called provisions in which should have alerted Mr.
Fransisconi to the fact that this didn't apply to him. I think
necessarily we confer that they don't exist for that reason.
Arthur Shoener, the vice president of Union Pacific,
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was asked where in this upgrade policy does it say that it

2

doesn't apply to Gene Fransisconi.

3

provision.

4

correspondence, any written communication to Gene Fransisconi

5

or any other employee that the upgrade policy didn't apply to

6

someone like Gene.

7

defendants have come forward —

8

forward with are two obscure letters between a union official

9

and somebody else, which they have not demonstrated in any way

10
11

He couldn't identify any

Mr. Shoener was asked to identify any

He couldn't identify it. All the
all that the defendant has come

was ever disclosed to Gene Fransisconi.
Now whether the Union Pacific policy was that this

12

applied to a manger or not may be probative, but it certainly

13

isn't dispositive. All that matters with respect to the issue

14

in question, which is was there a unilateral contract, is what

15

did Union Pacific communicate to Gene Fransisconi, and all that

16

Gene Fransisconi had before-him was this upgrade policy ever

17

sent to him at a time when he didn't supervise anybody.

18

hasn't supervised anybody as a training officer since 1976. He

19

gets his, he doesn't have any reason to get it, he doesn't

20

handle union employees or anybody else.

21

looks at the front page, he looks at the rest of it. It

22

appears to him that he qualifies.

23

they have not come forward with any evidence that Gene was

24

informed of anything else throughout the duration of his

25

employment.

He

He looks at it, he

Gary Lottman in his — and
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-21Now we took the depositions of Alan Hill, Gene's
replacement, and Alan Hill testified he thought it applied to
him as well.

Clearly there is a question of fact as to whether

this upgrade policy applied to someone in his position or not.
In any event, Gary Lottman could certainly raise the
issue in the interview.

Neil Vargoson, the most senior person

there who was in Gene's direct line of authority.

He in fact

was standing in for a vice president in that meeting also
admitted that he discussed the issue, and I believe it was Mr.
Vargoson, actually, who testified that he raised it as some
kind of indicia of the seriousness of Gene's alleged
violations.
So they've admitted that certainly it was discussed.
Gene didn't just grab this out of thin air. He was offered
upgrade and as part of his agreement to sign this confession.
With hindsight, signing that confession admittedly, I think —
certainly if I was his attorney and I was advising him at the
time I would have told him not to sign it. Under the duress of
the situation he did, we're dealing with it.
By the way, we think that that statement just simply
goes to weight.

Certainly they cited —

they've tried to refer

the Court to the criminal laws with respect to the withdrawal
of a confession.
relevant.

We simply don't believe that that's at all

That's a question for the jury to decide and

attribute weight to it or not. We've disavowed it, we don't
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-22think that it certainly should be controlling here.
• Gene only had the upgrade policy before him.

We think

that it's a question of fact as to whether that created an
implied in-fact contract. We think that Alan Hill's belief
that it applied to him necessarily proves positive that no
reasonable juror —
to apply —

and that's the standard that this Court has

Alan Hill believed it, and certainly it cannot be

said that no reasonable juror could conclude that Union Pacific
had unilaterally offered him terms of employment other than atwill with respect to the upgrade policy, and we think for that
reason it should go to a jury, at least on the upgrade policy.
Now Sanderson is on point with respect to the
interview.

He signed this, I will — you can keep your job.

The consideration is Gene would have been continuing
employment.

He was prevented from continuing to be employed.

All that they've —

they've tried (inaudible) opposition to

that is a disclaimer, which again, we think is under the law is
clearly not to be applied.

Sanderson again is on point. With

respect to the promise upgrade or resign, same situation,
Sanderson controls.
- THE COURT:
MR. BURNS:

Thank you.
Mr. Darger goes first.
Let me — does the Court have any question

about the contracts?
THE COURT: No.
MR. BURNS:

Thank you.
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MR. DARGER:

Your Honor, just briefly I want to run

2

down these other causes of action. First off on the public

3

policy issue, your Honor, I don't think there's any question

4

but that the issue of continued health coverage for people who

5

leave one job and go to another or are terminated is the issue

6

of substantial public policy, and that that is codified not

7

only in the federal law of COBRA, but in state laws.

8
9

That is, I think, goes without saying it's a clear and
substantial one. The issues here that they seem to be

10

attacking on that are that it didn't apply to his firing, but

11

the cases that they cite clearly indicate that the basis for a

12

public policy claim is that the conduct must bring the public

13

policy into play, and I believe here today, your Honor, that

14

their allegation is that his conduct was gross misconduct, and

15

that's why they had a right to deny COBRA, and they spent this

16

period of time trying to decide whether or not they were going

17

to do that.

18

of whether or not he was going to be covered into play.

19

So his conduct clearly brought the public policy

The other issue was that the conduct which brings the

20

public policy into play was a cause of his firing, and again,

21

the cause of his firing, by their own admission, is this

22

supposed gross misconduct.

23

it does meet those prongs, that essentially what they did was

24

they determined, "Hey, we are going to — we want this guy to

25

sign this resignation.

I would suggest to your Honor that

We're going to yell and scream that
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he's engaged in this gross misconduct and threaten him, that if

2

he doesn't he's not going to have any coverage," and that ,v

3

conduct that they claim was gross misconduct is exactly what

4

brought the whole issue of COBRA into play, and I think that it

5

does meet the test set out in Utah case law, your Honor.

6

Secondly on the fraud issue, they claim that it has to

7

presently exist imminent material fact, and that future

8

employment is not a presently existing fact.

9

suggest to the Court that the presently existing material fact

I would just

10

at issue here is not future employment, but the presently

11

existing prospect of immediate termination that was present

12

during that meeting, that he was facing immediate termination,

13

and in reliance upon their representations, he filled out a

14

statement in order to save his job.

15

*

They said there was no detrimental reliance.

I can't

16

think what's more detrimental than to first off sign a

17

statement where you admit after 25 years of service to this

18

company and loyal exemplary service where you admit that you

19

cheated the company. And that's in the face of your father's

20

40 years with the company and your grandfather's 25 years with

21

the company.

22

Fransisconi, and nevertheless after doing so and after all of

23

these threats he continued to refuse to resign and immediately

24

disavowed that statement.

25

facts and the reliance are present in this case, your Honor.

I'd suggest that that was very detrimental to Mr.

The presently existing material
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The third issue, defamation, Mr. Fransisconi does not

2

admit that he cheated, and I know that the Court doesn't think

3

much of his excuses about these items.

4

Court Mr. Fransisconi is making $60,000 a year plus benefits,

5

that according to our economist, add up to about $90,000 a

6

year.

7

buy maxi pads and to cheat on his expense accounts.

8

is up there, his mother just died, and his father is there, so

9

now he's staying with his father.

I'd suggest to the

His kids are raised, they're gone.

He doesn't need to
His father

He's been paying 50 bucks a

10

night to stay at the Cotton Tree Motel up there, and instead

11

what he's doing is he's staying with his father.

12

father shopping under the in-lieu of policy, which, by the way,

13

allows cash.

14

that.

15

come up I want you guys to have what you need, and I have a

16

girlfriend now that's coming over," and it's his father's

17

decision.

18

He takes his

And his father says, "I want this and I want

I want to stock my bathrooms because when you people

I suggest to the Court that maybe in hindsight it was

19

stupid that he would do that, but Mr. Fransisconi did not

20

(inaudible) to cheat to get deodorant and maxi pads.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. DARG2R:

Him needing to cheat isn't—
I understand that, your Honor, I

23

understand that, but after 25 years with that company and to do

24

something like that, it just doesn't add up, and I would

25

suggest that a reasonable jury would say, "Well, maybe that is
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something that at that time was reasonable.

2

and says, 'Let's go shopping, let's go down to CostCo, and I

3

want this and I want that.' What's he going to say, 'No, Dad,

4

you can't have it.

5

plant is what is appropriate.'"

6

to his father, his father could have gone shopping at CostCo by

7

himself, same results.

8
9

Maybe his dad goes

I have to buy you a plant instead because a
He could have given the cash

But nevertheless, your Honor, I think that overall and
particularly given the fact that Mr. Johnson reviewed all of

10

those statements never asking once, "What's this about, how

11

come there is no detail here?"

12

them, he sent them on, that over a period of time not only the

13

receipts that were shortened and excised, but also receipts

14

that didn't have any details because they were a credit card

15

slip.

16

He reviewed them, he approved

Anyway, as to the defamation, there were only several

17

people in that room that day who accused Mr. Fransisconi of

18

being a thief, and yet here's Tom Hague now, a manager of Union

19

Pacific down in Los Angeles telling Barbara Tower up in

20

Seattle, "Mr. Fransisconi is a thief, and he was terminated for

21

stealing."

22

Mr. Hague got that information was from one of the people in

23

that meeting.

24

that, then Mr. Hague as a manger of Union Pacific certainly has

25

the —

I suggest that the inference is the only place that

If they're closed mouthed and they're saying

is in a position to bind the company.
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With regard to the intentional infliction, your Honor,

2

here is a man for 25 years starting out of high school, he has

3

no educational training other than his career with the railroad

4

for 25 years, and one day he goes to this meeting and he's told

5

that he's a liar and a thief, and he goes, "Okay, well, what do

6

I do to save my job?"

7

thing, and now guess what, you're out of here.

8

resignation.

9

by railroad police officers, he's met at the airport. This is

10

a man who's been a manager, who's been the regional director of

11

safety exemplary employee for 25 years. They take away his

12

keys, won't let him go back to the office, they check out his

13

house, get the camera and things out of his house, and then he

14

starts getting phone calls and pressure from Union Pacific,

15

"You better sign that thing because not only are we going to

16

deny you COBRA, but,-you're not going to get your vacation pay,

17

we're not going to pay you your last month's rent, and we're

18

going to prosecute you criminally, and we're going to have your

19

father's house searched and your relatives' houses searched,"

20

and on and on and on.

21

Then they say, "Okay, you sign this
Here is your

You sign that." They take him back accompanied

You know, when I took over this case, your Honor, I

22

sat there and said, "Now why would Union Pacific do this?"

23

facts as I see them simply say that f i r s t off it's very unclear

24

as to what the in-lieu of policy provides, and why didn't

25

somebody just say, "Hey, we want this information and that's
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not right. We've got 25 years invested in you, Mr.

2

Fransisconi, and we've never told you before, in fact we've

3

been approving it, but we're telling you now you shouldn't be

4

doing that even if your father wants to."

5

clear here, and don't do it anymore. No, that didn't happen.

6

I mean let's get it

I'm saying to myself, "Why did this happen and why did

7

they get rid of this exemplary employee?"

That's when after I

8

took depositions in Omaha and we're sitting there, and it turns

9

out it's Mr. Shoener who had Mr. Fransisconi fired.

It was his

10

decision.

11

Fransisconi says, "I don't get this at all.

12

Mr. Shoener liked me.

13

because he used to tell me about this woman I went out with who

14

he used to go out with as well."

15

"Really?"

16

We were sitting there in a restaurant and Mr.
I mean I thought

I mean we used to sit around and talk

I looked at him and I go,

And as it turns out in taking Ms. Tower's deposition,

17

not only was she Mr. Shoener's mistress before, but after Mr.

18

Fransisconi's firing, and unbeknownst to him, he had been

19

having a relationship with the executive vice president of

20

Union Pacific's mistress. That to me provided the why in this

21

case, and that is the kind of behavior that I think is

22

outrageous.

23

If you have an opportunity to listen to Mr. Shoener's

24

testimony you'll find that he is a man of very large ego who

25

was very happy living in (inaudible) at the top of the Union
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-29Pacific building in Omaha where only the most powerful reside.
I suggest to the Court that a jury would think, "We know what's
going on here. We know why Mr. Fransisconi was terminated when
numerous other employees who actually lied and changed numbers
on receipts, who flew to Aspen to ski and then lied and said it
was some sort of business meeting, they were all caught and
'Oh, don't do that again.'

They're all working there."

Your Honor, finally, the argument of counsel that
Union Pacific has every right to do what it is legally — to
threaten to do to Mr. Fransisconi what it's legally entitled to
do.

Of course, they're talking about the COBRA, the vacation

and things like that. They cite a New York case, your Honor,
to the extent that you cannot claim that a coercion for doing
something you have a legal right to do.
But I suggest that the reason they cite a New York
case is because that is not the law in Utah.

The law in Utah

is set out in another case, a Utah case, and that is the case
of Athco Financial Services, and if I might approach the bench
I didn't have a copy of that case, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DARGSR:

The Athco case on the —

it's looks like

it's the third page back there says as follows:

"(inaudible)

has become when the defendant was in fact coercing" and this is
at the second paragraph at the top of the page, "was in fact
forced to sign a contract by lawful (inaudible) or threats. If
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plaintiff' s actions are lawful or unlawful or brought with

2

improper motive, he cannot be heard to say that he was merely

3

exercising a legal right." That's regardless of whether or not

4

he had the legal right to do it. Why did they make that

5

threat, and they go on to cite this case out of California,

6

"one has no right to threaten another in order to accomplish an

7

ulterior purpose with a grandless action or with an action to

8

enforce some just legal demand where the purpose is not to

9

enforce the demand but rather to — by exceeding the needs for

10

enforcement thereof or to meet the legal process as to oppose

11

his adversary and to cause some unnecessary hardship. A threat

12

to use the legal process constitutes duress where its coercive

13

effect is to overcome the freewill of the victim."

14

I suggest, your Honor, that the fact that he was never

15

prosecuted, the fact that he was eventually extended COBRA

16

is — creates an inference that the purpose that they were

17

making these threats were not because they were seriously

18

considering it, but the purpose was —

19

opportunity, listen to the recorded phone calls of Mr. Campbell

20

to Mr. Fransisconi, the purpose was clearly, clearly to coerce

21

Mr. Fransisconi into signing that separation agreement.

22

There's no question that Mr. Campbell knew Mrs. Fransisconi was

23

in need of surgery and had scheduled surgery for a non-elective

24

operation to avoid paralysis in her spine. That is the kind of

25

conduct that a jury would say is outrageous, your Honor. That

and if the Court has the
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-31is not merely heavy handed, that is the kind of conduct that is
made for this claim of intentional infliction.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Thank you. Mr. Waddoups?

MR. WADDOUPS:

There have been a number of points

raised, and I'll try and address them briefly.

First of all,

your Honor, concerning the first cause of action for breach of
contract, there's been a suggestion that somehow the in-lieu of
policy itself was a contract and that he couldn't be fired if
he used the in-lieu of policy the way that he was supposed to.
However, your Honor, when you look at the policy itself
contained in the expense reimbursement manual, it's clear that
it's talking about a reasonable and proper substitution for the
expense, it has to be supported by an original receipt. Your
Honor, a receipt that's been cut in half and put back together
to delete the description is not a proper description.
In addition to the —

excuse me, when you look in the

personal expense handbook, and we submitted this as an exhibit,
it's Exhibit D to our memorandum in support, this contains the
in-lieu of policy on page 13, and if you go a couple of pages
beyond to page 15 it has some additional information.

It's

very important to understand about what's authorized for use by
the company.
At the very top of the page it talks about business
gift expenses, and there it very clearly lays out that in order
for a business gift to be deductible by the company, the
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-32business gift can't exceed $25 per person per year.
IRS regulation.

That's an

In fact, Mr. Fransisconi gave thousands of

dollars worth of merchandise to his father, and through his
father to his wife, to his son, to his sister.
In addition to that, your Honor, on the same page 15
of the personal expense manual, it identifies some specific
items that are not reimbursable as expense.

Item No. 1 on that

list says, "Items that are submitted without an adequate
receipt or an explanation."
this case.

Your Honor, that's what we had in

It's very unfortunate Mr. Fransisconi was

terminated after 25 or 26 years with the company; however, it
was Mr. Fransisconi that was responsible for that.
Had Mr. Fransisconi clearly disclosed what he was
doing, and if he had really thought that it was appropriate, he
could have been corrected soon enough so that it wasn't —

it

didn't rise to the level that he had to be terminated for the
offense. But the real key is where he cuts the receipts,
actively conceals from his supervisor and from his others
what's going on.
Also, your Honor, on page 15 of the personal expense
handbook it talks about other non-reimbursable expenses. Item
No. 6 lists purchases of clothing or toiletries. Well, Mr.
Fransisconi purchased both, clothing that ended up being given
to his wife, and to others, and toiletries specifically
referenced there.
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-33THE COURT:

I'm pretty much with you on that, Mr.

Waddoups.
MR. WADDOUPS:
THE COURT:
up.

All right, thank you, your Honor.

He violated the policy and he covered it

I'd like to hear your response to Mr. Darger's argument,

because frankly, this $2,250, if I remember roughly, what the
audit showed that he took that he shouldn't have, it does feel
as if there was an overreaction here to that extent of the
problem, meeting with all of these people, going so far out of
the company's way to threaten him.

I understand big

organizations are afraid of these kinds of lawsuits and so they
like to create a paper trail. They wanted his admission to
what he had done wrong and wanted him to sign a separation
agreement.
But it still feels — actually, I don't like the
plaintiff's attempt to bring Ms. Tower in. Then it turns it
into some of these distasteful areas that we'd rather avoid, if
you can help it, but that sort of thing does seem more
reasonable as the basis for what does appear like an
overreaction than his (inaudible) cheating, which I believe he
did, there's no question about that.
MR. WADDOUPS:

Your Honor, let me address that

directly, then. Mr. Fransisconi was brought in in an audit of
the 200 largest expense accounts within the company.

When the

company was looking at the various results of these audits, it
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-34tried to classify the offenses into three general buckets.
The first one were things like, oh, just kind of bad
judgment or a mistake, an honest mistake would be the first
bucket that they identified.
The second bucket were things like poor business
judgment where people had claimed things or reported things
that were very poor business judgment, but really didn't rise
to the level of the intent to really deceive the company.
The third bucket that the company identified were
those cases in which there was an actual intent to conceal or
to deceive the company, showing some sort of culpability, and
those individuals who fell into category No. 3 were terminated
by the company.

It didn't matter whether they were responsible

for taking a very small amount, whether they were responsible
for taking a very large amount.

The fact is that the company

looked at that and said, "If we've got somebody who is
intentionally stealing from the company, we need to terminate
their employment," and that's what they did.
THE COURT:

There were others than just the plaintiff.

MR. WADDOUPS: Absolutely, your Honor. And you'll
recall, we went through the discovery disputes over this, and
the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to look at that. All
of those individuals who were categorized and category No. 3
were terminated, and that's the way that it worked out. Mr.
Fransisconi fell within there because of his active intent to
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deceive as demonstrated by the altered receipts, and that's

2

what resulted in it.

3

Just touch on a number of items here, your Honor. Mr.

4

Fransisconi again talks about the upgrade policy and he says,

5

"Hey, Alan Hill thought it applied to him."

6

case law is clear that a person's belief has to be reasonable.

7

When you look at Mr. Hill's deposition he says, "Well, yeah, I

8

thought it applied," but he didn't have any reason for why he

9

thought it might apply to him.

Your Honor, the

Later on he indicated, "Well,

10

he really didn't know for sure, but that's kind of what he

11

thought."

12

When you look at the upgrade policy itself, Mr.

13

Fransisconi says it doesn't have anything about how it doesn't

14

apply to him.

15

policy it states that all collective bargaining agreements

16

apply, it again makes a similar reference on pages 3, pages 4

17

of the upgrade policy.

18

Well, if you look on page 1 of the upgrade

The public policy, Mr. Darger talked about the public

19

policy cause of action and has attempted to resurrect that,

20

even though there's been no argument in the memorandum

21

associated with it. Then he says, "Well, insurance rights are

22

important, and that's surely an important public policy."

23

Honor, that's why COBRA is there, and in fact Mr. Fransisconi

24

was offered his COBRA continuation coverage, he declined it,

25

and Mrs. Fransisconi accepted it. What more can you say on it?
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He further talks about the fraud cause of action and

2

he says, "Well, I know what it was," Mr. Darger says, "He says

3

the presently existing fact was that Mr. Fransisconi faced

4

immediate termination and he wanted to be backed out of that

5

immediate termination."

6

argument, Mr. Fransisconi wasn't terminated on April 26th, he

7

was suspended.

8

agreement that would allow him to resign from the company

9

effective a month later, May 27th, and he chose to reject it.

10
11

Well, your Honor, if you look at that

He was subsequently given a proposed separation

So as far as the fraud argument, it's just simply not there. ;. ...
Similar with the defamation cause of action, there's

12

this alleged remark by Tom Hague somewhere in California to

13

someone else that Mr. Fransisconi had been cheating.

14

just nothing there.

15

There is

Your Honor, in addition, counsel cites this Athco

16

Finance case, and I have to admit, your Honor, I haven't seen

17

that before it was handed to me at counsel table, it wasn't

18

cited in the brief.

19

it appears to deal with the issue of whether or not a contract

20

is enforceable as a matter of duress.

21

Fransisconi did not accept the separation agreement, he did not

22

voluntarily resign from the company; therefore, it appears that

23

there would be no duress, and the legal standard that's cited

24

there doesn't seem to apply specifically.

25

But in my very quick reading of that case

In this case Mr.

Finally, your Honor, turning back to the intentional
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-37infliction of emotional distress claim, again, your Honor, we
dispute many of the claims that Mr. Fransisconi makes in
support of this.

The strongest one, it seems to be, this COBRA

offering, and I'd just kind of like to go through the timeline
to conclude on that.
First of all, the interview in Omaha where Mr.
Fransisconi was confronted and asked to explain his conduct .
regarding his expense accounts occurred on April 26th of 1996.
Mr. Fransisconi was then taken out of service, in essence
suspended pending a formal decision.
On May 1st Mr. Fransisconi was informed that his
employment was going to be terminated and that the company was
sending him a proposed separation agreement, and advised him to
consult with an attorney.

He received the proposed separation

agreement on May 2nd, which again, called for him to
voluntarily resign effective May 27th.

He was given up until

May 17th to either accept or reject that proposed agreement.
He rejected it on May 17th.
Now here's something that's particularly confusing,
was that Mrs. Fransisconi had surgery scheduled for June 5th of
1996, so more than two months after Mr. Fransisconi was
interviewed in Omaha.

According to the company's records the

COBRA coverage continuation letter was sent on June 7th of
1997.

Mr. Fransisconi declined the coverage, but his wife

accepted the coverage on June 21st, I believe, is the date
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there.

2

Your Honor, the way that that COBRA continuation

3

coverage works is an employee is covered under a group medical

4

insurance plan.

5

company they are no longer covered under the plan-

6

under the COBRA law, certain qualified employees and their

7

dependents are offered continuation coverage for a period of

8

time at their own expense. That continuation coverage is

9

normally offered within 3 0 days after the termination of

10

When they are no longer employed by the
However,

employment.

11

The employee is then given a 60 day period during

12

which to consider the offer, and they can either accept or

13

reject at any time during that 60 day period after they've

14

received a notice, and once they're received the notice, the

15

coverage becomes retroactive and it goes right back to the date

16

of termination when their coverage otherwise ended.

17

And that's exactly what happened in this case. Mr.

18

Fransisconi was offered COBRA continuation coverage, he

19

declined and his wife accepted, the coverage became

20

retroactive, and Mrs. Fransisconi's surgery was covered, and

21

she admits in her deposition that all of the expenses were

22

paid.

23

With that, your Honor, unless there are other specific

24

questions that the Court has, we'd like to go ahead and submit

25

it on that for the reasons that we've stated.

We think that
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-39it's clear that none of the causes of actions that have been
alleged are really ripe to go to a jury at all, that no
reasonable jury could find on that basis, and we'd ask for
summary judgment on all points. To the extent that the Court
may believe that there are some issues, we'd request partial
summary judgment.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Waddoups.
under advisement.

The matter is

I'll get back to you with a ruling as soon

as possible.
I assume you want your original upgrade policy back.
MR. WADDOUPS:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

I have a copy in the materials you've

provided me. What about these two receipts?
MR. DARGER:

Thank you, your Honor.

There is one

issue that I think the record needs to be corrected on, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DARGER:

That is that we have evidence of numerous

individuals who would be involved in this so-called third
category who falsified records that were not terminated, and
this was not really briefed in any of the briefs, but we've got
a whole stack of them.

If the Court recalls, we had to fight

and actually come into court to get that information, but that
is clearly a misrepresentation of the facts in that regard.
THE COURT:

If you'd love to file something responding
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-40to that, something very brief, say, five pages to supplement,
you may do that within the next 10 days and I'll take this
i

under advisement.
MR. DARGER:
THE COURT:

Thank you, we appreciate that.
You can have a day to respond to his if

you would.
MR. WADDOUPS:

Thank you, your Honor.

(Hearing concluded)
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APPENDIX I
Copy of Union Pacific Personal Expense Reimbursement Form
Submitted by Gene Francisconi on or about
July 6, 1995
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APPENDIX J
Union Pacific General Rules for Administering
Discipline Effectively (UPGRADE Policy)
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PGRADE
POLICY
Union Pacific General Rules for
Administering Discipline
Effectively

Effective July 1, 1994
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DSON

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
m 6 D O 0 G £ STREET
OMAHA. NEBRASKA 681 79

i AND

CUTivE OFFICER

May 27, 1994

ear Fellow Employee:
On July 1, 1994, Union Pacific will begin implementation of a new
mployee Discipline Policy, called UPGRADE, (Union Pacific's General Rules for__
jministering Discipline Effectively), across the entire railroad system. UPGRADE has
>en tested in a pilot project for the last eighteen months on three service units, some
r
stem maintenance-of-way gangs, the Harriman Dispatching Center and one
:omotive shop. The positive results of the pilot justify the decision to implement
D
GRADE system wide.
The goal of UPGRADE is to establish a Discipline Policy that is fair,
nsistent and effective, with an emphasis on corrective action and training rather than
punitive discipline. That goal was achieved during the pilot project. Specifically,
5 UPGRADE pilot was very successful in that discipline in these areas was reduced
d understanding of, and compliance with, the rules has increased. Such results
mplement our efforts in the areas of safety, employee satisfaction and cost control.
As I mentioned, the start-up date for system implementation is July 1.
ere will be an UPLINC BTV broadcast on June 7th,at 10:30 a.m., to provide an
erview of the Policy for all employees. This program will be rebroadcast on
:cessive shifts on June 7th and again on June 9th. A more detailed BTV Broadcast
UPGRADE will follow late in June for managers and Labor representatives.
The accompanying copy of the UPGRADE Policy is for your information and
erence. It would be beneficial when attending one of the BTV Broadcasts to bring
' Policy with you. Any questions concerning UPGRADE should be directed to Lee
ach, Director-Operating Practices and UPGRADE Coordinator, Room 625, Omaha.
Again, based on the pilot results, I'm optimistic the new UPGRADE Policy will
lieve its goals and will be a benefit for all employees and the company.

Sincerely,
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UPGRADE Discipline Policy
erview
xjuction

UPGRADE is intended to strvt as a consistent, less punitive, yet progressive
method of documenting discipline problems and modifying behavior, with
the objective of ensuring that problem behavior does not recur.

ctlve

July 1, 1994

cy
jellnes

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•

All collective bargaining agreements apply.
~
All possible rule violations, except certain Level 5 violations, must be reviewed with the Employee prior to implementing UPGRADE discipline
procedures.
Employees must be allowed to discuss the terms of the discipline with
union representation.
Managers are encouraged to verbally counsel Employees, when appropriate.
For implementation, all Employees will enter the UPGRADE system at
Discipline Level 0. Level 3 or 4 violations will, however, initiate a
review of Discipline History for the preceding 36 months and this history
will be considered in determining discipline to be assessed for the current
infraction. In any case, discipline to be assessed for any infraction will
be determined using the UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table and the
Progressive Discipline Table following procedures on page 3 of this
policy.
Following implementation, current discipline status is established when
discipline is issued. All non-dismissal disciplinary action clears after 36
months without another violation.
The charging Manager shall not be the hearing Manager in any case.
Existing policy and procedures pertaining to Rule 1.5 (Rule "G") violations- shall continue to be followed and such cases shall be considered
Level 5 violations.
Corrective Action Plans are required for all Employees assessed discipline at Levels 2, 3, or 4.
Discipline cases for Level 5 violations will be reviewed for consistent
policy application by an Executive Committee consisting of Representatives from Human Resources, Labor Relations, and the Employing
Department.
FRA Engineer Certification Requirements, with regard to suspension of
certificate for certain rules infractions, are not preempted by this policy.
The UPGRADE Coordinator will be consulted before an Employee is
charged with a Level 5 offense, other than for Rule 1.5 (Rule "G").
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Initiating the UPGRADE Process

Introduction

When possible, the Manager will conduct an initial review of an incident
with the Employee in order to build an understanding of the incident, not to
determine guilt. The Manager will:

Procedure

1. Prepare Manager ponion of Form 1 (Incident Review).
Note:

Form 1 must not be used in a formal hearing or investigation.

2. Ensure that Employee understands the purpose of the Form 1 Review
(see Introduction).
.. 3. Review Manager's understanding of the incident with the Employee as
documented on Form 1.
4. Obtain Employee's version of the incident for Form 1.
Note:

The Incident Review can be conducted over the phone or in person
by having the Employee complete Form 1 in person.

5. The following information should be used as a guideline in completing
Form 1:
•

What happened?

•

Who was involved?

•

Where and when did the incident occur?

•

Do not cite rule violations.

•

No accusations are to be made.

6. The Manager will then determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
continue the UPGRADE process?
if NO,

Form 1 is destroyed and the Employee notified of the decision
not to issue charge.

if YES, Employee is notified of the decision to charge the Employee
and proceed with the UPGRADE process.
Note:

Verbal counseling may be used in some cases by the Manager.
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etermining Discipline Levei

reduction

If the UPGRADE process is to continue upon completion of the Incident
Review, the Manager must complete Form 2, determining the discipline level
to be assessed by consulting applicable rule books, the UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table and, when applicable, the Progressive Discipline
Table. The Manager will:

Dcedure

1. Determine the alleged rule violation using applicable rule book.
2. Complete Form 2 as follows:

~

a. Specify the rule(s) violation(s) in Section One.
b. Check or list the applicable ruie(s) or policy publication(s) (Section One).
c. Determine the level of the alleged rule violation by reviewing the UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table (pages 6 - 7) and complete Section
Two.
d. Obtain the Employee's current discipline status and/or history from PINS
(PNX 034) and complete Section Three.
1) For Level 1 or 2 violations, review PENS Discipline History for 36
months or to effective policy date whichever is less.
2) For Level 3 or 4 violations, review PINS Discipline History for 36
months in all cases.
3) Determine current discipline status by applying the UPGRADE Discipline
Assessment Table to the highest level violation contained in the Discipline History. Discipline History Prior To Policy Effective Date will be
assigned status no greater than Level 3.
e. Determine whether violation resulted in property damage (SI50,000) or a
Lost Work Day Personal Injury requiring next higher level of discipline.
f. Using the UPGRADE Progressive Discipline Table on page 8, complete
Section Four (using information in Sections Two and Three).
g. When applicable, complete and attach waiver portion of Form 5 (Engineer
Certification SuspensionyRevocation Notice).
3. Prepare the Notice of Investigation consistent with applicable Collective
Bargaining Agreements and attach it to Form 2.
Note: If the discipline level assessed is the result of an Investigation or
Formal Hearing, Form 3 will then be completed with the information
from Form 2 and evidence developed at the hearing. When applicable,
complete and attach the Following Hearing portion of Form 5.
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Discussing Discipline with an Employee

Introduction

This portion of UPGRADE pertains to the effective communication that
must take place between the Employee and Manager. The intent of this
communication is to ensure complete understanding of the rule violation, the
discipline called for under UPGRADE, and the Employee's options. The
Manager will:

Procedure

1. Explain to the Employee the UPGRADE process and the discipline
assessment by reviewing Form 2 (Sections One - Four) for all Level 1-4
cases. A formal hearing is required for Level 5 cases. (Except some
Rule 1.5 cases.)
. /'. > -

\

2. Discuss options available to the Employee.
OPTION A:

Accept discipline as explained.

OPTION B:

Proceed to Formal Hearing.

Note: The Employee may talk with a union representative prior to selecting
an option.
3. Obtain the Employee's signature associated with the option selected.
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he Corrective Action Plan

ltroduction

A Corrective Action Plan is required for all Level 2, 3, or 4 discipline
assessments. The Corrective Action Plan will be used by the Manager and
the Employee to address how the unacceptable behavior is to be modified.
The Correcnve Action Plan should be creatively designed to meet the
requirements of the UPGRADE policy and satisfy the needs of the Employee
and the Company. The use of the Corrective Action Plan is considered
development, not punishment. To develop the Corrective Action Plan, the
Manager will:

rocedure

l.

Discuss the purpose of Form 4, The Corrective Action Plan, with the
Employee.

2.

Describe the behavior to be modified by the Employee and suggest how
Employee may modify the behavior.

3.

Ask the Employee to describe their suggestions on how they plan to
change or modify their behavior.

4.

Identify the training or helpful ideas required to modify the behavior
with the Employee.

5.

Establish review dates and a completion target for the action plan.

6.

Review the requirements of the action plan with the Employee.

NOTE: In the event an agreement cannot be reached for a Corrective
Action Plan, the Manager has the responsibility to set an appropriate plan.
7.

Sign and date Form 4, the Corrective Action Plan.

8.

Obtain the Employee's signature and the date on the Corrective Action
Plan.

9.

Provide the Employee with a copy of the completed Corrective Action
Plan, Form 4.

10. Review Corrective Action Plan periodically for compliance.
11. Upon completion of the Corrective Action Plan, note completion and
place the form into the Employee's record.
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The UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table
Introduction

To determine the discipline level of the current rule infraction, use the
following table to find the rule violated and the level of discipline which that
rule infraction calls for. The significance of this table is demonstrated by
the consistency of the application of discipline.

Table

UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table

•-•'•':\^-:':'-AC-'''

Results in '-. .
j Level A j Discipline

1 Violation of these rules *
General Code of Operating Rules
• Chapter 1.0 General Responsibilities
- Chapter 2.0 Railroad Radio Rules
- Chapter 3.0 Standard Time
• Chapter 4.0 Timetables
• Chapter 5.0 Sicnais & Their Use
UPRR Safety Rules (Ch. 70-83)
I Maintenance of Way Rules (Ch. 56)
General Code of Operating Rules
- Rule 1.1 4 Condition of Tools and Equipment
• Rule 1.2.5 Reporting
• Rule 1.9 Resold of Railroad Co.
- Rule 1.11 Si&spmg
- Rule 1.13 Comply vsirth Instructions
- Rule 1.33 inspection of Freight Cars
• Ruie 2.5 Comm. Not Unde'siood—
- Rule 5.3.3 Signal Disippsararice
• Rule 5.4-5.5 Rags and Signs (Placement)
• Chapter 6.0 Movement of Trains and Engines
- Chapter 7.0 Switching
- Chapter 8.0 Switches
Train Dispatcher Rules (Ch. 20-26)
Air Brake and Train Handling Rules (Ch. 30-34)
Maintenance of Way Rules (Ch. 40-55 L 57)
- Rules 1.3.1 & 1.3.3 (Chiei Engrs. last., Proc Manual & Stds.,
Signal Dept. FRA Insp. & M;ca. Instr., Book of Standards.)
UPRR Safety Rules • Cardinal Safety Rules1
- Rule 70.12 Safe Working Space
- Ruie 70.14 Lifting and Moving Materials
- Rule 70.32.7 Crossing Through Equipment
- Rule 71.1, 71.2, 71.4-71.6 Personal Protective Equipment
• Rule 80.21.3 Coupler-KnuckJe Adjustment
- Rule 80.21.7 Coupling Air Hoses
- Rule 81.1.1 Riding on Moving Equipment
- Rule 81.4 Getting OrvOff Equipment
- Rule 81.5 Face Ladders or Steps
- Rule 81.17 Hand Brakes
Timetable and Special Instructions
1

Employees a/6 responsible lor all Cardinal Safety
Rules which may apply to the nature of the work
being performed.

1

Letter of Reprimand

2

Up to one day of one round t r p
alternative assignment with pay
to develop a Corrective Action
Plan to modrfy behavior.
Pay will be in accordance with
Employe* Involvement GukkFines.

j
'
'

1

Where Chapter Numbert are thown, all Rules within Chapters) are Violation Level indicated EXCEPT FOR: Specific Rulw which may be feted
by rule number e\ a different level Where rule number* are shown it includes Sub-Rules unless specified otherwise. Rules mciude any
modification to rule through General Order, M of W General Order, SALERT, Timetable, of Timetable Special Instruction,

Any rule violation which resufts in $150,000 property damage or a Lost Work Day Personal Injury will receive the next higher level discipline.

For assessment d greater discipline when indicated per note
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UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table
Results in . .
Violation of \i)e$e rules *

Level A j Discipline

j

+•

|

General Code of Operating Ruies
- Ruie 2.13 (Radio) in Place of Hand Signals
- Ruie 5 3.7 Raoio Response
• Ruie 5.4 Reverse Movements
•
•

|

Ruie
Ruie
Ruie
Ruie

5.13
5.14
5.15
5.19

3

Yarc Limns
Restricted Lfmrts
Apcrc-acning Raiircad Crossings ..
Rag Protection

Frve days off work without pey
and may be required to review
rules which pertain to the specific
violations involved prior to returning to work. A Correctrve Action
Plan must be developed upon
return to work.

- Ruie 5.23 Emerce.ncv Stco or Severe Slack Action
• Ruie 5.29 inspecting Trains
• Rule 7.5 Testing Hand Brakes
- Ruie 7.5 Secunng Cars cr Engines
- Ruie 8.15 Swnches Run Through
- Rule 8.20 Deraji Location and Position
- Chapter 9.0 Block System Rules
- Chapter 10.0 Rules App. Only in CTC
- Chapter 11.0 Ruies App Oniy in ACS/ATS
- Chapter 12.0 Ruies App. Oniy in ATS
- Chapter 13.0 Ruies App. Only in ACS
- Chapter 14.0 Ruies App. Oniy within TWC
- Chapter 15 0 Track Bulletin Ruies
- Chapter 15.0 Ruies App. oniy in DTC
Maintenance of Way Ruies
- Chapter 42 On-Track Operations . . .
• Rule 43.10 Protecmo Aaainst Pass. Eauioment
- Rule 55.1.2 Testing tor Quality
General Code of Operating Ruies
- Rule 5 4-5.5 "tags & Signs (Speec & Stepping Requirements)
- Ruie 5.12 Protection of Occ Outfit Cars
• Ruie 5.13 Blue Signal Protection of Workmen
- Rule 5.14 Signs Protecting Equipment
- Ruie 5.2 lnruatmg Movement
• Ruie 5.3 Main Track Authorization
• Ruie 5.25 Movement Against Cum. of Traffic
- Rule 5.27 Movement at Restricted Speed
- Rule 5.31 Maximum Authorized Speed (when speed exceeds
authorized speed by 10 mph or 1/2 authorized speed, whichever is less)
- Ruie 9.5 Where Stop Must be Made (Except Rule 9.5.5)
- Rule 15.1 Track 3ulietms
• Rule 15.2 Protection by Track Bulletin Form B
- Rule 15.3 Auth. Movement Against Curr. Traffic
Maintenance of Way Rules
- Rule 55.1.3 Compromising Signal Safety
Timetable and SDecial Instructions
- Rules 245(n). 2*5(p), and 245(q)

4
j
1

4.5~

General Code of Operating Ruies
• Rule 1 i Drugs and Alcohol (Ruie "G'l
I • Rule 1.12 Weapons
I • Rule 1.6 Conduct. Employees must not be ... 1) Careless of
Safety; 3) Insubordinate; 4) Dishonest; 5) Immoral;
6) Quarrelsome
- Rule 1.7 Altercation
• Felony Conviction

5

Thirty days off work without pay
and must p a n necessary annual
operating rules or equivalent in
order to return to work. A Correctrve Action Plan must be developed upon return to work.

60 Days off work without pay and
must pass necessary annual operating rules or equivalent in order to return to work. A Corrective Action Plan must be developed upon return to work.*"

Permanent dismissal.

I

• Fraud

•Theft

__[

Where Chapter Numbers are shown, all Rules within Chapterts) are Violation Level indicated EXCEPT FOR: Specific Rules which may be listed by
rule number at a different level.

Where rule numbers are shown it includes Sub-Rules unless specified otherwise.

Rules include any

modification

to rule through General Order, M of W General Order, SALERT, Timetable, or Timetable Special Instruction.

Any rule violation which results in $150,000 property damage or a Lost Work Day Personal Injury will receive the next higher level discipline.

For assessment of greater discipline when indicated per note

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UPGRADE Progressive Discipline Table
Introduction

The level of discipline to be assessed for the current rule infraction, is
determined by referring to both the Progressive Discipline Table and the
UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table.

Progressive
Discipline
Table
i And the Current
I status is

If the Alleged Violation Level
is

Discipline

Then the Discipline Level to
Assess is

0
1

1

1

2

2

3

3

4

r

5

0

2

I

1

2

J

2
3

3
4

I
I

4'

5

2

~

1

3

2
3
4'
0
4

!

:

'
•

-

; :

,::•

I

r

•

2 "
3

4*

"

!

3
3
3
4
5
4
4

0

• ' 4

• , • • : • •

-

'

|

j

A
5

I
I
I
I
I
I
. I
••'••-••.:'•

.

:

••

•••••:-•'••'•'•/

••••••••••:

*

Ln cases where Level 4.5 discipline has been assessed, the discipline status is
considered Level 4 for the purpose of this table.

**

If the Employee's discipline status is Level 4 due to a single violation and the
current violation is Level 1 or 2, the discipline status will remain at Level 4.

:

NOTE: If an Employee commits three repetitions of the same rule infraction during a
36 month period (deluding missed calls) the discipline will be assessed at
Level 5 - Permanent Dismissal.
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lesponsibility Tables
itroduction

UPGRADE details specific responsibilities for the Managers who will be involved in the
process. The Responsibility Tables show the specific requirements of the process.

'ho takes
:tion
Level of Discipline

Action
1

Conduct interview
"Make Charge

Conduct Hearing

..

1-4

Manager A

5

Manager A

;

Enter Discipline In PINS

'-r-\^:;r^M:A

1-4

Manager B *

5

UPGRADE Coordinator or
Authorized Representative

1-4
Assess Discipline

Responsibility

5
1-5

~

Manaaer B *
UPGRADE Coordinator or
Authorized Representative
Core Person Designated By
Superintendent or Equivalent

Unless applicable collective bargaining stipulates otherwise.

-ocess
Action

Responsibility

•'•-•":-I

Manager A

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Initiates UPGRADE Process.
Determines Discipline Level.
Evaluates the Application of UPGRADE.
Discusses Discipline with the Employee.
Processes Completed Discipline Forms.

Manager B

6.
7.
8.

Conducts Level 1 - 4 Hearings.
Assesses Discipline Levels 1 - 4 .
Reports Discipline To core person for PINS entry.

UPGRADE
Coordinator

9.

Reviews Discipline Process Continually to Ensure
the Process is Meeting Policy Guidelines.
Conducts Level 5 Hearings or Assigns a
Representative.
Authorizes Assessment of Discipline at Level 5.

10.
11.
Executive
Committee

12.

Reviev/s Level 5 Discipline for consistent policy
application.

NOTE: Manager A, as the Charging Manager, may not be the Hearing Manager.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

|

Appeal Authorities
Introduction

UPGRADE provides a two step appeal process consistent with the provisions
of existing collective bargaining agreements. The table below explains who
has responsibility for handling those appeals.

Responslbllltles

Appeal
1
p

. 1 Discipline Level 1 - 5 :
| Superintendent or Equivalent
Labor Relations
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TOQArS

INCIDENT REVIEW
FORM 1

§

DATE

RLE NUMBER

Employee INFORMATION
ST MAIE

TTTU

HB£ DATE

RRST HUrfE / U

soc sec NCX

DEFLSEJMCE

WORK LOCATIOHGAXI

LHT

MANAGER'S COMMENTS

Employee's COMMENTS

U>UGSrS

SK>*TURE

Erncicr*^

AKD DATE

SGKA.TURE

ANO DATE

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
OCR, may
errors. 1RFS
^
^ , Machine-generated
I ^ D A H C HIQHDI
iwccontain
PPOr.Fni
l t r

n

B

TOOY-S

WAIVER/HEARING OFFER
FORM 2

CttTt

RLE KfLMB£R

Soc Sec No.

Lfett N V M

DapcServxa

thrt

Wort LoawarvG^g

Job T)fa

Krt C»»

Section One

Based on the facts brought forth in our discussion on
you are allegedly in violation of Rule(s)
found in the following Union Pacific Railroad pubiication(s)
Check the appropriate box:
•
Union Pacific Rules

•

Timetable

•
Other: (specify)
In connection with: (oescnbe incident)

Section Two

Under the UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table, the violation listed in Section
One requires a minimum discipline of LEVEL
.

Section Three

Disciplinary action within the past 36 months or since policy effective date, when
aoolicabie. (Rule and description)
DESCRIPTION OF VIOLATION

RULE

LEVEL

DATE

mis equates to a current discipline status of: LEVEL

Section Four

Under the UPGRADE Progressive Discipline Table, the current violation plus the
current discipline status require the assessment of: LEVEL
.
The violation
Did
Did Not result in an incident which requires
assessment of the next higher level of discipline. Therefore, the required
discipline for this violation is: LEVEL
.

Section Five
Check the
appropriate
box:

D

Eropiorw

•

cmciorw

kUH^GEJTS

SGNATUBE

OPTION A: I, the undersigned
violation(s) with the responsible
right to union representation in
pline listed above and to waive
SIGNATURE

Employee, have discussed the alleged
manager and have been afforded a
making my decision to accept the disciany rights to a formal investigation.
WTE

OPTION B: I, the undersigned Employee, have discussed the alleged '
violation(s) with the responsible manager and do not agree with the
facts or the recommended discipline. I understand that a formal investiaation will be held to review all the facts of these alleaations.
SOiATURc

OTE

Dtfl
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TOOY-S

ASSESSMENT OF DISCIPLINE
AFTER FORMAL INVESTIGATION
FORM 3

n

LAST NAME

SECTION
ONE

SECTION
TWO

FILE NUMBER

RRST NAME/' Ui

JOS TITLE

j

HIRE W 7 I

DEFT;

ScRVJCc

CKTE

SOC.

LJNiT

S£C. NO.

WO*K L O O T O N

/ O^G

As a result of facts developed in the investigation held on
you were in violation of Ruie(s)
Union Pacific Railroad publication(s):

found in the following

Check the appropriate box:
D
Union Pacific Rules

•

Timetable

D

Other:

(specify)

Violation Summary:.

Under the UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table, these violations require a minimum
assessment of Level
SECTION
THREE

discipline.

I Disciplinary action within the past 36 montns or since the policy effective date, where
I_applicable. (Rule and Description):

HUL£#

LEVEL

DESCRIPTION OF VIOLATION

DATE

This record equates to a current discipline status of LEVEL
SECTION
FOUR

I Under the UPGRADE Progressive Discipline Table, the current violation plus your current
discipline status require an assessment of LEVEL
discipline.
This violation
Did
Did Not result in an incident requiring the assessment of
next higher level of discipline. Therefore, the required discipline for this violation is:
Level
.
M^UGcRS

SJOWTURE

C*Tt

SECTION
FIVE
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Employee

i

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
FORM 4

RLE NO.

j SOCIAL SECURITY

NAME:

NO.

1 SECTION
ONE

MANAGER: Describes the behavior to be modified by the Employee pertaining to
this incident

1 SECTION
TWO

Employee: Describes the specific actlon(s) or steps to be taken to accomplish the
required change In behavior,

[SECTION
THREE

Employee and MANAGER: Identity any specific training or other instruction
needed to achieve the required change In behavior,

1 SECTION
FOUR

MANAGER: Identify all review dates tor checking progress toward completion of
the behavioral change and/or the specific deadline for completion.

-•••:
•^•^ ;

We have read these statements and agree that they satisfactorily list the responsibilities for the successful
completion of this Corrective Action Plan.
1 RESPONSIBLE

MANAGER

SIGNATURE

1 Eroioyee

SIGNATURE

DATE

~

"~~~|

1
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TODAY'S

I

•ioyee NAME

ENGINEER CERTIFICATION
SUSPENSION/REVOCATION NOTICE
FORM #5
(attachment

to Form 2 or 3)

DATE

FILE NO.

SOCIAL SECURITY

NUMBER

CTION
E

Please be advised if you accept discipline, you will no longer meet the
qualification requirements for the position of Locomotive Engineer, as
specified by the Federal Railroad Administration in 49 CFR Part 240.

>IVER

This decision is based on violations listed on Form 2/3 as they relate to
49 CFR 240.
, the applicable portion which reads:

apts
Diine
ense
:ation)

As required by 49 CFR 240.307, Union Pacific Railroad is mandated to
revoke your locomotive engineer certification. As provided in Part 240.117
paragraph G, the pertinenf period of revocation imposed is
month,
year(s), or ineligible for certification during EAP.

:TION

o

-LOWERING

In Consideration of findings of the hearing on
(Date),
you no longer meet the qualification requirements for the position of
Locomotive Engineer, as specified by the Federal Railroad Administration in
49 CFR Part 240.
This decision is based on findings sustained at the hearing as they
relate to 49 CFR 240.
, the applicable portion which reads:

ipiine
ssed
ense
<ed)

As required by 49 CFR Part 240.307, Union Pacific Railroad is mandated to revoke your locomotive engineer certification. As provided in Part
240.117 paragraph G, the pertinent period of revocation imposed is
month,
year(s), or ineligible for certification during EAP.
have read this statement and agree that it satisfactorily lists- the requirements for
;pension / Revocation of Engineer's Certification.
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GLOSSARY
The following definitions, while not all inclusive or absolute, are intended to
guide the determination of whether various acts by Employees meet necessary criteria
to be considered a violation of applicable Level 5 Rules.

ALTERCATION

When an Employee's actions cause or result in a vehement quarrel characterized by physical activity such as
pushing, shoving, or fighting.

CARELESS OF SAFETY

When an Employee's actions demonstrate an inability
or an unwillingness to comply with safety rules as
evidenced by repeated safety rule infractions.

DISHONEST

When an Employee's actions or statements constitute
stealing, lying, cheating, or deceiving the Company.

FRAUD

When an Employee's actions or statements are an
intentional misrepresentation of fact for the purpose of
deceiving others so as to secure unfair or unlawful
gain.

IMMORAL

When an Employee's actions are contrary to commonly
accepted moral principles.

INSUBORDINATION

When an Employee's actions or statements indicate a
refusal to carry out the clear instructions of a supervisor (as opposed to a failure for cause) which are work,
safety, or policy-related and which conform to accepted
Company and industry practice, or when an Employee
demonstrates gross disrespect towards a supervisor.

NOTE:

Any failure to comply with Union Pacific's Drug and.
Alcohol or Equal Employment Opportunity Policies will
be construed as insubordination.

QUARRELSOME

When an Employee's continued behavior is inclined or
disposed toward an angry verbal confrontation with
others in the work place.

THEFT

When an Employee's action is intended to and/or results in the taking and/or removing of property or other
items of value from the Company, it's customers, or
other Employees without proper authority.
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